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Introduction
Literature related with multinational corporations is voluminous. But a perfect
cognizance of multinational corporations is far from accomplished. In other words,
it is far early to say that it is time to terminate studies with regard to multinational
corporations. We still have a lot to do on the way of pursuing a better understanding
of their behavior. Based on the objective point, composing this dissertation is in
order for paying its own contribution to the ocean of knowledge in multinational
corporations theory and related theoretical issues.
In the academia, the widely cited source literature about multinational corpora-
tions is countable. Among the most classical, one can find they are Hymer (1976),
Buckley and Casson (1976), Dunning (1977, 1980, 1981, 1988) and Rugman (1980).
These works intend to explain why a multinational corporation would exist and
what drives foreign direct investment (FDI), where Dunning’s in particular have
done a valuable synthesis, leading to the famous OLI (ownership advantage-location
advantage-internalization advantage) paradigm.
On the one hand, these theories are even not enough to throw lucidity upon the
most fundamental aspect – why a multinational corporation would exist, for the
reasons of FDI are far more than what have been described by them, let alone other
relevant ones as a result of existence of FDI1.
On the other hand, the theories of multinational corporations are, to a large ex-
tent, independent of international trade theory (traditional interindustry trade, and
the more interesting intraindustry and intrafirm trade is not formally dealt with in
these theories), although it is potentially possible that they can be used to explain
some trade phenomena. For example, the theory of ownership advantage has es-
sentially the same core compared to the theory of Ricardo’s comparative advantage
(Ricardo, 1817). Henceforth, traditional trade pattern or specialization of produc-
tion can be explained by the theory of ownership advantage in principle. Another
multinational corporations theory, i.e., the theory of internalization advantage may
be used to explain partially intrafirm trade, since the theory tells it can be rational
to conduct trade or technological transfer within the interiority of a corporation.
1Chung (2001) argues “there has been no complete theory of the multinational firm”.
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However, the theory can not predict or explain why intrafirm trade also more likely
happens between developed countries.
To divide multinational corporations theory and trade theory artificially seems
to be unreasonable, since part of trade is conducted by multinational corporations.
A theory which only can explain one aspect of a fact is incomplete and always un-
der being challenged. With more and more trade and investment simultaneously
happening related with multinational corporations after the Second World War and
especially from the 1970s, it appears that a unified theory for accommodating FDI
and trade is necessary. Such kind of attempt to reconcile the multinational corpora-
tions theory with international trade theory began primarily from Helpman (1984)
and Markusen (1984), which have been further developed by the recent endeavour
of Markusen (1997, 2000) and Markusen and Maskus (2001a, 2001b). The recon-
ciling coup d’essai tries to find out the reasons for trade and investment through a
single framework. Findings of these works are nevertheless not always consistent.
For example, Markusen (2000) argues trade and investment is complement when the
countries differ in relative endowments and investment is vertical, while trade and
investment is substitute when the countries are similar and investment is horizontal
when trade costs are lowering. Put it directly, Markusen (2000) argues that trade
and investment in developed countries should be substitute. But in Markusen and
Maskus (2001a), one of the conclusions is that high-income countries would trade
and invest both heavily among one another.
In summary, the theories of FDI and trade, no matter whether they are single
pieces or unified ones, have not found out convincingly yet, why on earth trade and
investment concentrates in high-income countries, or developed countries.
The above-mentioned issue is one of the most important lingering around the
academia. What is more, some other issues related with activities of multinational
corporations, such as technological transfer, market risk and factor movement should
be studied more thoroughly.
Pertaining to technological transfer, there is a common understanding that de-
veloping countries should be helped by technological transfer, regarded as followers
in terms of their lower level of technology and science, and of course their lower
quality of economic development. Paradoxically, in practice, it is not hard to find
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technological transfer from developed countries is always under various restrictions
(or not the most advanced). A question mark for this kind of technological transfer
rises naturally: whether would it really do good to the international and domes-
tic economic performance of developing corporations or countries? To the best of
my knowledge, it is a pity that concern of academia and relevant countries has not
been aroused around this topic, at least on a theoretical basis2. The gracious ef-
fect of technological transfer may be magnified, otherwise, there should have been a
sign that technological gap between developing and developed countries is gradually
closing up and competitiveness of developing corporations or countries in the world
market should have been stronger. There has been empirical literature getting less
supportive evidence (e.g., Djankov and Hoekman, 2000), but ground for theoretical
attempts still needs to be plowed. The dissertation reconsiders this issue by theoret-
ically examining whether nowadays technological transfer from developed countries
is truly beneficial to developing countries.
The world markets are full of uncertainties and risks. But even so, “sales of for-
eign affiliates are now greater than world total exports of goods, implying that firms
use FDI more than they use exports to service foreign markets” (Di Mauro, 2000).
It is natural to ask why a corporation is willing to conduct FDI in foreign markets in
front of these risks. The question is related with why a corporation would like to be-
come a multinational, which can definitely have a large number of rationales. It may
be plausible to infer that FDI in foreign markets by multinational corporations can
be a practicable way to evade market risks. Are there any theories supporting this
speculation? Not exactly. Theories about multinational corporations and market
risk are incomplete. Teaching of prevalent international business and international
management theories concludes FDI is an inevitable way of increasing international
business of any kind such as trade, licensing, joint venture and the like, but it has
been less heedful of the function of risk aversion of FDI. Although literature (espe-
cially on financial areas) has extensively studied risk issues faced by a multinational
corporation, its focus is however more on the financial side rather than on the real
2Krugman (1979a) directly interprets technological transfer as “...the process by which new
products are transformed into old products”, which de facto takes it for granted that new technology
would never be transferred.
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one (such as FDI). There is literature indeed about FDI and market risk, most of
which only concerns one specific type of risk, such as exchange rate risk or political
risk, so a study with more generality is required. As a risk-averse multinational cor-
poration within an environment consisting of various economic and non-economic
market risk, how it decides regarding the amount of investment, labor employment,
and production in both its home and host markets would be discussed in the paper.
As for factor movement, it is not a new topic and has been touched upon before
by traditional international trade theories. These theories simply assume produc-
tive factors can not be mobile across borders. Let’s take the famous theorem of
absolute factor price equalization as an example. The theorem describes that fac-
tors prices would be equalized with free trade in goods and on the condition that
trading countries do not completely specialize. It is derived from traditional trade
theories, which to some extent can be pegged with factor movement because free
trade in goods, acceptably recognized in the academia, can be seen as a substitute
for free movement of factors. However, the fact that factor movement is more or
less neglected is obvious. Wong (1995) argues there are two notable reasons for
this, one being “...historically economic relationships between countries have been
determined mainly through the movement of goods” and the other “...under certain
conditions, the theory of international trade in goods can be extended to cover inter-
national factor mobility”, and itself is a new theoretical development on the topic.
In the available literature, to the question why there would be international factor
movement, most explanations have been given from the economic side. But non-
economic ones seem to be far less concerned in those literature even including Wong
(1995). As we know, to comprehend some phenomena like factor movement, only
economic theories may not suffice. For example, happening of labor movement is not
just because of a better payment in its immigration countries or areas. Geography
and social institution and so forth would have their say in determination too. In
addition, previous literature seldom explicitly enquires into three-factors (i.e., labor,
capital and technology) in a model; some of their common concern, such as whether
labor inflow from another corporation (or country) would do harm to current labor
employment in the host corporation (or country), needs further cogitation.
Writing the dissertation is in order to provide deeper understanding and rethink-
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ing to these unclosed academic issues, and work for appropriate policy implications.
Besides theoretical findings, relevant business and public policies would be presented
in this regard.
The dissertation is composed of four chapters. They are respectively chapter one
“Why would intraindustry trade or investment more likely happen between devel-
oped countries?”; chapter two “Why is it important for a multinational corporation
to hold technological leadership? A technological transfer perspective”; chapter
three “Multinational corporations and market risk: A real market perspective”; and
chapter four “Multinational corporations and factor movement”.
Briefly speaking, the theoretical findings and contribution to economics as a
philosophy from the four chapters are as follows:
Theoretical findings:
• Combining human capital theory, the dissertation has shown that intraindus-
try trade, intraindustry investment, and even interindustry trade and invest-
ment would more likely occur between developed countries. It confirms again
traditional economic theory (especially from the supply side) can accommo-
date these new phenomena of trade and investment well with more generality.
Some traditional academic issues such as why a corporation would like to
be involved in international trade or become a multinational have also been
answered.
• Restrained technological transfer from developed corporations or countries is
accompanied with reduction of profit from FDI of developing ones in the for-
mer’s domestic markets and no explicit effect on profit from their home mar-
kets. In other words, it would not bring any substantial benefit to developing
corporations or countries. To developed ones, they benefit materially a higher
level of employment of domestic productive factors and higher total profit level
in their home and foreign markets by perpetuating a technological gap with
the developing ones. This finding is never meant to accuse of the technolog-
ical transfer in the real world, but just presents a theoretical reconsideration
and seeks for a better route for the future practice of assisting the developing
world.
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• Being a multinational corporation would be better to avoid market risk from
multiple sources, which can be financial, real and so on, and more helpful for
making correct decision about investment, labor employment and production
in different markets. In the parallel words, a non multinational corporation
may uphold unsymmetrical market risk compared to its market share. Hence,
the chapter from another (theoretically admissible) angle has reasoned why
a corporation would like to become a multinational besides that given in the
first chapter.
• Within a framework pulling together economic and non-economic factors, with
respect to international movement of labor, capital and technology, only labor
inflow from a developed/developing corporation (or country) would be com-
plementary to labor employment of another developing/developed one when
the countries involved make progress in the elements like returns to productive
factors, social welfare, and property protection and market risk is decreasing
continuously; free international factor movement is a key (but not sufficient)
to promote production convergence for a multinational corporation and thus
economic convergence among countries.
Theoretical contribution:
The theoretical contribution of the dissertation can be summed up into four lat-
eralities, which are, international trade theory, theory of multinational corporations,
growth theory and business and public policy studies.
• To international trade theory, the dissertation is among the first explicitly and
analytically in explaining several important trade and investment issues such
as why intraindustry and investment dominates in developed countries.
• To theory of multinational corporations, the dissertation raises another two
renditions: one is provided in the first chapter and the other is in the third
chapter. Concisely, with a perfectly competitive market structure, higher
profit in home markets may trigger an incentive to conduct FDI in foreign
markets; and being a multinational corporation is a better choice confronting
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market risks variously sourced and correlated when the market structure is
monopolistic.
• To growth theory3, the dissertation finds out that even when factor movement
is free, production/economic convergence may not happen between developed
and developing corporations/countries, non-economic factors like social insti-
tution taken into account.
• To business and public policy studies, the dissertation advocates that skill up-
grading of available labor force in developing countries is the strategic policy
for higher FDI inflow; less affiliated conditions should be bounded with tech-
nological transfer from developed corporations/countries to developing coun-
terparts; research and development is crucial to generate higher production,
profit, and a long run growth for a developing corporation/country; and argues
that a country (an underdeveloped one specially) should strive for a better so-
cial environment rather than economic objects only, a direct reason of which
is that merits or demerits of social environment can have a vital effect on its
economic performance.
3Although these four essays are titled related with multinational corporations-a microeconomic
topic, they in fact have been involved with another vital theoretic arena, the macro one. Growth
theory belongs to the scope of macroeconomics. It is understandable that the microeconomic
behavior such as that of a corporation is not an object commonly treated in macroeconomics, but
any macroeconomic phenomenon can not be independent of the activities of those microeconomic
organs like MNCs. From the account of international trade, investment, factor movement and the
like, we hope that the dissertation would be contributive well to understanding of economic growth
and development also, since every issue of what we discuss about here has inevitably noticeable
effect on economic growth of a country and the world.
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1 Why would intraindustry trade or investment
more likely happen between developed coun-
tries?
A typical international economic phenomenon is that intraindustry trade or invest-
ment heavily concentrates in developed countries. Traditional trade theory is nor-
mally viewed as not being competent in accounting for the issue. Though potentially
new development of trade theory has been able to reason why intraindustry trade or
investment throngs towards these countries, we would like to show traditional trade
theory is not necessary to be invalid.
Applying human capital theory and under a framework of perfect competition,
the chapter finds out the causes for the vista as follows: to corporations from devel-
oping countries, investing directly in developed countries would be more attractive
than trading with them; to corporations from developed countries, they would like
more to conduct trade and direct investment between themselves and just export
to the developing counterparts. Other related theoretical issues like why a corpo-
ration would like to participate in international trade or become a multinational,
and why even interindustry trade or investment concentrates in developed countries
have been dealt with alongside.
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1.1 Introduction
Intraindustry trade (IIT) has become an important academic interest since the Sec-
ond World War and especially 1970s. The commonly recognized earliest analysis
about IIT can be dated back to Linder (1961). Based on the definition of So¨der-
sten and Reed (1994), IIT refers to “...the situation where countries simultaneously
import and export what are essentially the same products”. In the past several
decades, volume of IIT occupied a substantial proportion of the world trade. The-
oretical development seems to be led behind the changes of economic development.
Traditional trade theories, such as Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory and
Heckscher-Ohlin’s factor endowment theory, have been announced by many (new
trade) theorists that they can not explain IIT, still less why IIT thrives between
developed countries. In our point of view, traditional trade theory is not necessary
to be thus discarded. It has continued to be utilized in many contexts. For ex-
ample, among others, Young (1991) introduces learning by doing into the theory,
but it predicts “...developed countries would most like to trade with their less de-
veloped counterparts...” (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998), which is obviously against
the typical fact we can notice from today’s world economy.
Some international economists have had relevant, but not perfectly consistent
research results. Markusen (2000) argues trade and investment is complement when
the countries differ in relative endowments and investment is vertical, while trade and
investment is substitute when the countries are similar and investment is horizontal
when trade costs are lowering. Markusen (2000) is equivalent to say that trade and
investment in developed countries is thought to be substitute. But in Markusen and
Maskus (2001a), one of its conclusions is that high-income countries would trade
and invest both heavily among one another. Both these two papers are involved
with characteristics of new trade theory.
The aim of the chapter is not to justify whether trade and investment in devel-
oped countries is substitute or not. We are only interested why IIT or investment
are biased to developed countries. Observing that a large volume of trade (see
Bhagwati and Davis, 1999) and investment (see Brainard, 19974) actually happens
4According to Sauvant (2001), there is 74%, 14%, 11%, 3% and 1% FDI allocated in developed
areas, Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe and Africa respectively.
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between developed countries, the chapter has furthermore enlarged its explanatory
capability in the stylized trade and investment phenomena of our times which is not
just limited to IIT and intraindustry investment. Through the study, we can see
not only IIT, but also its gravity in developed world can be accommodated within
a framework of traditional trade theory.
There is no specially new methodology applied in the chapter. Inspired from the
theoretical practice that the human capital theory has ever been used to explain
the Leontief Paradox of international economics, we judge it may be helpful in
explaining some other international economic issues. Our judgement is correct and
the key findings of the chapter include: when there is difference in labor capability
due to existence of human capital, corporations from developed countries will more
likely not choose to invest in developing countries, since trading or investing between
themselves would be more profitable; to corporations from developing countries,
investment in developed countries would be more attractive than trading with them.
The following text is organized as follows: section 2 is theoretical foundation;
section 3 is the model; section 4 is discussion and section 5 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical foundation
Effort to elucidate IIT is tremendous. Imbrued from those valuable works by many
authors, we would have a terse review of the quintessence of their works. It should be
said the IIT most scholars concern refers to the traded goods which are made with
similar factors and highly substitutable. Grubel and Lloyd (1975) ever discerned
three groups of IIT differentiated goods. The first group are those made with similar
factor requirements but are less substitutable; the second group are those made with
different factor requirement but are highly substitutable; and the third group are
those made with similar factor requirements and highly substitutable, in which it
is the third group that calls forth much attention. That is because the former two
groups can be explained respectively by Ricardo model with comparative advantage
argument and Heckscher-Ohlin model [HO, Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933)] with
factors endowment argument5. The opinions about whether the third group can be
5Not all IIT phenomena necessitate extra explanations beyond traditional trade models. A part
of IIT happens because of seasonal, geographical, transport costs, entrepot trade, or government
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handled with traditional trade theory are still diverse. New trade theorists argue
traditional trade theory should be abandoned, whose constant return to scale and
perfect competition framework is not suited to account for IIT. They saddle with
increasing return to scale and imperfect competition instead (e.g., Krugman, 1979b,
1980, 1995). There are mainly two branches of models brought up accordingly,
which are neo-Chamberlinian (NC) and neo-Hotelling models (NH).
NC and NH models are used to explain IIT of horizontally differentiated goods.
The major difference between NC and NH models lies in their assumption about
consumers’ preference. Krugman (1979b), with the assumption of increasing returns
to scale, is among the earliest on NC models. NH models are sourced from Lancaster
(1980). In Krugman (1979b), introduction of every new variety of a product in the
utility function is symmetric, which implies consumers would consume as many
varieties of a product as possible, known as that consumers demand for varieties.
In Lancaster (1980), consumers would prefer to consume the most ideal variety of a
product. The appearance of every new variety of a product would lead to the fact
that a consumer is closer to consume his or her most ideal variety of the product.
In short, consumers demand for characteristics.
The preference mode Krugman (1979b) applies is developed from Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976), which assumes each consumer would demand all
available varieties of a differentiated good. Krugman (1979b, 1980), and Helpman
and Krugman (1985) study IIT mainly from the perspective of heterogeneous goods.
Markusen (1981), Brander (1981), and Brander and Krugman (1983) explain IIT of
homogeneous goods in the framework of imperfectly competitive market structure.
The extensive literature forms later well-known “new trade theory” characterized
with introduction of increasing return to scale and imperfect competition into trade
models.
Though new trade theory based on NC and NH models gives a reasonable nar-
ration of IIT, it can be noted that traditional trade models are still utilized and
further improved by scholars. Development of neo-Heckscher-Ohlin models (NHO)
or Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo models (HOR) by Davis (1995) is an example.
intervention reasons. Statistical classification can also play a role in apparent increase or decrease
of IIT.
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NHO models [see Falvey (1981), Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987)] are factually
extended versions of the HO model. Linking product specifications with factor en-
dowments, NHO models are used to explain IIT of vertical differentiated goods.
Vertical differentiation refers to quality differentiation of the products made in dif-
ferent countries. Products of higher quality are preferred to those of lower one, but
the consumption should be subject to income constraint. Products of lower quality
would be demanded more by consumers with lower income in less richer countries
(e.g., labor relatively intensive, but capital scarce), while those of higher quality
would be demanded more by consumers with higher income in richer countries (e.g.,
labor relatively scarce, but capital abundant). NHO models have not essentially
surpassed the arena of theory of factor endowments even though they stress the
supply side (factor endowments) as well as the demand side.
Davis (1995) is possibly the first pointing out increasing return is not a necessary
condition for IIT. By introducing element of technological difference into a HO
model (forming the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo model which is intrinsically
equivalent to NHO models), it provides a contrasting result with the standard HO
models. As the paper mentions, “a striking contrast between the predictions of
the standard analysis and that in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo model is that the
standard model predicts that countries with identical factor ratios do not trade. In
the present model, such countries have no interindustry trade...there may yet be
intraindustry trade. ”
Despite the whatsoever difference, all of these models, no matter what type
they are, NC, NH, or NHO, tell a same story that it is IIT that helps realize the
maximum of consumers’ utility by providing the condition that consumers can have
more access to varieties of a product. Consumers are modelled to prefer consuming
as many varieties of a product as possible. Since a country can hardly produce all
the varieties of a product, IIT would hence take place between countries6.
With regard to the issue why IIT would more likely happen between developed
countries, literature with NC, NH, NHO or HOR models have not given an direct
analysis before, though NC and NH models can potentially be developed to ac-
commodate it. We are more interested in whether traditional trade models can be
6More detailed illustration regarding to consumers’ taste can be referred to Barker (1977).
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employed in the chapter. From NHO or HOR models, one may get a theoretical im-
pression that IIT would also symmetrically happen between developing countries as
it would between developed ones. For example, much NHO or HOR literature does
not distinguish developed countries and developing ones explicitly. The most no-
ticeable conclusion is that there can be equivalent amount of IIT between countries
with identical factor ratios and lower technology level. Therefore one may miscon-
ceive that a sizeable amount of IIT would happen between developing countries and
confuse predictions of the models with real economic phenomenon.
Additionally, a common shortcoming of aforementioned models is that they are
not general enough to cover multiple issues of IIT. Though they explain why there
is IIT from a certain perspective, comparatively speaking, they have more or less
ignored the fact why IIT seems to more likely take place between developed coun-
tries.
A more general theoretical model is built in this regard within the chapter,
which can answer these issues simultaneously. Interestingly, besides the key two
issues discussed, the model also can answer why a corporation would like to become
a multinational corporation (MNC), why intraindustry investment would be more
likely happen between developed countries emphasized by Markusen (1997)7, and
why even interindustry trade or investment concentrates in developed countries.
1.3 The model
The section provides a theoretical clue to why IIT would more likely happen be-
tween developed countries. As mentioned above, the analysis would answer some
other concomitant questions such as why a corporation would like to participate
international trade or become a multinational, and why intraindustry investment
7According to Markusen (1997), “...there has been a substantial rise in both trade and direct
investment since the early 1970’s, with direct investment growing substantially faster than trade....
direct investment has been concentrated among the high-income countries, even more so than
trade, with some moderation of this effect in the 1990’s (almost 40% of the direct investment to
developing countries went to China alone however). These stylized facts suggest that (a) direct
investment is not motivated primarily by trade-barrier-avoidance, and (b) not motivated primarily
by factor-endowment/price differences. Both results cast significantly doubt on any treatment
which sees direct investment as more or less the same thing as portfolio/physical factor flows. ”
13
would more likely happen between developed countries.
A model makes use of human capital theory and optimal control approach for
this purpose. The issues would be dealt with from the supply side, which is different
from the main-stream analysis mainly from the demand side.
Assuming there are three countries, each one having two kinds of productive fac-
tors, i.e., labor and capital (which is fully used to invest in production by assump-
tion), and many different industries, each industry having numerous corporations
producing homogenous goods of the industry-specific type. The products produced
by different industries are heterogeneous. Some industries are foreign-oriented, but
some are not. Goods produced by foreign-oriented firms are demanded by foreign
markets. Non-foreign-oriented firms have no demand from foreign countries on the
contrary. Market prices for goods and productive factors are exogenous and every
firm in these three countries is a price taker.
Within the three countries, there can be two symmetric developing countries and
the rest one is developed; or two symmetric developed countries and the other one
is developing. Industries and corporations from a developed country have higher
technology level than those from a developing one. Investment and trade within
these three countries is assumed to be free to all corporations. There is no such
transaction cost as transport cost, trade and investment barrier, and sunk cost.
Production of a corporation in a foreign country would employ local labor and
capital.
To study the trade pattern of these three countries, we only need to study that of
three representative foreign-oriented corporations from these countries respectively
based on the assumptions. We call them corporation d, f1,and f2. The corporations
would choose to maximize their own discounted sum of long run profit, which is given
as follows:
For the corporation d of the country d
max
∫∞
t0
e−r(t−t0)f(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2)dt (1)
subject to dΠdd , dΠdf1 , dΠdf2
Πdd(t0) = Πdd0
Πdf1(t0) = Πdf10 and Πdf2(t0) = Πdf20
For the corporation f1 of the country f1
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max
∫∞
t0
e−r(t−t0)f(Πf1d ,Πf1f1 ,Πf1f2)dt (2)
subject to dΠf1d , dΠf1f1 , dΠf1f2
Πf1d(t0) = Πf1d0
Πf1f1(t0) = Πf1f10 and Πf1f2(t0) = Πf1f20
For the corporation f2 of the country f2
max
∫∞
t0
e−r(t−t0)f(Πf2d ,Πf2f1 ,Πf2f2)dt (3)
8
subject to dΠf2d , dΠf2f1 , dΠf2f2
Πf2d(t0) = Πd0
Πf2f1(t0) = Πf2f10 and Πf2f2(t0) = Πf2f20
where t0 denotes the base period. The total profit functions of the three corpo-
rations are assumed to have a Cobb-Douglas-production-function-like form:
Πd = f(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2) = αdΠ
βd
dd
Πφddf1Π
1−βd−φd
df2
(4)
Πf1 = f(Πf1d ,Πf1f1 ,Πf1f2) = αf1Π
βf1
f1d
Π
φf1
f1f1
Π
1−βf1−φf1
f1f2
(5)
Πf2 = f(Πf2d ,Πf2f1 ,Πf2f2) = αf2Π
βf2
f2d
Π
φf2
f2f1
Π
1−βf2−φf2
f2f2
(6)
Πd, Πf1 and Πf2 denote total profit of the corporations d, f1 and f2 respectively.
From (4), (5) and (6), total profit of each corporation is a multiplication of profits
from its domestic market and the other two foreign ones, i.e., Πdd , Πdf1 , and Πdf2 ,
Πf1d , Πf1f1 and Πf1f2 , or Πf2d , Πf2f1 , and Πf2f2 . Πdd stands for the profit of the
corporation d in its home market in the circumstance where it accrues independently
without any direct connection with profits from the other two markets. Similarly,
Πdf1 is the profit of the corporation d in the foreign market f1 which is also directly
uncorrelated with profits from the other two markets. The same explanation applies
to Πdf2 , ..., and Πf2f2 . Product of profits from home and foreign markets here has
twofold intentions. One is to capture the fact that the corporations d, f1 and f2
strategically operate in the three markets by, say, profit transfer, aiming to maximize
profit comprehensively within all the three markets rather than separately in every
single one. The other is purely for computational feasibility.
8The continuous form of the profit functions (1), (2) and (3) not only mimics more precisely
economic behavior in reality, but also renders easier calcualtion convenience in the following text.
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There are two productive factors, i.e., labor and capital. They can be denoted
according to their sites of employment and proprietors as Ld, Ldf1 , and Ldf2 , Id,
Idf1 , and Idf2 , Lf1, Lf1d , and Lf1f2 , If1, If1d , and If1f2 , Lf2, Lf2d , and Lf2f1 , and
If2, If2d , and If2f1 . Ld means the amount of labor employed in the country d by the
corporation d. Ldf1 means the amount of labor employed in the country f1 by the
corporation d. The explanation applies to Ldf2 , ..., and Lf2f2 .
The production functions of the three corporations are Cobb-Douglas, with con-
stant return to scale and given by (7), (8) and (9):
Qd =MdI
χd
d L
1−χd
d (7)
Qf1 =Mf1I
χf1
f1 L
1−χf1
f1 (8)
Qf2 =Mf2I
χf2
f2 L
1−χf2
f2 (9)
whereMd, Mf1, andMf2 are total factor productivity (TFP) of the corporations
d, f1 and f2 respectively. The TFP in corporations originally from developed
countries should be higher than or equal to those originally from developing ones.
The profit function of each corporation in an individual market, which is equal
to income from that market deducting the corresponding production cost and is
assumed to be larger than zero. (10) denotes the profit of the corporation d in its
domestic market; (11) and (12) tell there are two ways of profit realization for the
corporation d in f1 and f2 markets: one is through FDI and the other is through
export.
Πdd = pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd (10)
Πdf1 =
 pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1Idf1 − pLdf1Ldf1 (FDI)pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 IEdf1 − pLEdf1LEdf1 (Export) (11)
Πdf2 =
 pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Idf2 − pLdf2Ldf2 (FDI)pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 IEdf2 − pLEdf2LEdf2 (Export) (12)
Similarly, we can have the profit functions of the corporation f1 in the markets
f1, d, and f2 shown in (13), (14) and (15).
Πf1f1 = pQf1Qf1 − pIf1If1 − pLf1Lf1 (13)
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Πf1d =
 pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dIf1d − pLf1dLf1d (FDI)pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d IEf1d − pLEf1dLEf1d (Export) (14)
Πf1f2 =
 pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2If1f2 − pLf1f2Lf1f2 (FDI)pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 IEf1f2 − pLEf1f2LEf1f2 (Export) (15)
And the profit functions for the corporation f2 in the markets f2, d, and f1 are
given by:
Πf2f2 = pQf2Qf2 − pIf2If2 − pLf2Lf2 (16)
Πf2d =
 pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dIf2d − pLf2dLf2d (FDI)pEf2dEf2d − pIEf2d IEf2d − pLEf2dLEf2d (Export) (17)
Πf2f1 =
 pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1If2f1 − pLf2f1Lf2f1 (FDI)pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1 IEf2f1 − pLEf2f1LEf2f1 (Export) (18)
Hence, making use of the expressions from (10) to (18), we can have the total
profit dynamics of the corporation d which is denoted by the four forms of stochastic
differential equations:
(19) dΠd =
(1) βd(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd(pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1Idf1
−pLdf1Ldf1)dz1 + (1− βd − φd)(pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Idf2
−pLdf2Ldf2)dz2 (FDI)
(2) βd(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 IEdf1
−pLEdf1LEdf1 )dz1 + (1− βd − φd)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 IEdf2
−pLEdf2LEdf2 )dz2 (Export)
(3) βd(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd(pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1Idf1
−pLdf1Ldf1)dz1 + (1− βd − φd)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 IEdf2
−pLEdf2LEdf2 )dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) βd(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 IEdf1
−pLEdf1LEdf1 )dz1 + (1− βd − φd)(pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Idf2
−pLdf2Ldf2)dz2 (Mixed II)
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The first case specifies that profit change of the corporation d is composed of
three parts: one is from profit change in its domestic market and the other two
from conducting FDI in the other two markets; the second case denotes its profit
change when the firm exports to the other two markets; the third and forth cases
(i.e., Mixed I and II) illustrate its profit change when the corporation d invests in
one of the two markets while exporting to the other one. In the dynamics of change
of Πd, the share of profit gained from the domestic market is deterministic, and the
other two shares from the foreign markets are stochastic (dz1 and dz2 obey a Wiener
process).
Similarly, we can have the corresponding dynamics of change of total profit for
the corporations f1 and f2.
(20) dΠf1 =
(1) βf1(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1If1 − pLf1Lf1)dt+ φf1(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dIf1d
−pLf1dLf1d)dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1)(pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2If1f2
−pLf1f2Lf1f2)dz2 (FDI)
(2) βf1(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1If1 − pLf1Lf1)dt+ φf1(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d IEf1d
−pLEf1dLEf1d )dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 IEf1f2
−pLEf1f2LEf1f2 )dz2 (Export)
(3) βf1(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1If1 − pLf1Lf1)dt+ φf1(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dIf1d
−pLf1dLf1d)dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 IEf1f2
−pLEf1f2LEf1f2 )dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) βf1(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1If1 − pLf1Lf1)dt+ φf1(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d IEf1d
−pLEf1dLEf1d )dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1)(pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2If1f2
−pLf1f2Lf1f2)dz2 (Mixed II)
(21)9 dΠf2 =
(1) βf2(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2If2 − pLf2Lf2)dt+ φf2(pQf2dQf2d
−pIf2dIf2d − pLf2dLf2d)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2)(pQf2f1Qf2f1
−pIf2f1If2f1 − pLf2f1Lf2f1)dz2 (FDI)
9Values of dZ1 and dZ2 are different in (19), (20), (21) and their extension forms (22)-(30) given
in the Appendix A.
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(2) βf2(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2If2 − pLf2Lf2)dt+ φf2(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
IEf2d − pLEf2dLEf2d )dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2)(pEf2f1Ef2f1
−pIEf2f1 IEf2f1 − pLEf2f1LEf2f1 )dz2 (Export)
(3) βf2(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2If2 − pLf2Lf2)dt+ φf2(pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dIf2d
−pLf2dLf2d)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2)(pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1 IEf2f1
−pLEf2f1LEf2f1 )dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) βf2(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2If2 − pLf2Lf2)dt+ φf2(pEf2dEf2d − pIEf2d IEf2d
−pLEf2dLEf2d )dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2)(pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1If2f1
−pLf2f1Lf2f1)dz2 (Mixed II)
The dynamics of profit in individual markets of the three corporations would be
further figured out in details in the following text where human capital theory is
employed.
1.3.1 When the home country is developing
The reason that we would use the theory of human capital is that we have noticed,
unlike pursuing the cause of Leontief Paradox with human capital theory10, it is
surprising that there are few attempts using this argument to interpret IIT between
developed countries. We would combine the theory sourced from Schultz (1961)
explicitly with the model. And we will consider two situations, one is that when the
home country d is a developing country and when it is a developed country.
When the country d is developing, its one unit of labor and capital can be viewed
as a proportion of one unit of labor and capital of the developed country f1. That
is to say, there is difference in labor capability between developing and developed
countries whereas the latter is dominated by human capital. And for simplicity, we
assume it is the same as that of the other developing country f2. The idea can be
indicated as follows:
10The so-called Leontief Paradox (Leontief, 1953) found that the export of United States was
labor intensive, while import is capital intensive, which is against the HO theory. Kenen (1965)
argues if human capital is considered, export of the United States is capital intensive and Paradox
disappears. That is to say, countries that are well endowed with human capital will export goods
intensive in human capital.
19
Ld = Lf2, Id = If2
Lf1 = γLd, If1 = ηId
γ, η  1
Therefore, we will have the profit dynamics considering the factor of human
capital of the three corporations in individual markets with the form as dΠdd , dΠdf1 ,
dΠdf2 , ..., and dΠf2f2 [see (22) to (30) in the Appendix A], each of which is composed
of part of profit from the other two markets and has thus mimicked (at least partially)
transfer of profits conducted by the corporations.
With the profit dynamics, we can now enquire into the trade pattern of the
corporations. We first investigate the situations when the corporation d exports to
and invests in the two foreign markets.
When the corporation d chooses to export to the developing market and
the developed market Since time t only enters through the discount term with-
out appearing in the profit functions [see (1) to (18)], we study an infinite horizon
autonomous problem in fact. Therefore, with applying Talor expansion series, Itoˆ’s
theorem and expectation operator, a corresponding value function which is inde-
pendent of time t can be written down in (31), where the corporations f1 and f2
can invest in or export to each other’s market and invest in or export to the third
market.
rVd(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2) =
maxQdd ,Idf1 ,Ldf2 [f(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+V
′
dd
(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )βd3(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
β2d4(pEdf1
Edf1−pIEdf1
Id−pLEdf1
Ld)
2V ′′dd (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+
1
2
(βd−βd3−βd4)2(pEdf2Edf2−pIEdf2
Id−pLEdf2
Ld)
2V ′′dd (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+
V ′df1 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )φd3(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
φ2d4(pEdf1
Edf1−pIEdf1
Id−pLEdf1
Ld)
2V ′′df1 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+ 1
2
(φd−φd3−φd4)2(pEdf2Edf2−pIEdf2
Id−pLEdf2
Ld)
2V ′′df1 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+V ′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 ) θd3(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
θ2d4(pEdf1
Edf1−pIEdf1
Id−pLEdf1
Ld)
2V ′′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+ 1
2
(1−βd−φd−θd3−θd4)2(pEdf2Edf2−pIEdf2
Id−pLEdf2
Ld)
2V ′′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
(31)
To solve the value function, assume
Vd(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2) = Adf(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2) (32)
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Differentiate the both sides with respect to Qdd (which is a control variable for
the corporation d), and after simplification, we will have
0 = β2d4Π
2
df1
βd(1− βd) + (βd − βd3 − βd4)2Π2df2βd(1− βd)+
[φdΠ
−1
df1
φd3 + (1− βd − φd)Π−1df2θd3]Π3dd (33)
Solving the equation, we can have three results for Q˜dd , one real and two complex,
given by (34) and (35):
Q˜dd =
3
√√√√− (β2d4Π2df1βd(1−βd)+(βd−βd3−βd4)2Π2df2βd(1−βd))
φdΠ
−1
df1
φd3+(1−βd−φd)Π−1df2
θd3
+pIdId+pLdLd
PQd
(34)
and
Q˜dd = −12 3
√
−a
b
± 1
2
i
√
3
b
3
√
(−ab2) (35)11
We are only interested in the real number solution. Therefore, (35) can be
ignored. Similarly, we can also have the solutions for the amount of the corporation
d’s export to the markets f1 and f2, denoted by E˜df1 and E˜df2 .
E˜df1 =
Πdf1+pIEdf1
Id+pLEdf1
Ld
pEdf1
(36)
In (36), we will have four solutions for Πdf1 :
Π1df1 =
1
12
√
6
√
Mdf1+
1
12
√√√√√√√√√√√
−
6 3
√
12 3
√√√√((9n2df1+
√(
−768v3df1mdf1+81n
4
df1
))
mdf1
)
mdf1
−
24( 3
√
12)
2
vdf1
3
√√√√((9n2df1+
√(
−768v3mdf1+81n4df1
))
mdf1
) − 72ndf1
√
6√
Mdf1mdf1
(37)12
11In (34) and (35), a = β2d4Π
2
df1
βd(1−βd)+(βd−βd3−βd4)2Π2df2βd(1−βd) and b = φdΠ−1df1φd3+
(1− βd − φd)Π−1df2θd3.
12In (37), Mdf1 =
3
√
12
(
3
√((
9n2df1
+
√(
−768v3df1m+81n
4
df1
))
mdf1
))2
+4vdf1
3√12mdf1
mdf1
3
√((
9n2df1
+
√(
−768v3df1mdf1+81n
4
df1
))
mdf1
) , mdf1 =
−β2d4βd(1− βd)Π−2dd − θ2d4(1− βd − φd)(βd + φd)Π−2df2 , ndf1 = −φdφd3Πdd , and vdf1 = (φd − φd3 −
φd4)2Π2df2φd(1− φd).
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From the four solutions of Πdf1
13 (the other three, i.e., Π2df1 , Π
3
df1
and Π4df1 are given
in the Appendix A), the Π1df1 shown in (37) is the largest profit the corporation d
can make in the market f1. In the following text, we will just provide the largest
solution for similar issues.
E˜df2 =
Πdf2+pIEdf2
Id+pLEdf2
Ld
pEdf2
(38)
where
Πdf2 =
1
12
√
6
√
M
df2
+
1
12
√√√√√√√√√√
−
6 3
√
12 3
√((
9(ndf2 )
2+
√(
−768(vdf2 )3mdf2+81(ndf2 )4
))
m
df2
)
m
df2
−
24( 3
√
12)
2
v
df2
3
√√√√((9(n
df2
)2+
√(
−768(v
df2
)3m
df2
+81(ndf2 )
4
))
mdf2
) − 72ndf2
√
6√
Mdf2mdf2
(39)14
In the above solutions, it can be seen that mdf1 , ndf1 , mdf2 , ndf2 ≺ 0 and vdf1 ,
vdf2  0. We can know from the formula of Π1df1 , when Πdd tends to be infinitely
large, Πdf1 would tend to be infinitely large. The intuition is that the higher profit
a corporation makes in its home market, the higher profit it can make in a foreign
market (f1 in this case). Because Πdf1 is obtained from export of the corporation d
to the market f1, from this point, that is why a corporation would like to participate
in international trade. The same conclusion and intuition can also be obtained by
looking at E˜df2 . Of course, we can find out higher Πdf2 would also lead to higher
Πdf1 , which implies that a corporation would have stronger wish to expand the scale
of its involvement in international trade if it can make higher profit in one of the
foreign markets.
13We can note that Πdf1 and the following relevant functions of profit are different from (10) to
(18).
14In (39), M
df2
= 3
√
12
(
3
√((
9(ndf2 )
2+
√(
−768(vdf2 )3mdf2+81(ndf2 )4
))
m
df2
))2
+4v
df2
3√12mdf2
m
df2
3
√((
9(ndf2 )
2+
√(
−768(vdf2 )3mdf2+81(ndf2 )4
))
m
df2
) ,
m
df2
= −(βd − βd3 − βd4)2βd(1 − βd)Π−2dd − (βd − βd3 − βd4)2φd(1 − φd)Π−2df1 , ndf2 = −(1 −
βd − φd)θ2d3Πdd , and vdf2 = θ2d4Π2df1(1− βd − φd)(βd + φd).
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When the corporation d chooses to invest in the developing market and
the developed market When the corporation d chooses to invest in the other
two markets, we rewrite the value function in (40), where the corporations f1 and
f2 can invest in or export to each other’s market and invest in or export to the third
market.
rVd(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2) =
max Qdd ,Idf1 ,Ldf2 [f(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+V
′
dd
(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )βd1(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
β2d2(pQdf1
Qdf1−pIdf1 ηId−pLdf1 γLd)
2V ′′dd (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+
1
2
(φd−φd1−φd2)2(pQdf2Qdf2−pIdf2 Id−pLdf2Ld)
2V ′′dd (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+
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1
2
φ2d2(pQdf1
Qdf1−pIdf1 ηId−pLdf1 γLd)
2V ′′df1 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+ 1
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+V ′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 ) θd1(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
θ2d2(pQdf1
Qdf1−pIdf1 ηId−pLdf1 γLd)
2V ′′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+ 1
2
(1−βd−φd−θd1−θd2)2(pQdf2Qdf2−pIdf2 Id−pLdf2Ld)
2V ′′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
(40)
Combining (29), and differentiate the both sides with respect to Qdd , Qdf1 and
Qdf2 , we can solve
0 = β2d2Π
2
df1
βd(1− βd) + (φd − φd1 − φ2)2Π2df2βd(1− βd)+
[φdΠ
−1
df1
φd1 + (1− βd − φd)Π−1df2θd1]Π3dd
for the production of the corporation d in all the three markets denoted by (41),
(42) and (43):
Q˜dd =
3
√√√√−(β2d2Π2df1βd(1−βd)+(φd−φd1−φd2)2Π2df2βd(1−βd))
φdΠ
−1
df1
φd1+(1−βd−φd)Π−1df2
θd1
+pIdId+pLdLd
PQd
(41)
Q˜df1 =
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γLd
pQdf1
(42)
where
Πdf1 =
1
12
√
6
√
Mdf1+
23
1
12
√√√√√√√√√√√
−
6 3
√
12 3
√√√√((9n2df1+
√(
−768v3df1mdf1+81n
4
df1
))
mdf1
)
mdf1
−
24( 3
√
12)
2
vdf1
3
√√√√((9n2df1+
√(
−768v3mdf1+81n4df1
))
mdf1
) − 72ndf1
√
6√
Mdf1mdf1
(42’)15
Q˜df2 =
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Ld
pQdf2
(43)
where
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It is significant to notice that Πdf1 in (42) is not necessarily the same as that of
Πdf1 in (36). Direct investment in the f1 market makes the corporation d employ
local labor and capital which has higher skill than that in the dmarket. Even though
TFP of the corporation d remains the same in the market f1, its production in that
market still can increase. The corporation d can pay higher or equally for the service
of (the same amount of) local labor and investment in the market f1 as it does in
its home market, i.e.,
pIdf1If1 + pLdf1Lf1 = η(pIdf1Id) + γ(pLdf1Ld)  pIEdf1 Id + pLEdf1Ld.
15In (42’), Mdf1 =
3
√
12
(
3
√((
9n2df1
+
√(
−768v3df1m+81n
4
df1
))
mdf1
))2
+4vdf1
3√12mdf1
mdf1
3
√((
9n2df1
+
√(
−768v3df1mdf1+81n
4
df1
))
mdf1
) , mdf1 =
−β2d2βd(1− βd)Π−2dd − θ2d2(1− βd − φd)(βd + φd)Π−2df2 , ndf1 = −φdφd1Πdd , and vdf1 = (φd − φd1 −
φd2)2Π2df2φd(1− φd).
16In (43’), M
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(
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√((
9(ndf2 )
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−768(vdf2 )3mdf2+81(ndf2 )4
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m
df2
))2
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df2
3√12mdf2
m
df2
3
√((
9(ndf2 )
2+
√(
−768(vdf2 )3mdf2+81(ndf2 )4
))
m
df2
) ,
m
df2
= −(βd − βd1 − βd2)2βd(1 − βd)Π−2dd − (βd − βd1 − βd2)2φd(1 − φd)Π−2df1 , ndf2 = −(1 −
βd − φd)θ2d1Πdd , and vdf2 = θ2d2Π2df1(1− βd − φd)(βd + φd).
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The ratiocination is that market prices for productive factors (including higher-
skilled and lower-skilled ones) employed by different industries are exogenously set-
ting, and working in a lower technology industry would get lower remuneration (see
Mehta, 1998) [η(pIdf1Id) + γ(pLdf1Ld) is less than η(pIf1f1Id) + γ(pLf1f1Ld) owing to
the fact]. Of course, employers can pay productive factors more according to their
production performance than the market level in this perfect competition market
system, but they will never automatically pay in totality the excess profit back to
the employed factors.
So, when Q˜df1 [equal to Mdf1(ηId)
χdf1 (γLd)
1−χdf1 ] is larger than E˜df1 (equal to
Mdf1Id1
χdf1Ld
1−χdf1 ), pQdf1 = pEdf1 , and η(pIdf1Id)+γ(pLdf1Ld) is equal to pIEdf1
Id+
pLEdf1
Ld, Πdf1 in (42) would be larger than Πdf1 in (36).
Besides the reason mentioned above, the institutional guarantee is, before inter-
national economic exchange reaching a steady state, the prevalent rate of increase
of cost17 of employing labor and conducting investment in the market is less than
that of production in the framework of constant return to scale. To a corporation,
more output with identical or less production cost means that it can make higher
profit. Therefore, before reaching that steady state, FDI instead of export would be
a more favorable choice to the corporation d 18.
The fact illustrates that direct investment of developing corporations in devel-
oped markets would have more production than pure export from the former ones
due to higher profitability of the former. Along with the above logic, it can be in-
ferred that trade with or direct investment in the developing country f2 makes no
difference regarding to its net income.
Because direct investment in the country f1 can make more profit, the corpora-
tion d would less likely export to f1 ceteris paribus. The conclusion is also applied
to the corporation f2. That is the reason why it is more likely that the corporations
d and f2 would be more possible to invest in the country f1 and do not produce at
17The production cost in the chapter obviously refers to wages for employing labour and cost of
conducting investment.
18From η(pIdf1 Id)+γ(pLdf1Ld)  pIEdf1 Id+pLEdf1Ld, though the nominal wage to the physical
capital and labor is higher when the corporation d produces in the f1 market, the payment to the
abstract value in terms of content of Id and Ld per unit of physical capital and labor factually can
be equal to or less than that paid in its home marekt.
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their home markets. It is also easy to know that the corporation f1 would be more
likely to choose to export to both the countries d and f2 rather than directly invest
in their markets, which would be confirmed by the subsequent text.
1.3.2 When the home country is developed
We have studied the case when the home country is a developing state. Following
the reasoning given above, now we would look at the case when it is a developed
one. The relationships of productive factors of the three countries are redefined as
follows:
Ld = Lf1 = γ
′Lf2
Id = If1 = η
′If2
γ′ > 1, η′ > 1
(22)-(30) are correspondingly rewritten in (44) to (52) which are also given in
the Appendix A. We study the pattern of FDI and trade, i.e., the corporation d
invests in the country f1 and exports to the country f2 first. The value function
for this situation is therefore:
rVd(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2) =
maxQdd ,Idf1 ,Ldf2 [f(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+V
′
dd
(Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 ) β
′
d5(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
β′2d6(pQdf1
Qdf1−pIdf1 Id−pLdf1Ld)
2V ′′dd (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+
1
2
(βd−β′d5−β′d6)2(pEdf2Edf2−pIEdf2
Id−pLEdf2
Ld)
2V ′′dd (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )+
V ′df1 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 ) φ
′
d5(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
φ′2d6(pQdf1
Qdf1−pIdf1 Id−pLdf1Ld)
2V ′′df1 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+ 1
2
(φd−φ′d5−φ′d6)2(pEdf2Edf2−pIEdf2
Id−pLEdf2
Ld)
2V ′′df1 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+V ′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 ) θ
′
d5(pQdQd−pIdId−pLdLd)+
1
2
θ′2d6(pQdf1
Qdf1−pIdf1 Id−pLdf1Ld)
2V ′′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
+ 1
2
(1−βd−φd−φ′d5−φ′d6)2(pEdf2Edf2−pIEdf2
Id−pLEdf2
Ld)
2V ′′df2 (Πdd ,Πdf1 ,Πdf2 )
(53)
Applying the same procedure, we would have Q˜dd , Q˜df1 , and E˜df2 given by (54),
(55) and (56):
Q˜dd =
3
√√√√−(β′2d6Π2df1βd(1−βd)+(βd−β′d5−β′d6)2Π2df2βd(1−βd))
φdΠ
−1
df1
φ′
d5
+(1−βd−φd)Π−1df2
φ′
d5
+pIdId+pLdLd
PQd
(54)
Q˜df1 =
Πdf1+pIdf1
ηId+pLdf1
γLd
pQdf1
(55)
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where
Πdf1 =
1
12
√
6
√
M ′
df1
+
1
12
√√√√√√√√√√√
−
6 3
√
12 3
√√√√((9(n′df1 )2+
√(
−768(v′df1 )
3m′d
f1
+81(n′d
f1
)4
))
m′
df1
)
m′
df1
−
24( 3
√
12)
2
v′
df1
3
√√√√((9(n′
df1
)2+
√(
−768(v′
df1
)3m′
df1
+81(n′df1 )
4
))
m′df1
) − 72n
′
df1
√
6√
M ′df1m
′
df1
(55’)19
E˜df2 =
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Id+pLEdf2
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pEdf2
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If the corporation d invests in the country f2 rather than exporting to it, (56)
will become
E˜df2 =
Πdf2+pIdf2
Id
1
η′+pLdf2
Ld
1
γ′
p
df2
(57)
where
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m′df1 = −β′2d6βd(1 − βd)Π−2dd − θ′2d6(1 − βd − φd)(βd + φd)Π−2df2 , n′df1 = −φdφ′d5Πdd , and v′df1 =
(φd − φ′d5 − φ′d6)2Π2df2φd(1− φd).
20In (56’), M ′
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= −(βd − β′d5 − β′d6)2βd(1 − βd)Π−2dd − (βd − β′d5 − β′d6)2φd(1 − φd)Π−2df1 , n′df2 = −(1 −
βd − φd)θ′2d5Πd, and v′df2 = θ′2d6Π2df1(1− βd − φd)(βd + φd).
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With the similar induction, Πdf2 in (57) tends to be smaller than that in (56)
where
pIddId + pLddLd  pIEdf2 Id + pLEdf2Ld  pIdf2Id
1
η′ + pLdf2Ld
1
γ′ ,
since the corporation d would choose to export to rather than invest in the
country f2 in order for maximizing its profit. Similarly, m′df1 , n
′
df1
, m′
df2
, n′df2 ≺ 0
and v′df1 , v
′
df2
 0. Judged from Πdf1 in (55), when Πdd tends to be infinitely large,
Πdf1 would also tend to be infinitely large. Because Πdf1 is obtained from FDI of
the corporation d in the f1 market, from this point, it can be understood why a
corporation would like to become a multinational. That is, higher profit in its home
market may trigger the corporation to invest in another country. When there is
higher profit in the market f2, the corporation d would much more likely strengthen
its FDI in the market f1.
The analysis in both sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 has shown that corporations from
developed countries would be more likely to conduct trade or direct investment
between each other, but biased to export to developing countries, while corporations
from developing countries would be more likely to invest directly in developed ones.
It makes no difference that a corporation from a developing country trades with or
invests directly in the other.
21In (57’), M ′
df2
= 3
√
12
 3
√√√√((9(n′df2 )2+
√(
−768(v′df2 )
3m′d
f2
+81(n′d
f2
)4
))
m′
df2
)2+4v′
df2
3√12m′df2
m′
df2
3
√√√√((9(n′df2 )2+
√(
−768(v′df2 )
3m′d
f2
+81(n′d
f2
)4
))
m′
df2
) ,
m′
df2
= −(βd − β′d7 − β′d8)2βd(1 − βd)Π−2dd − (βd − β′d7 − β′d8)2φd(1 − φd)Π−2df1 , n′df2 = −(1 −
βd − φd)θ′2d7Πd, and v′df2 = θ′2d8Π2df1(1− βd − φd)(βd + φd).
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1.4 Further discussion
The above text only considers individual behavior of a corporation without taking
into account the other two corporations’ reaction. It can be more interesting to look
into the case where the three representative firms interact with one another. For
more direct insight, we study the situation where the home country is developed.
To the two corporations d and f1, since there is no clear-cut quantitative dif-
ference with regard to their profit from trade or FDI, we simply assume they trade
with each other and export to the country f2. And the corporation f2 invests in the
two developed countries as predicted from above. The interaction obeys the proce-
dure once and for ever: the two developed corporations choose their own optimal
quantity of export simultaneously after their observing the action of the corporation
f2.
We complement another three assumptions in order to find out the relationships
among the relevant quantity of export and FDI:
qd is assumed to be the aggregate demand for products of the corporations d, f1
and f2 of the home market of the corporation d, which is the addition of Qd, Ef1d
and Qf2d .
Edf1 = qf1 −Qf2f1 −Qf1f1 ; Edf2 = qf2 − Ef1f2 −Qf2f2
qf1 is assumed to be aggregate demand for the products of the corporations d,
f1 and f2 of the home market of f1, which is the addition of Edf1 , Qf1f1 and Qf2f1 .
Ef1d = qd −Qf2d −Qdd ; Ef1f2 = qf2 − Edf2 −Qf2f2
qf2 is assumed to be aggregate demand for the products of the corporations d,
f1 and f2 of the home market of f2, which is the addition of Edf2 , Ef1f2 and Qf2f2 .
Qf2d = qd −Qdd − Ef1d ; Qf2f1 = qf1 − Edf1 −Qf1f1
qd, qf1, and qf2 are three constants. Making use of the same algebra, we have
(58) to (66) immediately as follows:
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φd).
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φd)(pEdf1 (qf1−Qf2f1−Qf1f1)−pIEdf1 Id−pLEdf1Ld)
−2, n′df2 = −(1−βd−φd)θ′2d3(pQd(qd−Ef1d−
Qf2d) − pIdId − pLdLd), and v′df2 = θ′2d4(pEdf1 (qf1 − Qf2f1 − Qf1f1) − pIEdf1 Id − pLEdf1Ld)
2(1 −
βd − φd)(βd + φd).
24In (61’), M ′
f1d
= 3
√
12
 3
√√√√((9(n′
f1d
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f1d
)3m′
f1d
+81(n′
f1d
)4
))
m′
f1d
)2+4v′
f1d
3√12m′
f1d
m′
f1d
3
√√√√((9(n′
f1d
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f1d
)3m′
f1d
+81(n′
f1d
)4
))
m′
f1d
) ,
m′
f1d
= −θ′2f14(1−βf1−φf1)(βf1+φf1)(pEf1f2 (qf2−Edf2 −Qf2f2)− pIEf1f2 Id− pLEf1f2Ld)
−2 −
φ′2f14φf1(1 − φf1)(pQf1(qf1 − Edf1 − Qf2f1) − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)−2, n′f1d = −βf1β′f13(pQf1(qf1 −
Edf1 −Qf2f1) − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld), and v′f1d = (βf1 − β
′
f13 − β′f14)2(pEf1f2 (qf2 − Edf2 −Qf2f2) −
pIEf1f2
Id − pLEf1f2Ld)
2βf1(1− βf1).
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3√√√√√√√√√√√√√√
−(φ′2f14(pEf1d (qd −Qf2d −Qdd)− pIEf1d Id − pLEf1dLd)
2φf1(1− φf1)+
(βf1 − β′f13 − β′f14)2(pEf1f2 (qf2 − Edf2 −Qf2f2)
−pIEf1f2 Id − pLEf1f2Ld)
2φf1(1− φf1))
βf1(qd −Qf2d −Qdd)− pIEf1d Id − pLEf1dLd)
−1β′f13+
(1− βf1 − φf1)(pEf1f2 (qf2 − Edf2 −Qf2f2)− pIEf1f2 Id − pLEf1f2Ld)
−1θ′f13
+pIf1Id + pLf1Ld
PQf1
(62)
E˜f1f2 =
Πf1f2+pIEf1f2
Id+pLEf1f2
Ld
pEf1f2
(63)
where
Πf1f2 =
1
12
√
6
√
M ′
f1f2
+
1
12
√√√√√√√√√√√
−
6 3
√
12 3
√√√√((9(n′
f1f2
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f1f2
)3m′
f1f2
+81(n′
f1f2
)4
))
m′
f1f2
)
m′
f1f2
−
24( 3
√
12)
2
v′
f1f2
3
√√√√((9(n′
f1f2
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f1f2
)3m′
f1f2
+81(n′
f1f2
)4
))
m′
f1f2
) − 72n
′
f1f2
√
6√
M ′
f1f2
m′
f1f2
(63’)25
Q˜f2d =
Πf2d+pIf2d
Id+pLf2d
Ld
pQf2d
(64)
where
Πf2d =
1
12
√
6
√
M ′
f2d
+
25In (63’),M ′
f1f2
= 3
√
12
 3
√√√√((9(n′
f1f2
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f1f2
)3m′
f1f2
+81(n′
f1f2
)4
))
m′
f1f2
)2+4v′
f1f2
3√12m′
f1f2
m′
f1f2
3
√√√√((9(n′
f1f2
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f1f2
)3m′
f1f2
+81(n′
f1f2
)4
))
m′
f1f2
) ,
m′
f1f2
= −(βf1 − β′f13 − β′f14)2βf1(1 − βf1)(pEf1d (qd − Qf2d − Qdd) − pIEf1d Id −
pLEf1d
Ld)−2 − (βf1 − β′f13 − β′f14)2φf1(1 − φf1)(qf1 − Edf1 − Qf2f1) − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)−2,
n′f1f2 = −(1 − βf1 − φf1)θ′2f13(qf1 − Edf1 − Qf2f1) − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld), and v′f1f2 =
θ′2f14(pEf1d (qd −Qf2d −Qdd)− pIEf1d Id − pLEf1dLd)
2(1− βf1 − φf1)(βf1 + φf1).
32
1
12
√√√√√√√√√√√
−
6 3
√
12 3
√√√√((9(n′
f2d
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2d
)3m′
f2d
+81(n′
f2d
)4
))
m′
f2d
)
m′
f2d
−
24( 3
√
12)
2
v′
f2d
3
√√√√((9(n′
f2d
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2d
)3m′
f2d
+81(n′
f2d
)4
))
m′
f2d
) − 72n′f2d
√
6√
M ′
f2d
m′
f2d
(64’)26
Q˜f2f1 =
Πf2f1+pIf2d
Id+pLf2d
Ld
pQf2f1
(65)
where
Πf2f1 =
1
12
√
6
√
M ′
f2f1
+
1
12
√√√√√√√√√√√
−
6 3
√
12 3
√√√√((9(n′
f2f1
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2f1
)3m′
f2f1
+81(n′
f2f1
)4
))
m′
f2f1
)
m′
f2d
−
24( 3
√
12)
2
v′
f2f1
3
√√√√((9(n′
f2f1
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2f1
)3m′
f2f1
+81(n′
f2f1
)4
))
m′
f2f1
) − 72n
′
f2f1
√
6√
M ′
f2f1
m′
f2f1
(65’)27
Q˜f2f2 =
3
√√√√√√√
−(φ′2f22Π2f2d(1− βf2 − φf2)(βf2 + φf2)+
(1− βf2 − φf2 − θ′f21 − θ′f22)2Π2f2f1(1− βf2 − φf2)(βf2 + φf2))2
βf2
1
Πf2d
β′f21+φf2Π
−1
f2f1
φ′f21
+pIf2
Id
η′ + pLf2
Ld
γ′
PQf2
26In (64’), M ′
f2d
= 3
√
12
 3
√√√√((9(n′
f2d
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2d
)3m′
f2d
+81(n′
f2d
)4
))
m′
f2d
)2+4v′
f2d
3√12m′
f2d
m′
f2d
3
√√√√((9(n′
f2d
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2d
)3m′
f2d
+81(n′
f2d
)4
))
m′
f2d
) ,
m′
f2d
= −θ′2f22(1 − βf2 − φf2)(βf2 + φf2)(pQf2(qf2 − Edf2 − Ef1f2) − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)−2 −
φ′2f22φf2(1−φf2)(pQf2f1 (qf1−Edf1−Qf1f1)−pIf2f1 Id−pLf2f1Ld)−2, n′f2d = −βf2β′f21(pQf2(qf2−
Edf2−Ef1f2)−pIf2 1η′ Id−pLf2 1γ′Ld), and v′f2d = (βf2−β
′
f21−β′f22)2(pQf2f1 (qf1−Edf1−Qf1f1)−
pIf2f1 Id − pLf2f1Ld)2βf2(1− βf2).
27In (65’),M ′
f2f1
= 3
√
12
 3
√√√√((9(n′
f2f1
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2f1
)3m′
f2f1
+81(n′
f2f1
)4
))
m′
f2f1
)2+4v′
f2f1
3√12m′
f2f1
m′
f2d
3
√√√√((9(n′
f2f1
)2+
√(
−768(v′
f2f1
)3m′
f2f1
+81(n′
f2f1
)4
))
m′
f2f1
) ,
m′
f2f1
= −(βf2 − β′f21 − β′f22)2βf2(1− βf2)(pQf2d (qd −Qdd −Ef1d)− pIf2d Id − pLf2dLd)−2 − (1−
βf2−φf2−θ′f21−θ′f22)2(1−βf2−φf2)(βf2+φf2)(pQf2(qf2−Edf2−Ef1f2)−pIf2 1η′ Id−pLf2 1γ′Ld)−2,
n′f2f1 = −φf2φ′f21(pQf2(qf2 − Edf2 − Ef1f2) − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld), and v′f2f1 =
φ222(pQf2d (qd −Qdd − Ef1d)− pIf2d Id − pLf2dLd)2φf2(1− φf2).
33
=3
√√√√√√√√√√√√√√√√
−(φ′2f22(pQf2d (qd −Qdd − Ef1d)−
pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)2(1− βf2 − φf2)(βf2 + φf2)+
(1− βf2 − φf2 − θ′f21 − θ′f22)2(pQf2f1 (qf1 − Edf1 −Qf1f1)
−pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)2(1− βf2 − φf2)(βf2 + φf2))2
βf2(pQf2d (qd −Qdd − Ef1d)− pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)−1β′f21+
φf2(pQf2f1 (qf1 − Edf1 −Qf1f1)− pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)−1φ′f21
+pIf2
Id
η′ + pLf2
Ld
γ′
PQf2
(66)
Substitute Q˜f2d , Q˜f2f1 , and Q˜f2f2 into (58) to (63) and solving the nine simul-
taneous equations with nine unknown variables, the relationships among Q∗dd , E
∗
df1
,
E∗df2 , E
∗
f1d
, Q∗f1f1 , E
∗
f1f2
, Q∗f2d , Q
∗
f2f1
, and Q∗f2f2 can be found out analytically in the
end. Factually, based on the discussion of the model, we have already had the result
for Q∗f2f2 which should be equal to zero. The rest variables are expressed by (67) to
(73):
Q∗dd = − b4a + 12
√
b2
4a2
− 2c
3a
+ 1
8
(c2−3bd+12ae)
3a 3
√√√√√√√√√√√√
2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace
+
√√√√ (−4(c2 − 3bd+ 12ae)3+
(2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace)2
+1
2
√√√√√√√√√
b2
2a2
− 4c
3a
− 1
8
(c2−3bd+12ae)
3a 3
√√√√√√√√√√√√
2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace
+
√√√√ (−4(c2 − 3bd+ 12ae)3+
(2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace)2
+
(− b3
a3
+ 4bc
a2
− 8d
a
)
4
√√√√√√√√√√√√√√
b2
4a2
− 2c
3a
+ 1
8
(c2−3bd+12ae)
3a 3
√√√√√√√√√√√√√√√√
2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace
+
√√√√ (−4(c2 − 3bd+ 12ae)3+
(2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace)2
+ 8
3a
3
√√√√√√√√
2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace+√√√√ (−4(c2 − 3bd+ 12ae)3+
(2c3 − 9bcd+ 27ad2 + 27b2e− 72ace)2
(67)28
28In (67), a = −P 3Qd(1 − βd − φd)φ′d3pEdf1 , b = 3P 2Qd(1 − βd − φd)φ′d3pEdf1A + P 3Qd(φdφ′d3Z −
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E∗df1 =
1
pQf2d
(− 3
√√√√ (−pIf2 Idη′ −pLf2 Ldγ′ )3
((1−βf2−φf2−θ′f21−θ
′
f22
)2(1−βf2−φf2)(βf2+φf2))2−φ′2f22(1−βf2−φf2)(βf2+φf2))
βf2β
′
f21
+φf2φ
′
f21
−pIf2dId − pLf2dLd) + qd −Q∗dd(68)
E∗df2 =
1
6a′
3
√√√√√√√√√√√
36b′c′a′ − 108d′(a′)2 − 8(b′)3+
12
√
3
√√√√√√√
4(c′)3a′ − (c′)2(b′)2
−18b′c′a′d′+
27(d′)2(a′)2 + 4d′(b′)3
a′
−2
3
3c′a′−(b′)2
a′ 3
√√√√√√√√√√√√

36b′c′a′ − 108d′(a′)2 − 8(b′)3+
12
√
3
√√√√ 4(c′)3a′ − (c′)2(b′)2−
18b′c′a′d′ + 27(d′)2(a′)2 + 4d′(b′)3
a′

−1
3
b′
a′
(69)29
E∗df1 = E
∗
f1d
(70)
Q∗dd = Q
∗
f1f1
(71)
E∗df2 = E
∗
f1f2
(72)
Q∗f2d = Q
∗
f2f1
(73)
(70)-(73) reflect that the corporation d and the corporation f1 are symmetric,
which is not only represented in their exports to the markets of each other and
the market of the developing country, but also in the FDI from the developing
(1−βd−φd)φ′d3w+(1−βd−φd)φ′d3pEdf1H), c = 3P 2QdA(φdφ′d3Z − (1−βd−φd)φ′d3w+(1−βd−
φd)φ′d3pEdf1H) + β
′2
d4p
2
Edf1
(pEdf1H − w)ZN, d = 3PQd(φdφ′d3Z − (1 − βd − φd)φ′d3w + (1 − βd −
φd)φ′d3pEdf1H)A
2−(β′2d4p2Edf12HN(pEdf1H−w)Z−2β
′2
d4pEdf1wN), e = A
3(1−βd−φd)φ′d3pEdf1 −
[(2β′2d4pEdf1HN − β′2d4p2Edf1H
2N − β′2d4w2N + (βd − β′d3 − β′d4)2Z2N)(pEdf1H − w)Z], Z =√
v′df1
(φd−φ′d3−φ′d4)2φd(1−φd) , v
′
df1
= (φd−φ′d3−φ′d4)2(pEdf2 (qf2−E∗df2)−pIEdf2 Id−pLEdf2Ld)
2φd(1−
φd), w = pIEdf1 Id + pLEdf1Ld, N = βd(1− βd), A = pIdId + pLdLd, and H = qf1 −Q
∗
f2d
.
29In (69), a′ = −(βf1 − β′f13 − β′f14)2p3Ef1f2 , b
′ = (βf1 − β′f13 − β′f14)2[p3Ef1f23qf2 − 3p
2
Ef1f2
B′2],
c′ = (βf1−β′f13−β′f14)2[−3p3Ef1f2 q
2
f2−6p2Ef1f2B
′qf2+pEf1f2C
′], d′ = −(1−βf1−φf1)(pEf1f2 θ′f13)+
(βf1− β′f13− β′f14)2(3pEf1f2 qf2B′2−B′3)φf1(1−φf1)) + (βf1− β′f13− β′f14)2qf23− (βf1− β′f13−
β′f14)
23p2Ef1f2 q
2
f2B
′(pEf1f2 qf2−B′)C ′, A′ = pIEf1d Id+pLEf1dLd, B
′ = pIEf1f2 Id+pLEf1f2Ld, and
C ′ = (Q∗f1f1PQf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)3(βf1(pEf1d (qd −Q∗f2d −Q∗dd)−A′)−1β′f13 + (φ′2f14(pEf1d (qd −
Q∗f2d −Q∗dd)−A′)2φf1(1− φf1).
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counterpart in the markets of these two countries. From (67) to (73)30, we can
easily find out such a relationship as the higher Q∗dd , the lower E
∗
df1
[see (68)]. Other
ones we are most interested in are among Q∗f2d , E
∗
df2
, and E∗df1 . The comparative
statics relationships among them can be drawn through the variables C ′, c′, d′, and
Z (see footnotes 27 and 28), which have been approximately represented by Figures
1 to 5:
Figure 1
Figure 2
30We can notice that these expressions and optimal solutions in the section 1.3 are not related
with the discount term r.
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Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
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The five figures depict:
Q∗f2d ↑=⇒
C ′ ↓=⇒
 c′ ↓d′ ↑ =⇒
 E∗df2 ↓=⇒ Z ↑E∗df2 ↑=⇒ Z ↓

=⇒

 Q∗dd ↑or Q∗dd ↓

Combining (68)
 =⇒
 E∗df1 ↓or E∗df1 ↑
 (74)
(74) argues that increase of Q∗f2d would lead to two possibilities of changes of
E∗df2 , Q
∗
dd
and E∗df1 because of the higher complexity when considering the interaction
of the three corporations. The finding here accounts that even direct investment
from the developing corporation in the developed markets is increasing, trade or
direct investment between the other two developed corporations can also rise while
maintaining higher export to the developing one, which exactly serves as an indirect
proof that intraindustry would more likely happen between developed countries.
It can be seen, when there is higher amount of trade and direct investment taking
place among the three corporations, it is likelier that more trade or FDI between the
two from the developed countries is of intraindustry (if the corporations from the
developed countries are from a same industry) or is of interindustry (if the corpora-
tions from the developed countries are from different industries), and more exports
from the two developed corporations to the developing one which is obviously one-
way (it can be equivalent to say the developing country imports unilaterally); when
there is lower amount of trade and direct investment among the three corporations,
it is more likely that trade or FDI between the two developed corporations and ex-
port31 to the developing country decreases simultaneously. Though the result allows
a lower volume of trade between the two developed countries, it does not weaken
our argument after all. Since in that case, export from the two developed countries
to the developing one would also decline. From (74), we can settle with the judge-
ment, which is, if there is higher volume of (two-way) trade or direct investment
happening, it will only happen between developed countries.
31The one way export in most cases is of interindustry in the real economy.
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Till now, according to the definition of So¨dersten and Reed (1994) about IIT,
it is clear that IIT or intraindustry investment would more likely occur between
developed countries, for FDI from developing countries in developed ones and export
from developed countries to developing ones can not constitute the so-called IIT.
Therefore, from the model, it is not difficult to infer that not only intraindustry
trade or investment, but also interindustry trade or investment would more likely
happen between themselves.
Another trade pattern, i.e., intrafirm trade, can also be intuitively explained by
the chapter. It is argued that intrafirm trade “plays a critical role in the operations
of multinational companies” and mentions there is positive relationship “...between
the intrafirm-trade shares and trading-partner income levels...” and “U.S.-MNC
manufacturing production is largely concentrated in high-income countries”32. Be-
yond a doubt, it is conceivable that intrafirm trade mainly centers in developed
countries from the model. Since trade or investment, no matter whether it is in-
terindustry or intraindustry, would more likely occur between developed countries,
intrafirm trade (which can be intraindustry or interindustry) would be more possi-
ble to happen between them too. To developing countries, investment in developed
countries is more salutary than trade with them, therefore, intrafirm trade would
less likely happen between developing, i.e., lower income countries33.
The model itself does not cover the information of non-foreign-oriented corpora-
tions. We need to have some coupe de plume on it for the sake of completeness of the
chapter. Foreign-oriented corporations and non-foreign-oriented corporations differ
in the perspective of the goods they produce. These two types of corporations of a
same country type will employ labor and capital of a same technological level when
they are in an autarchy economy. The cost they pay to labor and capital should be
the same resulted from market-setting pricing assumption. When the economy be-
32See Zeile, W. J. (1997), “US intrafirm trade in goods, ” Survey of Current Business,
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ai/0297iid/maintext.htm.
33On the contrary, Helpman (1984) suggests the likelihood of intrafirm trade (headquarters
services of a MNC exported to its subsidiaries in a foreign country) would be higher when the
difference in factor endowments is higher. As an extension of Helpman (1984), intrafirm trade in
Helpman (1985) is involved with intermediate inputs instead of headquarters services. Both the
papers make use of assumption of increasing return or monopolistic competition.
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comes an open one, we have known that foreign-oriented corporations of developing
countries will not produce in their home market any more34, since they can produce
more at a same cost level in developed countries. A potential question may be why
the non-foreign-oriented corporations would not follow their foreign-oriented coun-
terparts to conduct international exchange. The answer is they can if they produce
a foreign-oriented type of goods. They would also consider a trade-off of whether it
is worthy of doing so, since when the foreign-oriented corporations leave the home
market, the employable amount of labor and capital would be relatively higher, and
it may be more profitable to continue to be non-foreign-oriented. Vice versa, al-
though a foreign-oriented corporation of developing countries would prefer to go to
invest in developed markets, it is not necessary for all foreign-oriented firms of the
developing country to do so. The model implies the higher gap of technological level
of productive factors with relatively lower increase of nominal wage gap between de-
veloped and developing countries, the more foreign-oriented corporations from the
developing countries conduct FDI in the developed ones.
Moreover, the model has naturally let us have theoretical foundation of reviewing
policies of introducing FDI in some developing countries, like China. China is the
country that has the most FDI inflow in the developing would. It can be argued
that cheap labor force may matter, but, from the model, it is never an important
factor since the majority of them are less skilled. Obviously, China’s investment
policies favorable to FDI plays the leading role instead. With China being acceded
to the WTO, to commit the principle of National Treatment, a unified investment
policy is expected to be enforced applicable to all domestic and foreign corporations
in the country after a transition period. One of the causal results can be that capital
(containing FDI) outflow may increase. In the past few years, capital outflow from
China was in a high magnitude (for example, see Sicular, 1998). It is estimated
China’s capital outflow occupied 60 percent of total foreign capital inflow in 1997
(see Xing, 2000). In 1998, the amount of capital outflow was US$ 48 billion35,
compared to the actual FDI inflow of US$ 52.13 billion (from statistics of Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of China). The optimistic expectation
34They still can be multinational corporations since their headquarters do not necessarily move
to the developed countries.
35See “Falsified export claims boost capital flight in China, ” Asia Times, July 2, 1999.
40
expressed by many Chinese scholars and government officials in a surge of FDI
after entry into the WTO does not make much sense. Further, China’s previous
investment policy might be only tactically right, but not strategically. The strategic
one should have at least made the top priority aiming at raising local labor skill in
the industries that permit foreign investment, which has to be expanded to almost
all the industries from the day of accession to the WTO on.
1.5 Conclusion
Applying human capital theory and an optimal control model within a perfect com-
petition framework, this chapter has figured out why IIT or intraindustry investment
more likely happen between developed countries.
The novelty of the model is that it offers a new way to capture realistic economic
behavior of multinational corporations. Specification of stochastic disturbance and
interdependence in dynamics of profit change, and interaction of three representative
corporations are the marked characteristics of the model though it is involved with
tedious algebraic calculation.
Through the general theoretical framework, we can also comprehend several
international economic issues such as interindustry trade, interindustry investment
and intrafirm trade. They, as IIT does, more probably take place between developed
countries. The key theoretical question “why is there such a large volume of trade
between countries with similar endowments?” mentioned in Bhagwati and Davis
(1999) has thus been answered. Analogous to China, to other developing countries,
the chapter has clearly implied and recommended skill upgrading of available labor
force through various effective measures like promoting education would be the most
farseeing approach for increase of FDI inflow.
The chapter tenders a profit-driven explanation about why a corporation likes
to participate in international trade or become a multinational, which complements
the available theories of multinational corporations and international business lit-
erature. From the chapter, it can be understood that traditional trade models are
not necessary to be cast to the winds when observing IIT related with differentiated
goods. Theories from supply side still should not be overlooked.
It should be pointed out that from the chapter we can not judge what on earth
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trade and direct investment between developed countries is a pair of substitute or
complement, but the distinction is not crucial for these findings. Since trade or
direct investment between developed countries can gain the same level of profit in
the model, it does not make much sense to discuss whether it is a substitute or not.
Noting there are quite a few empirical papers studying IIT, from which it can be
seen that not all theories of IIT have not been well proved36, nevertheless, a similar
attempt based on the chapter is possible for the future research.
36There are abundant empirical studies on IIT. Hoftyzer (1975) and Kennedy and McHugh (1980)
test the Linder’s hypothesis without showing support. Hufbauer (1970) and Baldwin (1971) find
mixed results about economies of scale and trade pattern. Greenaway and Milner (1989) survey
relatively newer empirical literature around three hypotheses of IIT: country-specific, industry
specific and policy-based, including Loertscher andWolter (1980), Caves (1981), Bergstrand (1983),
Havrylyshyn and Cwan (1983), Greenaway and Milner (1984), and Balassa (1986) etc., whose
results are not overwhelmingly uniform yet.
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2 Why is it important for a multinational cor-
poration to hold technological leadership? A
technological transfer perspective
Internalization theory teaches that a corporation should not transfer technology
(which can be any type) out of its corporate precinct. Like other business mea-
sures such as licensing, technological transfer does happen between corporations or
countries. As a kind of factor movement, technological transfer mainly flows from
developed countries to developing ones. What can a developed corporation or coun-
try obtain from and how does it manage its technological transfer? Why hasn’t the
technological gap between developing and developed countries shrunk? Through
studying why a corporation hopes to keep technological leadership, the answer has
been offered by a theoretical model in the chapter.
The model points out: restrained or managed technological transfer from a cor-
poration or a country with superior technology coexists with reduction of profit from
FDI of the transferee in the domestic market of the transferrer and no explicit effect
on profit from its own home market, though it positively but trivially affects the
latter’s research and development; on the opposite, benefit for a corporation or a
country with advanced technology is substantial due to the fact of enjoying higher
employment of its domestic productive factors, higher total profit level in both of
its home and foreign markets and grasping the initiative of technological transfer
which can be strategically used.
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2.1 Introduction
In the chapter one, we have known that multinational corporations of developed
countries would choose to export to developing countries rather than investing there.
But in real economy, FDI in developing countries from developed ones is normal.
The reasons causing this can be manifold. Traditional FDI theories argue existence
of FDI is because, in the real economy, there is transport cost, trade barrier, and
imperfect competition. Among others, a representative theory is OLI paradigm.
The eclectic paradigm views FDI is the consequence when a corporation complies
with three advantages, i.e., ownership, location and internalization. The chapter
would be more closely related with the theory of internalization advantage. But in
comparison, the chapter makes a stride forward.
According to the theory of internalization advantage, a corporation protects its
ownership advantage by exclusively utilizing only in the internal corporate environ-
ment and not disseminating it through external markets. But this act is obviously
passive and it is not really in agreement with the stylized fact that technological
transfer does happens in the external environment of the corporation. With regard
to the typical business behavior, from the walls outside the corporations or coun-
tries involved, there is a common understanding that developing corporations or
countries would benefit from technological transfer, regarded as followers in terms
of their lower level of technology and science, and of course their lower quality of
economic development. Ironically, one may be confused at but have to admit the
fact that the technological gap between developing and developed countries has not
been closer and competitiveness of developing corporations or countries in the world
market should have been stronger. With more clear-mindedness and attentiveness,
it is not hard to find technological transfer from developed countries is always under
various restrictions (or not the most advanced). A question mark for this kind of
technological transfer rises naturally: whether would it really do good to the interna-
tional and domestic economic performance of developing corporations or countries?
To the best of my knowledge, it is rather surprising that concern of academia and
relevant countries has not been aroused around this topic, at least on a theoretical
basis.
For this reason, and as a contribution, in the chapter, we build a theoretical
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model, from which it can be found out that a corporation can benefit from limited
transfer of its ownership advantage, since in that way can the corporation from the
developed country achieve a higher profit via reducing the one reaped from FDI
conducted by the developing corporation in its domestic market.
Unlike the chapter one37, the chapter permits mobility of labor and capital and
technological gap would be endogenized. Even though free mobility of productive
factors can not guarantee catching up in economic performance38, under the cir-
cumstances such as that the freedom of movement is limited, it would be much less
robust to support convergence in production, technology and so on.
Since limited factor movement may not bolster up catching up, we argue in the
chapter that FDI and its affiliated technological transfer in developing countries
may be the outcome of MNCs’ strategy for keeping a higher level of return and
maintaining its technological leadership.
The following text is organized as follows: section 2 is theoretical foundation;
section 3 is the model; section 4 is policy implications and section 5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical foundation
Technological leadership is a symbol of high competitiveness of a corporation and
thus a country. It can lead to a superior position in international trade and FDI
according to Ricardo’s comparative advantage and the theory of internalization ad-
vantage. From these classical theories, it can be inferred that every corporation
or every country would try its best to obtain technological leadership as a tool of
obtaining markets, profit and competitive advantage permanently.
However, technological leadership of the leader can disappear if the follower
catches up. How to achieve this catching up in the reality for followers? (Objective)
technological spillover39 and (subjective) imitation may be not sufficient since these
37The chapter one excludes the possibility that developed countries can be followed up by de-
veloping ones as a matter of fact where there is no labor and capital movement and technological
gap is exogenous.
38The chapter four would have more details on this point.
39Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) explain a MNC would bring its technology abroad
because of a lower production cost in the host markets. Though this technology flow has nothing
to do with technological transfer, possibility of spillover from which can not be excluded. Another
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forms of technological mobility are not very helpful for the follower to grasp the key
of technological innovation and progress. In other words, technological spillover and
imitation can endow the follower with a veil rather than a pith. We argue there are
two essential ways: one is by means of their own research and development40 and
the other is through technological transfer sourced from trade or MNCs’ existence.
Research and development is the cradle of any technological innovation and
progress. Unless there is free lunch, research and development of a developing corpo-
ration or a country may be the most important for technological convergence41. In
recent literature of endogenous growth theory, along an essentially same line which
can be dated back to Schumpeter (1942), such as Lucas (1988), Romer (1986, 1990),
and Grossman and Helpman (1990b, 1991), technology has been incorporated in
growth models endogenously, which is in order to explain long run economic growth
of a country. Obviously, research and development, especially an endogenous one,
is one of the most important pinches of endogenous technological change and thus
economic growth (also see Krugman, 1990).
Technological transfer42 has been touched upon in trade theory literature. Ver-
non (1966) and Krugman (1979a) give birth to the so-called “product life cycle”
model43, which virtually exogenizes44 unequal technological roles of developing and
developed countries with an unchanged technology movement mode and interna-
tional trade pattern.
Technological transfer is more discussed in literature with MNCs being involved.
Related studies conveys the knowledge that technology can be transferred through
form of technological spillover is by way of reading scientific journals (see Eaton and Kortum,
1996).
40Research and development can also be understood as learning by doing (see Boldrin and
Sheinkman, 1988, and Grossman and Helpman, 1990 for example).
41This point would be further illustrated in the following text.
42Of course, technological transfer would happen when there is technological gap between cor-
porations (see Wang and Blomstro¨m, 1992, and Glass and Saggi, 1998).
43The product life cycle model assuming technological innovation only happens in the developed
countries, describes that developed countries would export new products to the developing ones,
while the developing ones export older products back to the developed ones after they have grasped
the transferred (older) technologies of producing these older products.
44Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), and Grossman and Helpman (1991a) consider trade with
endogenous technological innovation.
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foreign direct investment (see Findlay, 1978, Mansfield and Romeo, 1980, and Wang,
1990), and technology licensing (see Ethier and Markusen, 1996 and Horstmann and
Markusen, 1996) while the latter is less relevant to the chapter.
There is no doubt about the function of FDI as a channel of technological transfer
(and spillover). However, previous studies have not brought into view why transfer
from developed countries always happens to less advanced technology. Though as
the majority of theoretical studies mentioned above, most empirical ones find out
that FDI has a positive effect on productivity of host countries (for example, see
Coe and Helpman, 1995, Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister, 1997, and Audretsch 1991,
1995)45, why would there be the statement that “developing countries set the pace
for world economic growth during the past two decades, but the gap between leaders
and laggards grew wider”? (The World Bank, 1999)
Among others, there may still be unintelligibility about the phenomenon that
technological transfer is typically moving from developed countries to developing
ones. This chapter will provide a clue to the issue by accounting for why a MNC
would like to keep technological leadership.
2.3 The model
We would consider a theoretical model which can accommodate technological trans-
fer and research and development within a single framework. From the model, we
can know what the difference is when technological transfer happens in two distinct
circumstances, i.e., when there is research and development in developing countries
and when there is not (in both situations, there is research and development in
developed countries). Based on the realistic events, we suppose technological trans-
fer from the corporations of the developed countries is limited since the developed
corporations and countries would manage to maintain a technological gap with the
developing one.
There are two countries d and f producing two different products, within each
of which the market is perfectly competitive and there are numerous symmetric
corporations producing a same type of product, such that prices are determined by
45An exception is due to Djankov and Koekman (2000), which find there is a negative effect of
FDI on domestic firms in Czech industry.
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the market and there is no transport cost. Owing to the assumptions, we can view
countries d and f are actually the aggregates of the corporations within each of
them. Studying the behavior of an arbitrary corporation of a country is the same
as studying the country itself.
We first look at the case when there is technological gap between the two cor-
porations, which is embodied in difference of capability of productive factors they
employ. From this part, an initial impression would be possessed about the necessity
of keeping technological leadership.
We assume labor and investment from the arbitrary corporation d of the country
d is more skillful than that from the one called f of the country f. Following the
chapter one, one unit of labor or capital of the corporation d is a multiplication of
that of the corporation f . The relationships of labor and investment employed by
the corporations d and f can hence be denoted as:
Ld = θLf , θ  1 (1)
Id = υIf , υ  1 (2)
The profit functions of the corporation d and f in their home markets are given
in (3) and (4):
Πd = PdQd − cdQd (3)
Πf = PfQf − cfQf (4)
where the Cobb-Douglas production functions are Qd = adI
βd
d L
γd
d and Qf =
afI
βf
f L
γf
f , where ad and af are TFP; Id, Ld, If and Lf are investment/capital and
labor employed by the corporations d and f in the countries d and f respectively.
Applying the same way of transformation, we can have the profit functions of
corporations d and f in their corresponding host market:
Πdf = PfQdf − cfQdf (5)
Πfd = PdQfd − cdQfd (6)
where Qdf = adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
and Qfd = afdI
βfd
fd
L
γfd
fd
; Idf means the amount of in-
vestment of the corporation d in the country f ; Ldf is the amount of labor employed
by the corporation d in the country f and so on.
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With (3) and (5), subject to (1) and (2), and suppose demand for products of
the two corporations d and f in the country d is qd which is a constant equal to the
sum of Qd and Qfd . Similarly, qf is equal to the sum of Qf and Qdf . We can have
the following expression of maximization of total profit of the corporation d:
maxTΠd = TΠd = Πd +Πdf = Qd(Pd − cd) +Qdf (Pf − cf )
= adI
βd
d L
γd
d (Pd − cd) + adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
(Pf − cf )
= adI
βd
d L
γd
d (Pd − cd) + (qf − afIβff Lγff )(Pf − cf )
= adI
βd
d L
γd
d (Pd − cd) + (qf − af ( Idυ )βf (Ldθ )γf )(Pf − cf ) (7)
To solve for the optimal employment of labor and the optimal quantity of in-
vestment in the home market of the corporation d, let the Lagrangian be
ld = adI
βd
d L
γd
d (Pd − cd) + (qf − af ( Idυ )βf (Ldθ )γf )(Pf − cf ) (8)
The FOCs are:
dld
dLd
= 0 = adI
βd
d γdL
γd−1
d (Pd − cd)− af ( Idυ )βfγf (Ldθ )γf−1 1θ (Pf − cf ) (9)
dld
dId
= 0 = afβfI
βf−1
f L
γf
f (Pf − cf )− adβd(υIf )βd−1υ(θLf )γd(Pd − cd) (10)
(9) can be written as
adI
βd
d γd(Pd−cd)
af (
Id
υ
)
βf γf
1
θ
γf
(Pf−cf )
=
L
γf−1
d
L
γd−1
d
= L
γf−γd
d (11)
Taking natural logarithm on both sides, (11) is changed into
ln ad − ln af + βf ln υ + (βd − βf ) ln Id + ln γd − ln γf+
ln(Pd − cd) + ln θγf − ln(Pf − cf ) = (γf − γd) lnLd (12)
Similarly, (10) can be written as
adβdL
γd
d (Pd−cd)
afβf
1
υ
βf
(
Ld
θ
)
γf (Pf−cf )
=
I
βf−1
d
I
βd−1
d
(13),
whose natural logarithm form is
ln ad − ln af + βf ln υ + ln βd − ln βf + (γd − γf ) lnLd + ln θγf+
ln(Pd − cd)− ln(Pf − cf ) = (βf − βd) ln Id (14)
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Rearranging (13) and (14), we would have L∗d = exp
ln ad−ln af+βf ln υ+(βd−βf ) ln I∗d+ln γd−ln γf+ln(Pd−cd)+ln θγf−ln(Pf−cf )
γf−γd
I∗d = exp
ln ad−ln af+βf ln υ+lnβd−lnβf+(γd−γf ) lnL∗d+ln θγf+ln(Pd−cd)−ln(Pf−cf )
βf−βd
(16)46
where
ln γd − ln γf = ln βd − ln βf (16’)
L∗d and I
∗
d is the total amount of labor and capital from the country d employed
in its home market d. Given the assumption that factors can be mobile between the
two countries, in this chapter, we consider the case that a corporation employs only
its home factors in both markets. From (16), we can see that the higher θ and υ,
the higher employment of L∗d and I
∗
d . That is to say, the higher gap in capability
of labor and investment between two corporations, the technological leader would
enjoy higher factors employment.
The optimal profit of the corporation d in both its home and host markets is
therefore:
TΠ∗d = adI
∗βd
d L
∗γd
d (Pd − cd) + (qf − af ( I
∗
d
υ
)βf (
L∗d
θ
)γf )(Pf − cf ) (17)
Now we turn to the profit maximization problem of the corporation f of the
developing country f. Its objective function is
maxTΠf = Πf +Πfd = afI
βf
f L
γf
f (Pf − cf ) + (qd − adIβdd Lγdd )(Pd − cd)
= afI
βf
f L
γf
f (Pf − cf ) + (qd − ad(υIf )βd(θLf )γd)(Pd − cd) (18)
The FOCs are:
dTΠf
dLf
= 0 = afI
βf
f γfL
γf−1
f (Pf − cf )− ad(υIf )βdγd(θLf )γd−1θ(Pd − cd) (19)
dTΠf
dIf
= 0 = afβfI
βf−1
f L
γf
f (Pf − cf )− adβd(υIf )βd−1υ(θLf )γd(Pd − cd) (20)
(19) and (20) can be written as
af I
βf
f γf (Pf−cf )
ad(υIf )
βdγdθ
γd (Pd−cd) =
Lf
γd−1
L
γf−1
f
(21)
afβfL
γf
f (Pf−cf )
adβdυ
βdLf
γdθγd (Pd−cd) =
If
βd−1
I
βf−1
f
(22)
46It is easy to prove that L
∗
d
L∗f
= θ and I
∗
d
I∗f
= υ.
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which can be transformed into
ln af − ln ad + (βf − βd) ln If − βd ln υ + ln γf − ln γd − ln θγd
+ ln(Pf − cf )− ln(Pd − cd) = (γd − γf ) lnLf (23)
ln af − ln ad + ln βf − ln βd − βd ln υ − ln θγd + (γf − γd) lnLf+
ln(Pf − cf )− ln(Pd − cd) = (βd − βf ) ln If (24)
(23) and (24) give the optimal amount of labor and investment from the country
f employed by the corporation f in its home market: L∗f = exp
ln af−ln ad+(βf−βd) ln I∗f−βd ln υ+ln γf−ln γd−ln θγd+ln(Pf−cf )−ln(Pd−cd)
γd−γf
I∗f = exp
ln af−ln ad+lnβf−lnβd−βd ln υ−ln θγd+(γf−γd) lnL∗f+ln(Pf−cf )−ln(Pd−cd)
βd−βf
(25)
where (16’) is still satisfied.
The corresponding optimal profit of the corporation f in both its home and host
markets is:
TΠ∗f = afI
∗βf
f L
∗γf
f (Pf − cf ) + (qd − ad(υI∗f )βd(θL∗f )γd)(Pd − cd) (26)
From (25), we can see higher θ and υ will lead to lower employment of L∗f , I
∗
f . The
intuition is just on the opposite to the technology leader, i.e., the corporation d,
which suggests that the larger technological gap, the lower factors employment in
the technology follower.
Besides the relationship between technological gap and employment level, we
are also interested in another one between the gap and total profit of a corporation.
We can turn to (17) and (26), where the relationship between total profit and the
variables θ and υ for both corporations d and f is given.
Without violating the equality ln γf − ln γd = ln βf − ln βd, we can look at a
special case where γf = γd and βf = βd, meaning structure of production functions
of the corporations d and f is the same. It is not hard to find that TΠ∗d is positively
correlated, but TΠ∗f negatively correlated with θ and υ. Total profit of the corpo-
ration d would become higher while total profit of the corporation f suffers a loss
with increase of θ and υ.
The above text has shown the advantage of holding technological leadership for
a corporation and a country initially through investigating its impact on factors
employment and total profit. In the following sections, we will go further to look
into the issue by considering when technological transfer happens.
51
2.3.1 Technological transfer
In this section, we would take into account two situations when technological transfer
happens. As mentioned above, developed countries will always have research and
development. The developing country, as a transferee of technology, which may or
may not have research and development. We will investigate the effect of whether
there is research and development in the developing country on the production and
factors employment of both the developed and developing countries.
When there is no research and development in the corporation f We
assume technological transfer is only a proportional part (due to the expounding
of the text above) of research and development of the corporation d, i.e., Tr =
ψRd,where ψ ∈ (0, 1), while Rd is a function of labor employment and one lag
variable of itself47:
Rd = Ld
ςRd,−11−ς (27)
With (27), technological transfer can be written as:
Tr = ψRd = ψLd
ςRd,−11−ς (28)
whose natural logarithm is
lnRd = ς lnLd + (1− ς) lnRd,−1 (29)
Solving the difference equation, we can have
lnRd = D(1− ς) + lnLd (30)
That is
Rd = exp (D(1− ς) + lnLd) (31)
D is a positive constant. Substituting the optimal labor employment of the cor-
poration d into (31), we will have its optimal research and development for achieving
the technological gap embodied in (1):
47So research and development is also modeled endogeneously in the chapter.
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R∗d = exp (D(1− ς) + lnL∗d) (32)
Since (27) can be written as
R∗d = L
∗
d
ςR∗d,−1
1−ς (33)
let (33) be equal to (32), which gives
D(1− ς) + lnL∗d = lnL∗dς + lnR∗d,−11−ς (34)
Therefore, L∗d is given by (35):
L∗d = exp
lnR∗d,−1
1−ς−D(1−ς)
(1−ς) (35)
The one lag of Rd, i.e., Rd,−1 mimics the function of learning by doing48, which is
“the steady improvement of productivity engendered by the experience of produc-
ing” (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, pp. 137).
We continue to write down the optimal production functions of the corporations
d and f for both markets:
Q∗d = ad(exp
ln ad−ln af+βf ln υ+lnβd−lnβf+(γd−γf ) lnL∗d+ln θγf+ln(Pd−cd)−ln(Pf−cf )
βf−βd )
βd
(exp
lnR∗d,−1
1−ς−D(1−ς)
(1−ς) )
γd (36)
Q∗f = af (exp
ln af−ln ad+(βf−βd) ln I∗f−βd ln υ+ln γf−ln γd−ln θγd+ln(Pf−cf )−ln(Pd−cd)
γd−γf )
βf
(exp
ln af−ln ad+lnβf−lnβd−βd ln υ−ln θγd+(γf−γd) lnL∗f+ln(Pf−cf )−ln(Pd−cd)
βd−βf )
γf (37)
From (36) and (37), it can be seen that only the corporation d can have a long run
production growth. This result adapts itself to endogenous growth theory. Without
research and development, the corporation f and the country f can not survive a
long run growth.
To increase Q∗d and therefore its profit, the corporation d may potentially widen
the gap by increasing its research and development and (35) is the mechanism it
can rely on, given the advantage of being a technological leader mentioned above.
48With similar spirit of Young (1991) and Stokey (1991) where learning is bounded, in the
chapter, we exclude the possibility of technological leapfrogging (see Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon,
1993).
53
In this chapter, we argue technological transfer from the corporation d can be,
on the one hand, based on the requirement from the developing country, on the
other hand, based on a certain strategic demand of the corporation d itself. To the
former consideration, as a kind of economic exchange, the corporation d transfers
technology in return for its share in the market of the developing country f . To the
latter consideration, technological transfer from the corporation may have whatso-
ever negative effect on the corporation f, which will be confirmed in the following
text.
Applying the optimal values of Id and Ld, there are two following expressions in
(38) and (39):
Π∗d
Π∗f
= ad(Pd−cd)
af (Pf−cf )I
∗βd−βf
f L
∗γd−γf
f υ
βdθγd (38)
Π∗fd
Π∗df
=
afd (Pd−cd)
adf (Pf−cf )
I
∗βfd−βdf
d L
∗γfd−γdf
d υ
−βfdθ−γfd (39)
When would technological transfer would reasonably happen, which can be re-
quired by the developing corporation or country f or completely decided by the
corporation or country d? Among others, the chapter argues that it may occur
when (39) is not an equality any more, say,
Π
′
fd
Π
′
df
≺ afd (Pd−cd)
adf (Pf−cf )
I
∗βfd−βdf
d L
∗γfd−γdf
d υ
−βfdθ−γfd (40)
when
exp
lnR′d,−1
1−ς−D(1−ς)
(1−ς)
exp
ln ad−ln af+βf ln υ+(βd−βf ) ln I∗d+ln γd−ln γf+ln(Pd−cd)+ln θ
γf−ln(Pf−cf )
γf−γd
 θ (40’)
where
R′d,−1  R∗d,−1
which means the profit of the corporation f in the market d over that of the
corporation d in the market f , has been broken to be less than before (the likely
case is that Π
′
df
increases or Π
′
fd
decreases), because research and development of the
corporation d has surpassed the level of maintaining (1). We can reach the following
result.
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Proposition 1 When the corporation f does not participate in research and devel-
opment, technological transfer from the corporation d is negatively correlated with
the profit from FDI of the corporation f in the home market of the corporation d
(i.e., the developed market).
P roof. We can prove this by observing the relationship between technological
transfer and profit from FDI of the corporation f in the developed counterpart is
negative. Technological transfer (the corporation d should control the amount of
technological transfer) is given by extra total profit of the corporation f in the two
markets:
ETΠf = PTrTr
′
= Π
′
df
(
afd (Pd−cd)
adf (Pf−cf )
I
∗βfd−βdf
d L
∗γfd−γdf
d υ
−βfdθ−γfd − Π
′
fd
Π
′
df
), where PTr
is the net benefit per unit Tr. The above equation can be written as:
Π
′
fd
= Π
′
df
afd (Pd−cd)
adf (Pf−cf )
I
∗βfd−βdf
d (exp(lnR
∗
d −D(1 − ς)))γfd−γdf υ−βfdθ−γfd − PTrTr′.
Given other variables, higher Tr
′
is accompanied with lower Π
′
fd
.
When there is research and development in the corporation f We assume
the function of research and development of the corporation f has a same structure
as the corporation d does.
lnRf = η lnLf + (1− η) lnRf,−1 (41)
Solving the difference equation, (41) becomes
lnRf = F (1− η) + lnLf (42)
Getting rid of the natural logarithm operator, we have
Rf = exp (F (1− η) + lnLf ) (43)
Easily, the optimal research and development of the corporations f when (1) is
maintained are given by:
R∗f = exp
(
F (1− η) + lnL∗f
)
(44)
Dividing (44) by (32), we will have
R∗d
R∗f
=
exp(D(1−ς)+lnL∗d)
exp(F (1−η)+lnL∗f)
(45)
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Then,
lnR∗d − lnR∗f = D(1− ς) + lnL∗d − F (1− η)− lnL∗f (46)
After necessary adjustment, (46) would be evolved into
L∗d = L
∗
f exp(lnR
∗
d − lnR∗f −D(1− ς) + F (1− η)) (47)
where
exp(lnR∗d − lnR∗f −D(1− ς) + F (1− η)) = θ (48).
From (48), it is clear that there is a negative relationship between R∗f and θ, which
argues the research and development in the corporation f would help reduce the
technological gap with the corporation d and thus the country d.
However, (48) can also become an inequality when competition in research and
development in both corporations deviates from the equilibrium in (1). We assume
the corporation d occupies the winning side and (48) turns into
exp(lnR
′
d − lnR′f −D(1− ς) + F (1− η))  θ (48’)
where
R
′
d
R
′
f
 R
∗
d
R
∗
f
What will happen if there is technological transfer from the corporation d to the
corporation f?
Proposition 2 When the corporation f participates in research and development,
technological transfer from the corporation d has a positive but trivial effect on re-
search and development of the former.
P roof. (45) can be transformed into: Tr
′
ψ
 exp
(
D(1−ς)+lnL′d
)
exp(F (1−η)+lnL′f)
R
′
f . Then it can
be seen that technological transfer from the corporation d does not help narrow the
technological gap between the corporations d and f.
Proposition 3 When the corporation f participates in research and development,
technological transfer from the corporation d is negatively correlated with its profit
of FDI in the developed country.
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P roof. The extra total profit of the corporation f in two markets is given by
ETΠf = PTrTr
′
= Π
′
df
(
afd (Pd−cd)
adf (Pf−cf )
I
∗βfd−βdf
d L
∗γfd−γdf
d υ
−βfdθ−γfd−Π
′
fd
Π
′
df
).
And Π
′
fd
= Π
′
df
afd (Pd−cd)
adf (Pf−cf )
I
∗βfd−βdf
d (L
∗
f exp ( lnR
∗
d− lnR∗f−D(1 − ς)+
F (1 − η)))γfd−γdf υ−βfdθ−γfd−PTrψ exp
 D(1− ς) + lnL′f exp(ln Tr′ψ −
lnR
′
f −D(1− ς) + F (1− η))
.
Given other variables, it can be seen that Tr
′
is negatively correlated with Π
′
fd
.
In summary, technological transfer would not increase the international compet-
itiveness of the corporation f no matter whether it conducts research and develop-
ment or not if changes of Πfd can be counted as an reference indicator.
Another two relevant propositions are as follows:
Proposition 4 Higher R
′
d leads to higher Π
′
d, the profit of the corporation d in its
domestic market. Higher R
′
f as a whole may lead to lower Π
′
d.
P roof. Π
′
d = adI
′βd
d L
′γd
d (Pd − cd)
= adI
′βd
d [L
′
f exp(lnR
′
d−lnR′f−D(1−ς)+F (1−η))]γd(Pd−cd). There is a positive
relationship between Π
′
d and R
′
d, but a negative one between Π
′
d and R
′
f .
Proposition 5 Higher R
′
f leads to higher Π
′
f , the profit of the corporation f in its
domestic market.
P roof. Π
′
f = afI
′βf
f L
′γf
f (Pf − cf )
= afI
′βf
f (
exp(ln Tr
′
ψ
−D(1−ς))
exp(ln Tr
′
ψ
−lnR′f−D(1−ς)+F (1−η))
)γf (Pf − cf ). Hence, there is a positive re-
lationship between Π
′
f and R
′
f .
From the Proposition 5, it can be seen that the effect of Tr
′
has been offset by the
numerator (exp(ln Tr
′
ψ
−D(1− ς))) and the denominator (exp(ln Tr′
ψ
− lnR′f −D(1−
ς)+F (1− η))) in the expression of Π′f . Tr′ can positively affect Π′f through R′f if it
benefits R
′
f (see the possibility from the Proposition 2). However, the Proposition 4
virtually implies that technological transfer threatening profit level in the domestic
market of the corporation d would be cautiously conducted. That is why inter-
national competitiveness of the corporation f can not be materially enhanced (see
the negative relationship between Π
′
fd
and Tr′ in the Proposition 3). Alternatively
speaking, the Proposition 5 (with the Proposition 2) argues technological transfer
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not essentially jeopardizing the interest of the corporation d in the counterpart f ’s
market can be implemented. With the Proposition 3, we can derive the fact that
profit level of the corporation d in the market f is positively associated with the
transfer. Henceforth, it is justified to say that economic performance of the corpo-
ration f in the home market might be trivially positively affected or even unaffected
by the transfer.
When research and development happens in both corporations d and f , we will
have new production functions of the two corporations:
Q
′
d = ad(exp
ln ad−ln af+βf ln υ+lnβd−lnβf+(γd−γf ) lnL′d+ln θγf+ln(Pd−cd)−ln(Pf−cf )
βf−βd )
βdL
′
f
exp(lnR
′
d − lnR′f −D(1− ς) + F (1− η))γd (49)
Q
′
f = af (exp
ln af−ln ad+(βf−βd) ln I′f−βd ln υ+ln γf−ln γd−ln θγd+ln(Pf−cf )−ln(Pd−cd)
γd−γf )
βf
(
exp(ln Tr
′
ψ
−D(1−ς))
exp(lnR
′
d−lnR
′
f−D(1−ς)+F (1−η))
)γf (50)
Not surprisingly, conducting research and development of the corporation f
would help it realize a sustainable growth of production. In other words, research
and development can inject force to the developing country f for a long run growth.
However, technological transfer does not substantially help the corporation f achieve
a higher Q
′
f from (50) as it does not explicitly help increase domestic profit Π
′
f .
Therefore, to the corporation f , technological transfer can be viewed as a kind
of remuneration. But to the corporation d, it has strategic implications since it can
be used to exchange for lower profit of its developing rival in the market d and thus
a decline of its total profit in both markets.
All in all, the above analysis has illustrated the importance of controlling tech-
nological leadership. And now, we will simply look back at the case supposing the
corporation f has followed up, i.e.,
Ld = Lf and Id = If (51)
In this situation, there is no need for technological transfer from the corporation
d, and we will have symmetric equilibrium for the two corporations.
Proposition 6 When there is no technological gap between the two corporations,
research and development of the corporations d and f will help increase both of its
domestic and foreign profit.
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When there is no technological gap between the corporations d and f , and for
simplicity we suppose the amount of labor and capital employed in home and foreign
markets by each corporation is identical, it is easy to show that the corresponding
profit functions of the two corporations in both markets are given by (52) to (55).
Π
′′
d = adI
′′βd
d [exp
(1−ς) lnR′′d,−1−D(1−ς)
(1−ς) ]
γd(Pd − cd) (52)49
Π
′′
df
= adf I
′′′βdf
df
[exp
(1−ς) lnR′′′d,−1−D(1−ς)
(1−ς) ]
γdf (Pf − cf ) (53)
Π
′′
f = afI
′′βf
f [exp
(1−η) lnR′′f,−1−F (1−η)
1−η ]
γf (Pf − cf ) (54)
Π
′′
fd
= afdI
′′′βfd
fd
[exp
(1−η) lnR′′′f,−1−F (1−η)
1−η ]
γfd (Pd − cd) (55)
From (52) to (55), Π
′′
d and Π
′′
df
can be seen that they are positively correlated with
Rd,−1 (R
′′
d,−1 and R
′′′
d,−1 is the equivalent amount of research and development for L
′′
d
and L
′′′
df
respectively) , while Π
′′
f and Π
′′
fd
is positively associated with Rf,−1.
There is not any negative impact on the profit of the corporation d in its home
and foreign markets, resulted from a full catching up of the late-starter f . The
Proposition 6 is merely a theoretical judgement. So what is the justification for
a developed corporation/country to set restrictions on technological transfer to a
developing one? Firstly, according to the model, we can see restrictive technological
transfer as a type of restrictive business measures (RBM) can be employed to pre-
vent the interest of a developed corporation in its home market from being harmed
(see the Proposition 4) during the process of catching up from the developing cor-
poration50. Secondly, no evidence gives sign that contemporary social mechanism
encourages and can retain such a positive sum game as realization of full techno-
logical convergence. Differences in economic institution, political system and social
environment among countries are contributing factors.
2.4 Policy implications
The text above has accounted a long-lasting ignored matter by reconsidering why a
MNC would strive to hold technological leadership. When referring to assistance to
49The evolution of L
′′
d , and the following L
′′′
df
, L
′′
f , and L
′′′
fd
is the same as that of L∗d given in
(35).
50Another argument is provided in Krugman (1986), which argues that technological advantage
of the developed one would fall and no real wage changes for its own products.
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developing countries, many academicians would succumb to the idea of technological
transfer. But the problem is how developing countries can benefit from it.
The chapter has provided an almost totally contrasting evidence for the percep-
tion of assisting developing countries through technological transfer. Not aiming
to veto the feasibility of the form of assistance, the chapter just hopes to activate
relevant re-evaluation. In a world with limited technological transfer or factor move-
ment, how much on earth can developing countries be helped? From the chapter, the
kind of restrained technological transfer may never be related with what developing
countries can look forward to. We do not deny the fact that technological transfer
can be availed by research and development of these countries, but it does nothing
more subsidiary else like lessening technological gap and promoting international
economic performance.
The centrality of the problem is in the end causally connected with the extent of
freedom of factor mobility. Yet, we would not expect there would be free mobility
of technological transfer at least in the current world system.
Two egregious policy prescriptions are listed below for references if there are no
favorably prominent changes in social institution, and international economic and
political relations in the world, or we can simply say, when factor movement is not
totally free in the world:
• Developing corporations and countries should strengthen their own research
and development and should not hold opportunistic attitude to refrained tech-
nological transfer from developed ones;
• Excessive conditions should be avoided in technological transfer from devel-
oped corporations and countries, especially in the case exceeding pure eco-
nomic consideration, such as inter-governmental international assistance.
2.5 Conclusion
Through studying why a corporation hopes to keep technological leadership, the
chapter has answered what a developed corporation or country can gain from and
how it manages its technological transfer.
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We obtain the result from the framework where factors can not be freely mobile
between countries, since the developed corporation or country will keep the techno-
logical gap between itself and the developing one. In this situation, we can not see
technological transfer brings any substantial benefit to a developing corporation or
country.
The theoretical model reveals the following points:
• The higher technological gap, the higher domestic factors employment in a
developed corporation or country, but less domestic factors employment in a
developing corporation or country;
• Restricted technological transfer is negatively correlated with profit of a devel-
oping corporation or country in its foreign market, but has no explicit effect
on its profit in its home market, not helping diminish its technological gap;
a developed corporation or country does not suffer anything but possesses a
higher total profit level sourced from both its domestic and foreign markets;
• Research and development is the key of generating higher production, profit,
and a long run growth for a developing corporation or country. And it is the
sole lane of effectuating technological catching up with its developed counter-
part when RBM is prevalent.
Like managed trade between countries, restrained technological transfer between
corporations can be vividly viewed as a micro protectionist mirror image of the
former, i.e., a macro one. In sum, being a technological leader, a multinational
corporation benefits materially, not only can enjoy a higher level of employment of
its domestic productive factors, higher total profit level, but also grasps the initiative
of technological transfer by using it strategically rather than merely apparently
handing out assistance or compensation to the inferior one. And that is one of the
reasons why the gap between developing and developed countries is hard to be filled
up or becomes even larger.
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3 Multinational corporations and market risk: A
real market perspective
Common sense tells us that market risk seems to affect negatively the operation
of a risk-averse corporation. However, an experience from life enlightens that the
negativity effect of a thing can always be availed positively, without exception to
market risk. With the philosophy of life in mind, the chapter explains why it seems
that a corporation is willing to conduct FDI in foreign markets confronting various
market risks.
This chapter studies how market risk can affect the investment, labor employ-
ment, and thus production of a MNC in both its home and foreign (real) markets.
We conduct the inquiry by considering two alternatives in the framework of monop-
olistic market structure: one is that market risk is not correlated among domestic
and foreign markets and the other one is that market risk is correlated across mar-
kets. The core finding and conclusion is that it is more superior for a corporation
to become a multinational one such that market risk from various sources can be
dealt with more conformably, for it is unlikely to neutralize all of those market risk
from different sources which is very likely correlated due to deeper global economic
integration.
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3.1 Introduction
Being a successful corporation, no matter whether it is risk-averse, a risk lover
or risk-neutral, has to cope well with market risk from various sources. Under
fierce market competition, whether a corporation can make its decision properly in
complex market situations, concerning its factors employment and production in
different markets, may be one of the most important prerequisites for retaining its
market share.
Potential market risk of a corporation may face is uncountable. According to
the difference of its inherence, market risk can be classified into two categories, i.e.,
economic one and non-economic one. Basically, economic risk would be related with
investment by a corporation in financial market (like foreign portfolio investment)
and real market (like FDI). Non-economic risk sources socially, politically or natu-
rally. For a corporation itself, market risk it should deal with can be simply divided
into the internal one and the external one. If a corporation can scrutinize more
varieties of market risk than others in its operating decisions, it would certainly be
embedded in an unconquerable position.
It is recognized that market risk can be avoided partially. For example, in finan-
cial markets, stipulating certain contracts with using specific financial instruments,
interest or foreign exchange risk can be diverted. In comparison to this relatively
full-fledged analysis of market risk in financial markets, there is still much work for
the counterpart about market risk in real ones. This chapter tends to contribute to
the theoretic pamphlet in this area, with focusing on how the market risk is related
to investment, labor employment and thus production of a risk-averse MNC in its
home and foreign markets.
There are still not complete theories explaining why it seems that a corporation
is willing to conduct FDI in foreign markets in front of myriads of market risk. Di
Mauro (2000) argues “sales of foreign affiliates are now greater than world total
exports of goods, implying that firms use FDI more than they use exports to service
foreign markets”. Given multinational corporations have reaped what they expect
through FDI, we conjecture if direct investment in foreign markets is a practicable
way to evade market risk. Through this chapter, we would prove this with finding
out relevant candid algebraic expressions related to how a (risk-averse) corporation
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determines its business issues. From these formulas, we can easily understand why
a corporation’s becoming a MNC would be more attractive in open economies than
being the one home market oriented, where market risks are correlated given a
regime of monopolistic market structure.
The following text is organized as follows: section 2 is theoretical foundation;
section 3 is the model; section 4 is further extension and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical foundation
Popular theories of international business and international management teaching
why a corporation would like to become a MNC can be resolved into imperfect
markets theory [e.g., Kindleberger (1969)’s structural market imperfection theory,
Buckley and Casson (1976)’s natural market imperfection theory], Vernon’s product
cycle theory and the theoretical synthesis, i.e., OLI paradigm. These theories almost
uniformly conclude FDI is an inevitable way of increasing international business of
any kind such as trade, licensing, joint venture and the like. Generally speaking,
they are not concerned about and can not provide a commensurate reply to why
total amount of FDI across countries is continuously in an accelerating tendency51
given world market situation is full of risky elements (and imperfectly structured)
which are value-destroying52. One may argue the causes of market imperfection
are related with market risks. Internalization of production and operation behavior
of a MNC can effectively avoid market imperfection and thus market risks. It only
sounds reasonable on a shallow theoretical layer and does not help much raise degree
of precision of market participation of a MNC in reality, e.g., these theories can not
show how market risk affects employment plan in different markets of a MNC.
In fact, corresponding to imperfect markets theory, there is a branch theory
indeed from international business literature called perfect markets theory whose
main hypotheses accounting for FDI includes differential rates of return, portfolio
diversification, and market size (see Liyondo, 1995). But in the theoretical field of
international business, the role of perfect markets theory is much less important than
those popular ones more familiarly known. However, it exactly is a major approach
51According to UNCTAD, the amount of global FDI in 1997 was twice of that in 1990.
52Non-direct evidences can be referred to Haar (1989) and Christophe (1997).
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that relates FDI with risk among the forum of international business literature. The
key hypothesis of portfolio diversification states that decentralization of investment
can enfeeble concentration of risk through FDI. This theory seems to be somewhat
close to the topic of the chapter, but it is not essentially the same. Firstly, the theory
emphasizes diversification instead of FDI in risk aversion; secondly, it meets a same
difficulty as those popular ones do mentioned above; and thirdly, it is discredited
to a large extent because of its theoretical foundation. As referred in Liyondo
(1995), “a more fundamental criticism of this theory has been the argument that in
a perfect capital market there is no reason to have firms diversifying activities just to
reduce risk for their shareholders... This criticism implies that for the diversification
motive to have any explanatory power for foreign direct investment, the assumption
of perfect capital markets must be dropped.”
To achieve theoretical improvement for the literature of international business
and international management, we may need to borrow approaches from other the-
oretical sources about MNCs and market risks.
On the one side, there has been a great amount of literature on decision making
concerning portfolio investment. For example, those famous theories like modern
portfolio theory pioneered by Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958), Sharpe ratio
(Sharpe, 1966, 1975, 1994) and option pricing theory (Black and Scholes, 1973,
Black, 1976) are all related with portfolio investment and market risk. Conspic-
uously, there lacks of due theoretical concern on the relationship between foreign
direct investment and market risk. However, some valuable findings and arguments
from the literature about portfolio investment and market risk are not necessarily
inutile when we are studying MNCs and market risk in a real market perspective.
The reason is simple because an agent would be risk-averse and take corresponding
risk avoiding countermeasures in a real market as he or she behaves in a financial
one.
On the other side, to date, inquires concerning FDI and market risk are always
umbilical on some aspect and lack of general studies. For example, they would just
discuss MNCs and political risk (e.g., Kobrin, 1978, Erol, 1985), or FDI and exchange
rate risk (Kohlhagen, 1977, Itagaki, 1981, Dixit, 1989a, 1989b, Cushman, 1988).
MNCs and other business risk like illegal technology imitation and diffusion have
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been discussed by Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Ethier and Markusen (1996).
Most of these works find that FDI is negatively correlated with these specific risks,
but there are also opposite discoveries, such as an empirical piece from Goldberg
and Kolstad (1995).
Coming to a conclusion, the above text has pointed out various shortcomings
of available theories. In order to corroborate MNCs theories, it can be ascertained
that a more appropriate and general treatment of MNCs and market risk is needed.
The chapter would explain why FDI can function as a means of risk aversion in real
markets. In other words, we will find out why being a MNC is more advantageous,
which can serve as another explication about why a MNC “...would be able to
compete with locally owned establishments in performing these activities despite the
disadvantages that derive from unfamiliarity with local customs, language, business
practices...” (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995)
There is such literature as Doukas and Travlos (1988), Gomes and Ramaswamy
(1999), and Morck and Yeung (1991) arguing that being a MNC can benefit from
its multinationality. These papers voice their viewpoints not based on risk aversion
however. They stress the advantage of being a MNC lies in factor price differential,
economies of scale and shareholders’ valuation. The chapter would step forward and
discuss the benefit of being a MNC from the aspect of risk aversion instead and will
solve the dilemma international business literature comes across.
3.3 The model
We design a symmetric two corporations-two countries model. Assumed to be two
open economies, different from the perfect competition framework specified in the
chapters one and two, each country in the model has only one corporation. Each
corporation would invest in both domestic and foreign markets (d and f). Since
allowing different types of market risks in both markets which can be economic and
non-economic, we assume each corporation is risk-averse, and would set its respective
price considering the information of market risk. Therefore, the market structure
is monopolistic and price determination is endogenous, which is not subject to the
curse upon the assumption of perfect capital markets.
The corporations are profit maximizers and risk-averse. Total profit function of
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a corporation is specified as the addition of profit in domestic and foreign markets
adjusted by market risk. Since the corporations are symmetric mentioned above, we
only write down the objective function for the corporation d, given by (1):
maxTΠd = Πd +Πdf − 1ωV ar(rdd + rdf + rfd + rff ) (1)
TΠd means total profit of the corporation d, which is addition of the profit in
its home market Πd and the foreign market Πdf by FDI. The total profit has been
adjusted by the variance term V ar(rdd + rdf + rfd + rff ). rdd , rdf , rfd , and rff are
assumed to be total four kinds of risk in the two markets. rdd is the market risk in
the home market of the corporation d, and rdf is the one the corporation d would
face when directly investing in the market f . Similar interpretation applies to rfd
and rff . ω is risk tolerance, which is the same for both the corporations d and f .
As before, the production functions for the corporation d in its home and foreign
markets are Cobb-Douglas:
Qd = adI
βd
d L
γd
d (2)
Qdf = adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
(2’)
Now we would denote the risk of individual market more specifically. With a
similar form to the so-called RiskMetrics53 estimation in financial literature, we
assume the relationship between market risk and profit having a formula as follows:
r2dd = ϕddΠ
2
dd−1 + (1− ϕdd)r2dd−1 (3)
That is to say, the current home market risk square faced by the corporation d
is equal to the weighted sum of the risk square it faced and its profit square in the
market of last period. Solving the difference equation, we can have
rdd =
√
Add (1−ϕdd )+Π2dd−ϕddΠ
2
dd
(1−ϕdd )
(4)
Similarly, we can have the formula for rdf , rfd , and rff :
53RiskMetrics model is a benchmark for measuring financial risk. For a brief introduction of
its history of evolution, one can refer to “Return to RiskMetrics: The evolution of a standard, ”
http://www.gloriamundi.org/var/pub/rrm.pdf and Longerstaey and Zangari (1996).
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rdf =
√
Adf (1−ϕdf )+Π2df−ϕdfΠ
2
df
(1−ϕdf )
(5)
rfd =
√
Afd (1−ϕfd )+Π2fd−ϕfdΠ
2
fd
(1−ϕfd )
(6)
rff =
√
Aff (1−ϕff )+Π2ff−ϕffΠ
2
ff
(1−ϕff )
(7)
Let the price function of the corporation d be:
Pd = Ad −Qdd −Qfd (8)
where Ad is a positive constant. To expand the V ar(rdd + rdf + rfd + rff ), we
need to differentiate two possibilities: one is that rdd , rdf , rfd and rff is uncorrelated
and the other is on the contrary.
3.3.1 When the market risk of the two countries is uncorrelated
Substituting Πd and Πdf with Qdd(Pd − cd) and Qdf (Pf − cf ), (1) can be rewritten
as (9).
TΠd = Qdd(Pd − cd) +Qdf (Pf − cf )
− 1
ω
V ar(rdd + rdf + rfd + rff ) (9)
Replacing (2) and (2’) into (9), we can have
TΠd = addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Pd − cd) + adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
(Pf − cf )
− 1
ω
r2dd − 1ωr2df − 1ωr2fd − 1ωr2ff (10)
which can be further rewritten as:
TΠd = addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad −Qdd −Qfd − cd) + adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff
−Qdf − cf ) + afdI
βfd
fd
L
γfd
fd
(Ad −Qfd −Qdd − cd)+
aff I
βff
ff
L
γff
ff
(Af −Qdf −Qff − cf )− 1ω
r2dd+1
−ϕddΠ2dd
(1−ϕdd )
− 1
ω
r2df+1
−ϕdfΠ2df
(1−ϕdf )
− 1
ω
r2fd+1
−ϕfdΠ2fd
(1−ϕfd )
− 1
ω
r2ff+1
−ϕffΠ2ff
(1−ϕff )
(11)
where
Pf = Af −Qff −Qdf (12)
Qfd = afdI
βfd
fd
L
γfd
fd
(13)
Qff = aff I
βff
ff
L
γff
ff
(14)
68
To solve for optimal investment and labor employment, we need to expand all
the related terms in (11), and reattain a more detailed one in (15):
TΠd = addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad − addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−Qfd − cd)
+(qf − aff I
βff
ff
L
γff
ff
)(Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ) + afdI
βfd
fd
L
γfd
fd
(Ad −Qfd
−Qdd − cd) + aff I
βff
ff
L
γff
ff
(Af −Qdf −Qff − cf )
− 1
ω
Add(1− ϕdd) + (addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad − addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−Qfd − cd))2
−ϕdd(addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad − addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−Qfd − cd))2
(1−ϕdd )
− 1
ω
Adf (1− ϕdf ) + (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
−ϕdf (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
(1−ϕdf )
− 1
ω
r2fd+1
−ϕfdΠ2fd
(1−ϕfd )
− 1
ω
r2ff+1
−ϕffΠ2ff
(1−ϕff )
(15)
Applying FOC with respect to Idd ,
dTΠd
dIdd
= addβddI
βdd−1
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad − addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−
Qfd − cd)− addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
βddaddI
βdd−1
dd
L
γdd
dd
− 1
ω
2rdd
2addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad − addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−Qfd − cd)[addβddI
βdd−1
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad−
addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−Qfd − cd)− addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
βddaddI
βdd−1
dd
L
γdd
dd
]−
ϕdd2addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad − addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−Qfd − cd)[addβddI
βdd−1
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad
−addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
−Qfd − cd)− addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
βddaddI
βdd−1
dd
L
γdd
dd
]
(1−ϕdd )
= 0
(16)
which can be simplified as:
ω
2add2rdd
= I
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Ad −Qfd − cd)− I
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
I
2βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
addL
γdd
dd
− Iβdddd L
γdd
dd
(Ad −Qfd − cd)− ω2add2rdd = 0 (17)
(15) is factually a quadratic equation, solved from which
I
βdd
dd
=
L
γdd
dd
(Ad−Qfd−cd)±
√
L
2γdd
dd
(Ad−Qfd−cd)2+L
γdd
dd
addL
γdd
dd
ω
add
rdd
2L
γdd
dd
addL
γdd
dd
(18)
Since (L
γdd
dd
(Ad−Qfd − cd)−
√
L
2γdd
dd
(Ad −Qfd − cd)2 + L
γdd
dd
addL
γdd
dd
ω
addrdd
) is less
than zero, the positive one of I
βdd
dd
in (18) would be kept. Then, the optimal invest-
ment and labor employment for the corporation d in its home and foreign markets
is:
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I∗dd =
βdd
√
(Ad−Q∗fd−cd)+
√
(Ad−Q∗fd−cd)
2+ ω
rdd
2L
∗γdd
dd
add
(19)
L∗dd =
γdd
√
(Ad−Q∗fd−cd)+
√
(Ad−Q∗fd−cd)
2+ ω
rdd
2I
∗βdd
dd
add
(20)
I∗df =
βdf
√√√√ (Af−Q∗ff−cf )+√(Af−Q∗ff−cf )2+ ωrdf
2L
∗γdf
df
adf
(21)
L∗df =
γdf
√√√√ (Af−Q∗ff−cf )+√(Af−Q∗ff−cf )2+ ωrdf
2I
∗βdf
df
adf
(22)
Easily, the symmetric results for the corporation f are given by (23) to (26):
I∗fd =
βfd
√
(Ad−Q∗dd−cd)+
√
(Ad−Q∗dd−cd)
2+ ω
rfd
2L
∗γfd
fd
afd
(23)
L∗fd =
γfd
√
(Ad−Q∗dd−cd)+
√
(Ad−Q∗dd−cd)
2+ ω
rfd
2I
∗βfd
fd
afd
(24)
I∗ff =
βff
√√√√ (Af−Q∗df−cf )+√(Af−Q∗df−cf )2+ ωrff
2L
∗γff
ff
aff
(25)
L∗ff =
γff
√√√√ (Af−Q∗df−cf )+√(Af−Q∗df−cf )2+ ωrff
2I
∗βff
ff
aff
(26)
And now we would go on to find out the optimal production of the corporation
d in its domestic market (Q∗dd) and the foreign market (Q
∗
df
). For this purpose, (19)
would be rewritten into (27):
2L
∗γdd
dd
2I
∗βdd
dd
add(Ad −Q∗fd − cd) = (L
∗γdd
dd
2I
∗βdd
dd
add)
2 − ω
rdd
(27)
It is straightforward to solve for Q∗dd , given by
Q∗dd = Ad − cd − L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd +
ω
rdd
4L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd
(28)
Q∗df = Af − cf − L
∗γff
ff
I
∗βff
ff
aff +
ω
rdf
4L
∗γff
ff
I
∗βff
ff
aff
(29)
The optimal productions of the corporation f in its home and foreign markets
are:
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Q∗ff = Af − cf − I
∗βdf
df
L
∗γdf
df
adf +
ω
rff
4I
∗βdf
df
L
∗γdf
df
adf
(30)
Q∗fd = Ad − cd − L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add +
ω
rfd
4L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add
(31)
From (19) to (26), and (28) to (31), it is clear to see that optimal domestic in-
vestment, FDI, labor employment and production of a corporation is negatively
correlated with the market risk which may concern. For example, I∗dd , L
∗
dd
and Q∗dd
is only related with their domestic risk rdd . In shortness, to a corporation, when the
market risk of the two countries is not correlated, it only needs to consider the type
of risk it would be sure to run counter to without worrying about others, given the
market shares of the two corporations in both markets. In the meantime, higher
tolerance is positively correlated with investment, labor employment and production
of a MNC in both markets54.
3.3.2 When the market risk of the two countries is correlated
On the other way around, when the market risk of the two countries is correlated,
(9) should be replaced by (32)
TΠd = addI
βdd
dd
L
γdd
dd
(Pd − cd) + adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
(Pf − cf )− 1ωr2dd
−2 1
ω
rddrdf − 2 1ωrddrfd − 2 1ωrddrff − 2 1ωrdf rfd−
2 1
ω
rdf rff − 2 1ωrfdrff − 1ωr2df − 1ωr2fd − 1ωr2ff (32)
The FOCs for optimal investment and labor employment are
dTΠd
dIdf
= 0 = adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff−
adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
−2 1
ω
rdd
1
2
[
Adf (1− ϕdf ) + (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
−ϕdf (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
(1−ϕdf )
]−
1
2
54Additionally, we can see from the model that production of FDI in a foreign market is a
substitute to the local production of the local corporation.
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2(adf Idf
βdfLdf
γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af−
Qff − adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]
−2ϕdfadf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf )[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff−
adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]
(1−ϕdf )
−
2 1
ω
rfd
1
2
[
Adf (1− ϕdf ) + (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
−ϕdf (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
(1−ϕdf )
]−
1
2
2(adf Idf
βdfLdf
γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af
−Qff − adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]−
2ϕdfadf Idf
βdfLdf
γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf )[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff
−adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]
(1−ϕdf )
−2 1
ω
rff
1
2
[
Adf (1− ϕdf ) + (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
−ϕdf (adf Idf βdfLdf γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))2
(1−ϕdf )
]−
1
2
2(adf Idf
βdfLdf
γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf ))[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff
−adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]−
2ϕdfadf Idf
βdfLdf
γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf )[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff−
adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]
(1−ϕdf )
− 1
ω
2rdf
2ϕdfadf Idf
βdfLdf
γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf )[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff
−adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]
2−ϕdf
−
2ϕdfadf Idf
βdfLdf
γdf (Af −Qff −Qdf − cf )[adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
(Af −Qff
−adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
− cf )− adf I
βdf
df
L
γdf
df
adfβdf I
βdf−1
df
L
γdf
df
]
(1−ϕdf )
(33)
With simplification and rearrangement, the optimal investment, labor employ-
ment and production by the corporation is given from (34) to (39):
I∗dd =
βdd
√√√√ (Ad−Q∗fd−cd)+√(Ad−Q∗fd−cd)2+2 ωrdf r−1dd +rfdr−1dd +rff r−1dd +2rdd
2L
∗γdd
dd
add
(34)
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I∗df =
βdf
√√√√ (Af−Q∗ff−cf )+√(Af−Q∗ff−cf )2+2 ωrddr−1df +rfdr−1df +rff r−1df +2rdf
2L
∗γdf
df
adf
(35)
L∗dd =
γdd
√√√√ (Ad−Q∗fd−cd)+√(Ad−Q∗fd−cd)2+2 ωrdf r−1dd +rfdr−1dd +rff r−1dd +2rdd
2I
∗βdd
dd
add
(36)
L∗df =
γdf
√√√√ (Af−Q∗ff−cf )+√(Af−Q∗ff−cf )2+2 ωrddr−1df +rfdr−1df +rff r−1df +2rdf
2I
∗βdf
df
adf
(37)
Q∗dd = Ad − cd − L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd +
ω
rdd
r−1
fd
+rdf
r−1
fd
+rff
r−1
fd
+2rfd
L
∗γfd
fd
2I
∗βfd
fd
afd
(38)
Q∗df = Af − cf − L
∗γff
ff
I
∗βff
ff
aff +
ω
rdd
r−1
ff
+rfd
r−1
ff
+rdf
r−1
ff
+2rff
L
∗γff
ff
2I
∗βff
ff
aff
(39)
The corresponding results for the corporation f are given from (40) to (45):
I∗ff =
βff
√√√√ (Af−Q∗df−cf )+√(Af−Q∗df−cf )2+2 ωrdf r−1ff +rfdr−1ff +rddr−1ff +2rff
2L
∗γff
ff
aff
(40)
I∗fd =
βfd
√√√√ (Ad−Q∗dd−cd)+√(Ad−Q∗dd−cd)2+2 ωrddr−1fd +rdf r−1fd +rff r−1fd +2rfd
2L
∗γfd
fd
afd
(41)
L∗ff =
γff
√√√√ (Af−Q∗df−cf )+√(Af−Q∗df−cf )2+2 ωrdf r−1ff +rfdr−1ff +rddr−1ff +2rff
2I
∗βff
ff
aff
(42)
L∗fd =
γfd
√√√√Ad−Q∗dd−cd)+√(Ad−Q∗dd−cd)2+2 ωrddr−1fd +rdf r−1fd +rff r−1fd +2rfd
2I
∗βfd
fd
afd
(43)
Q∗fd = Ad − cd − L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add +
ω
rdf
r−1
fd
+rdd
r−1
fd
+rff
r−1
fd
+2rfd
L
∗γdd
dd
2I
∗βdd
dd
add
(44)
Q∗ff = Af − cf − I
∗βdf
df
L
∗γdf
df
adf +
ω
rdd
r−1
ff
+rfd
r−1
ff
+rdf
r−1
ff
+2rff
I
∗βdf
df
2L
∗γdf
df
adf
(45)
As compared with the section 3.3.1, we still can conclude, from (34) to (45),
that the optimal domestic investment, FDI, labor employment and production of a
corporation is negatively correlated with market risk. But the finding here shows
the corporation would be much more sensitive to the risk, when different kinds of
which from different markets are correlated with one another. For example, I∗dd , L
∗
dd
and Q∗dd is negatively correlated with any one of rdd , rdf , rfd , and rff .
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The other two facts that higher tolerance is positively correlated with investment,
labor employment and production and production of FDI in a foreign market is a
substitute to the local production of the local corporation still remain the same.
Supplementarily, when we view the price functions for the corporations d and f
in their home markets, it can be alluded to that the higher risk, the higher price
would be set by the corporations. The fact is also true for the case in the section
3.3.155.
P ∗d = Ad −Q∗dd −Q∗fd = 2cd + L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd −
ω
rdd
r−1
fd
+rdf
r−1
fd
+rff
r−1
fd
+2rfd
L
∗γfd
fd
2I
∗βfd
fd
afd
−
Ad + L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add −
ω
rdf
r−1
dd
+rfd
r−1
dd
+σff
r−1
dd
+2rdd
L
∗γdd
dd
2I
∗βdd
dd
add
(46)
P ∗f = Af −Q∗ff −Q∗df = 2cf + I
∗βdf
df
L
∗γdf
df
adf −
ω
rdd
r−1
df
+rfd
r−1
df
+rff
r−1
df
+2rdf
I
∗βdf
df
2L
∗γdf
df
adf
−Af + L
∗γff
ff
I
∗βff
ff
aff −
ω
rdd
r−1
ff
+rfd
r−1
ff
+rdf
r−1
ff
+2rff
L
∗γff
ff
2I
∗βff
ff
aff
(47)
Till now, we already can understand why being a MNC is more superior than a
counterpart which orients domestically only. Since we know, in the open economies,
if the risk of different markets is correlated (the case is extremely likely with in-
tegration of world markets), as a non-MNC, it hardly can evade the risk of the
foreign markets which can well be conveyed to its home market. Under this circum-
stance, its decision about investment (domestic), labor employment (domestic), and
therefore production would be probably inadequate. Even if assuming the corpo-
ration has considered these sources of risk in its operation in the home market, its
business behavior is not rational, since it positions itself inferiorly by shouldering
unsymmetrical market risk compared to its market share in the world.
On the contrary, being a MNC is a better countermeasure against risk sourced
from various markets, reflected in would-be more suitable decision on investment
(domestic and FDI), labor employment (domestic and foreign), production (domestic
55The corresponding price setings in the home market of the corporations d and f when the
market risk of the two countries is not correlated are given by P ∗d = Ad − Q∗dd − Q∗fd = 2cd +
L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd −
ω
rdd
4L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd
−Ad+L∗γdddd I
∗βdd
dd
add −
ω
rfd
4L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add
and P ∗f = Af −Q∗ff −Q∗df =
2cf + I
∗βdf
df
L
∗γdf
df
adf −
ω
rff
4I
∗βdf
df
L
∗γdf
df
adf
−Af + L
∗γff
ff
I
∗βff
ff
aff −
ω
rdf
4L
∗γff
ff
I
∗βff
ff
aff
).
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and foreign) and market shares it deserves. A complementary remark is that the
function of FDI in risk aversion is only owing to the business behavior of itself and
has nothing to do with the notion that diversification of investment can diversify
risk.
3.4 Further extension
The solutions of the model are ready for more specific problems. For example, rdd
can be subdivided into rdir and rder, which represents internal risk and external risk
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faced by the corporation d. Therefore, the home market risk of the corporation d is
determined by (48):
rdd =
√
V ar(rddir, rdder) =

√
r2ddir + r
2
dder
or√
r2ddir + r
2
dder
+ 2rddir,dder
(48)
while r2ddir = ϕddirΠ
2
dd
+(1−ϕddir)r2ddir−1 and r2dder = ϕdderΠ2dd+(1−ϕdder)r2dder−1.
When the risk of the two countries is not correlated, for simplicity, we only observe
the optimal domestic production of the corporation d which is:
Q∗dd = Ad − cd − L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add +
ω
rddir
+rdder
4L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add
(49)
or
Q∗dd = Ad − cd − L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add +
ω
2rddir
+2rdder
+
rdder
rddir
+
rddir
rdder
4L
∗γdd
dd
I
∗βdd
dd
add
(50)
The difference between (49) and (50) is subject to whether rddir and rdder is
correlated or not. Oppositely, when the risk of the two countries is correlated,
Q∗dd = Ad − cd − L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd+
ω
(rddir
+rdder
)(rfdir
+rfder
)−1+(rdf ir+rdf er)(rfdir+rfder)
−1+(rff ir+rff er)(rfdir+rfder)
−1+2(rfdir+rfder)
L
∗γfd
fd
2I
∗βfd
fd
afd
(51)
when the internal and external risk of the corporation d and the corporation f
is not correlated; or
56Internal risk rimr mainly refers to that arising from the corporation itself, such as that arising
from internal capital market (see Wulf, 2000). External risk remr can be inflation risk, exchange
rate risk, political risk, environment risk and so on.
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Q∗dd = Ad − cd − L
∗γfd
fd
I
∗βfd
fd
afd+
ω
(2rddir + 2rdder +
rdder
rddir
+
rddir
rdder
)(2rfdir + 2rfder +
rfder
rfdir
+
rfdir
rfder
)−1+
(2rdf ir + 2rdf er +
rdf er
rdf ir
+
rdf ir
rdf er
)(2rfdir + 2rfder +
rfder
rfdir
+
rfdir
rfder
)−1+
(2rff ir + 2rff er +
rff er
rff ir
+
rff ir
rff er
)(2rfdir + 2rfder +
rfder
rfdir
+
rfdir
rfder
)−1
+2(2rfdir + 2rfder +
rfder
rfdir
+
rfdir
rfder
)
L
∗γfd
fd
2I
∗βfd
fd
afd
(52)
when the internal and external risk of the corporation d and the corporation f
is correlated. From (49) to (52), though the exposition of Q∗dd is becoming more
and more complicated, the reflected essential point has no changes, which bears the
same argument as the section 3.3.2 does.
Therefore, except those of pricing, functions of investment, labor employment
and thus production of a risk-averse MNC in its home and foreign markets monop-
olistically structured are strictly inverse to risk no matter whether it is correlated
or not across markets. And these algebraic formulas indeed can serve as a decision
reference for the risk-averse MNC to counter market risk and maximize its total
profit.
In sum, in an imperfect competition markets system framed by the chapter, and
there is no way to neutralize various market risk from different sources with deeper
global economic integration, becoming a multinational is more selectable.
3.5 Conclusion
The chapter has shown that, within a monopolistic market framework, a MNC is a
better way to evade or counteract market risk coming from various sources, analyzing
two different contingencies of market risk, i.e., when risk of the home and foreign
markets is correlated and its opposite counterpart.
The finding is embodied in its making more proper decisions about domestic and
foreign investment (FDI), labor employment and production and being a MNC is a
proper way to shoulder these risks conformably. That may be an (unmindful) ra-
tional that a corporation is willing to conduct FDI in foreign markets encountering
numerous market risks. Similar to the chapter one, we here obtain another expla-
nation about why a corporation would become a multinational. From the solutions
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of employment, production and pricing formula of a MNC, we can see the precision
degree of its operation behavior can be raised if it takes into account of various
market risks as much as possible. The unresolved theoretical issue in international
business and international management literature is done.
There is a convergence hypothesis by Markusen and Venables (1995): “multina-
tionals displace national firms and trade as countries become more similar in size,
technology and relative factor endowments”. For the two corporations-two countries
model is symmetric, the conclusions of the chapter are in line with the hypothesis.
However, the hypothesis can not explain why there is no proportionate amount
of FDI between developing countries with similar factor endowments. Besides the
argument in the chapter one, the model here suggests so, since market risk (like
political risk or securities market risk) is relatively lower in developed countries. To
developing countries, an induced policy recommendation from the chapter is that
they should press down market risk for healthier economy and possible higher FDI
inflow.
Over and above, we treat market risk as a broad concept in the chapter. We do
not restrict it to be a certain domain, so our theoretical model is general enough to
study any kind of risk, economic or non-economic, and is easy to be extended much
further to multi-country or unsymmetrical risk degree case.
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4 Multinational corporations and factor movement
Operation of multinational corporations is closely related to international factor
movement and thus economic performance of a country. In the previous chapters,
factor movement has been touched under different extent of restriction. How about
if there is no restriction? Among the most interesting theoretical issues, one may
want to know whether free factor movement can cause economic convergence, like
the case of factor price equalization in trade theory where factors are permitted
to move freely (though the chapter shows that the proposition may not be true).
Some common theoretical and policy concern, like whether labor inflow from another
corporation (or country) would do harm to current labor employment in the host
corporation (or country), needs further discussion.
The chapter focuses on factors employment and production of MNCs under the
circumstance where three kinds of factors, i.e., labor, capital and technology are
freely mobile internationally. The chapter finds out, among the three kinds of fac-
tor movement, only labor inflow has a complementary effect on labor employment
within the MNC concerned given returns to productive factors, social welfare, and
property protection are improving and market risk is declining all the time in the
related countries. Meanwhile, a numerical estimation shows production of MNCs of
developing countries can (but not necessarily) follow up their developed counterparts
when free factor movement is permitted. It is concluded therefore that a country
(especially an underdeveloped one) should strive for a better social environment
rather than economic objects only.
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4.1 Introduction
MNCs are an important way of organizing global production. Factor movement
doubtlessly would affect production of a MNC. For example, the chapter two is in-
volved with factor movement, but the chapter only studies factor movement subject
to a certain degree of restriction, i.e., factor movement is not totally free. This
chapter will go deeper to study the case where factor movement is completely free,
though it could be a utopian for the real economy.
Available theories about factor movement are still limited. We just can not find
out there is a perfect theory about factor movement. Traditional international trade
theories simply assume productive factors can not be mobile across borders. Wong
(1995) has offered two notable reasons for factor movement being ignored by argu-
ing “...historically economic relationships between countries have been determined
mainly through the movement of goods” and “...under certain conditions, the theory
of international trade in goods can be extended to cover international factor mobil-
ity”. In the available literature, to the question why there would be international
factor movement, most explanations have been given from the economic side. But
non-economic ones seem to be far less concerned in those literature even including
Wong (1995). As we know, to comprehend some phenomena like factor movement,
dependance only on economic logic may not suffice. After all, one does not live just
for economic interest.
With economic globalization and an inevitable trend of incessant and growing
activities of MNCs, factor movement becoming relatively facilitated across borders.
The effect of factor movement on a MNC and a related country may kindle lots of
attention, which is not necessarily perfect. Among the most interesting issues, one
would want to know whether free factor movement can cause economic convergence,
like the case of factor price equalization in traditional trade theory where factors are
permitted to move freely (though it has been shown that the proposition may not
be true in the chapter). Some common theoretical and policy concern, like whether
labor inflow from another corporation (or country) would do harm to current labor
employment in the host corporation (or country), needs further enquiry.
The chapter develops corresponding discussion, especially in searching for the
solutions of how freely mobile factor affects domestic factors employment in a MNC
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when non-economic elements are considered; and whether free factor movement can
contribute to production/economic convergence between developed and developing
corporations/countries. The answers are elicited which include that labor inflow
is positively associated with local labor employment, and that free international
factor movement still can not guarantee production convergence between MNCs
or economic convergence between countries. Through the study in the relationship
between MNCs and factor movement, we have acquired relevant policy implications.
The rest of the text is organized as follows: section 2 is theoretical foundation;
section 3 is the model; section 4 is discussion of production/economic convergence;
section 5 is policy recommendations and section 6 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical foundation
Earlier economic theories about factor movement can be traced to Stolper-Samuelson
theory (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941)57, factor price equalization theory (Samuel-
son, 1948)58, Rybczynski theory (Rybczynski, 1955)59 and so on. They belong to
international (goods) trade theories. Gravity of these theories does not lie in the
form of factor movement we are interested in, where factors are only allowed to
be mobile domestically rather than internationally. Assuming away international
mobility of factors, these theories are criticized for being oversimplified and going
short of a satisfactory depiction of the real economy. Certainly, these classical trade
theories indeed can statically provide predictions associated with (domestic) factor
movement under strict assumptions. But, grounding on these theories suggesting
factors would flow to a higher paid place60, we may have a following question: since
a factor can move from a domestic sector to another one because of a higher return
rate in the latter, why wouldn’t the factor, at the very beginning, move to a country
where it is scarce and when there exists no international transport cost? These
theories, however, avoid the “conjecture” as we have known.
A relatively more direct study related to factor movement can be attributed to
57About the relationship between factor prices and product prices.
58About the relationship between factor prices and international (goods) trade.
59About the relationship between output levels and changes of factor supplies.
60A higher payment is an important reason why factors would mobile, but it is not exclusive.
We will see this in more details in the following text.
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the theory of factor contents of trade. It is also be noted that the starting point
of these theories is not for studying international factor movement, but examining
trade of goods through examining the amount of factors embodied in trade. The
representative works include Travis (1964), Vanek (1968), Leamer (1980), Deardorff
(1982) and Ethier (1984). To a large extent, the appearance of these theories is
in response to Leontief Paradox. The theorists mean to show if predictions of the
HO model are true in reality. No matter whether their test results are consistent or
inconsistent with HO model [e.g., findings of Trefler (1995) are contrary to Bowen,
Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987)’s, while the former argue that the HO model (more
precisely speaking-its another version-Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek model by Vanek, 1968)
performs well], such microeconomic issues as motives of factor movement and how
factor inflow affects factors employment of the host country have been seldom dis-
cussed. Hence, it requires rethinking if this transformation and arbitrary equivalence
between traded goods and factors does make sense. Factor contained in goods is
equal to factors endowment being consumed in quantity, but does not conform to
the factor movement we usually describe. That is to say, the theory of factor con-
tents of trade is not competent in explaining factor movement. For example, some
productive factors can not move freely internationally in their original forms, but
may be misunderstood that they can according to the theory.
Of course, there are many other authors who have more adequately studied
factor movement, evidenced by the literature like Mundell (1957), Kemp (1966),
Caves (1971), Bhagwati (1973), Brecher and Diaz Alejandro (1977), Bhagwati and
Hamada (1974, 1982), Markusen and Melvin (1979), Grossman (1984), Markusen
(1988) and the more comprehensive Wong (1995). The existent problem is that
these works either assume capital movement is exogenous, or have relatively narrow
horizon of analysis like studying the relationships of two factors (capital and labor)
movement only and so on. Though these works substantially promote research in
factor movement, likewise, they still need various modification. For example, they
scarcely look into the causes why there would be international factor movement,
which are the backbone of a full theory about factor movement. Granting that it
can infer partially from these works that capital outflow would happen in a bigger
country whose rental rate is lower, or less convincingly, capital would move from a
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smaller country to the bigger one in free trade (see Wong, 1995), reasoning with non-
economic perspective is evidently not up to the mark61. In reality, factor movement
is not merely due to economic consideration. Obviously, under many circumstances,
social, natural, environmental reasons and so on are crucial determinants. But
theoretical development after Wong (1995) seems to be still deviated from deeper
inquiry into factor movement. There is no specific reason. In our opinion, perhaps
more interests still have been being centered on the theoretical field of intraindustry
trade.
In sum, we do not have a perfect theory yet about factor movement till now
because of various theoretical no goes mentioned above. As a result, economic
theories regarding to international economy are incomplete too. Ineptitude and
unjustification of contemporary economic or social policies based on these theories
may lead to unanticipated negative consequences. We argue it is of necessity to pry
the issues related to factor movement within a more general framework.
It has been shown by the following study which not only combines domestic
factors employment and factor inflow, but economic and non-economic elements such
as social institution and geography62. Based on this model, we can further expect
to have some public policies implication for economic growth and development of a
country, which could be especially intuitive for developing countries.
4.3 The model
We build up a 2×3 model, i.e., two countries a and b, three factors63 (capital, labor
and technology). We still follow major assumptions of the chapters one and two
such as perfectly competitive market structure and no transaction costs.
61Bhagwati (1985), Salvatore (1991) analyzing FDI in a political economy standing with a postu-
lation that protectionism may cause FDI, and Bhagwati and Hamada (1982) relating international
labor migration with education provide some non-economic explanations separately.
62Therefore, the chapter will deal with multi-factors production economies. In the academia, it
is known that in the situation where there is more than a single productive factor and involvement
of other non-economic elements, general relationships among the productive factors and those
elements may be not easy to obtain (similar viewpoints can be found in Grossman and Helpman,
1995).
63Previous literature seldom explicitly enquires into three-factors (i.e., labor, capital and tech-
nology) in an integrated model.
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Different from the chapters one, two, and three, the model here is further ideal-
ized owing to the assumption that factor movement is free (there is no intervention
from each country for factor movement64) and legal65. We will study two arbitrary
corporations from a same industry of these two countries first. a is a corporation
from the developed country a and b is from the developing country b. In the chapter,
a developed country has better social institution, and closer to the market center
(more details are in the following section 4.4). Since they are from a same industry,
the products the corporations a and b produce can be either the same or differenti-
ated. In the chapter, we assume they are the same.
The two corporations have similar production functions, so we will just specify
the details of the corporation a in the main text.
The corporation a has a CES production function:
Ya = (laL
1−ε
a + kaK
1−ε
a + taT
1−ε
a + lˆaLˆ
1−ε
a + kˆaKˆ
1−ε
a + tˆaTˆ
1−ε
a )
1
1−ε (1)
where ε can have a form theoretically assumed as:
ε =
∫ ζ
0
(La(ΩaLa ), Lˆa(ΩaLˆa ), Ka(ΩaKa ), Kˆb(ΩaKˆa ), Ta(ΩaTa ),
Tˆa(ΩaTˆa ), C(Θa1), E(Θa2), I(Θa3))dt
La, Ka, and Ta are labor, capital and technology employment in the corporation
a. Lˆa, Kˆa, and Tˆa are labor, capital and technology inflow from the corporation
b (or the country b) and employed by the corporation a. ζ is larger than zero.
When ε tends to be infinitive, the elasticities of substitution among the multiple
inputs including local factors employment and factors inflow, approaches to zero,
i.e., no substitution among the independent variables on the right hand side of the
equation (1); when ε tends to be zero, the variables would be approximately perfect
substitutes of one another.
64Although in the real economy, there is strong intervention in labor movement. For example,
there is the unrestricted flow of professionals between North America, the European Union coun-
tries, Japan and other highly developed countries, from which unskilled migrants are generally
excluded there are the flows of low-skilled workers between the Indian subcontinent and the Ara-
bian peninsula, and from the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia to those countries generally
known as the Asian tigers (see Doomernik, 1998).
65Some papers like Ethier (1986), Bond and Chen (1987) and Djajic (1987) study illegal factor
movement.
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C, E, and I denote culture, education level and social institution respectively66.
All these non-economic indicators make the consumers goods characterized with
social relationships such that we can provide social foundation for factor movement.
Θa1, Θa2, and Θa3 are subsets of Θa which can contain such variables as geogra-
phy67, history, and time. ΩaLa , ΩaLˆa , ΩaKa , ΩaKˆa , ΩaTa and ΩaTˆa are subsets of Ωa
which can include these variables such as payment to productive factors, social envi-
ronment, natural environment, time, demographic structure68, labor standard, and
safeguard level of property rights and the like in the country a. Θ and Ω can have
overlapping domains. In the case of labor migration, people always make decision
based on their financial ability, compare economically, politically and institution-
ally among places they live and work and other ones where they intend to go, and
then determine finally which are better for living and working temporarily or per-
manently. In fact, capital movement and technology transfer would have their own
similar considerations too.
In the mathematical expression (1), international factor inflow is an external
factors employment modeled as having symmetric function contributing to produc-
tion of the corporation a. The way we model this type of factors employment is
on the basis of three considerations: (1) in the process of economic globalization,
restrictions on factor movement are expected to be less severe than before, it can
be reasonable to assume more and more countries would eventually adopt positive
measures to encourage productive factor inflow including labor, capital and tech-
66If all these variables can overlap, then the corporations or countries a and b can be viewed as
homogeneous, otherwise, these two corporations are heterogeneous. The categorization is more or
less different from most literature which argues whether a country is homogeneous or not to one
another is basically based on the country’s resource endowment.
67Geography is viewed as a dynamic concept in the chapter rather than a purely static geographic
location [e.g., Baldwin and Forslid (1999) argue that economic growth and location are interactive].
Dynamics of geography is in the sense that when a developing corporation is converging to a
developed one in production and the like, the location of the former is becoming more important,
supposing the developed corporation is initially located closer to the market center while the
developing one is closer to the market periphery.
68Demographic structure (such as rate of population growth or population migration character-
istics) can affect production growth, which is closely related to factor employment in a country.
Studies of direct relationship of growth and demography can be referred to Bloom, Canning and
Malancy (1999), Ghose (1999) and so on.
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nology; (2) inquiry of factor movement and production growth in a more general
context is in order to contribute to the current literature; (3) to fix a groundwork
for posterior discussion about what a developing country should do in knowledge
economy or information times, since it may have been aware that factor movement
is a key way to catch up with developed countries and thus stretch a hand for better
understanding of functions of policies in economic development.
Let factor movement functions have the endogenous forms:
Lˆa =
wˆ
x2
La/b
Wˆ
x5
a/b
Dx1K
x3
a T
x4
a
tx6 (2)
From (2), we can see labor movement from the corporation b is positively correlated
with time, wˆLa/b and Wˆa/b, where wˆLa/b is change of wLa (wage rate of labor in the
corporation a) divided by change of wLb (wage rate of labor in the corporation b);
and Wˆa/b, change of Wa divided by change of Wb, denotes comparison of a non-
economic variable-social security (or social institution) between the two countries,
where Wa and Wb is social security situation in the countries a and b respectively.
Lˆa is negatively correlated with D, where D is distance between the corporations
a and b, and employment of capital and technology in the corporation a. (2) gives
an account of why labor would move into another country economically and non-
economically, i.e., labor mobility is also subject to situation of social security of a
country. A good social security environment would be attractive to labor inflow.
Similar specification and logic is applied in (3) and (4).
Kˆa =
wˆ
x11
Ka/b
Dx7L
x8
a T
x9
a Rˆ
x10
a/b
tx12 (3)
Capital movement from the corporation b is positively correlated with time and
wˆKa/b , where wˆKa/b is change of return to capital of the country a (wka) divided
by change of wkb ; but negatively correlated with distance, labor and technology
employment in the corporation a and risk degree. Rˆa/b is comparison of market risk
between the countries a and b, equal to change of Ra divided by change of Rb
69.
Tˆa =
wˆ
x17
Ta/b
Dx13L
x14
a K
x15
a Pˆn
x16
a/b
tx18 (4)
69As discussed in the chapter three, market risk mentioned here can be economic or non-
economic.
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Technology movement from the corporation b is positively correlated with time
and wˆTa/b , where wˆTa/b is change of return to technology of the country a (wTa)
divided by change of wTb ; but negatively correlated with distance
70, labor and capital
employment in the corporation a and Pˆ na/b. Pˆ na/b is comparison of protection of
property rights between the countries a and b, equal to change of Pna divided by
change of Pnb.
In equations (2), (3) and (4), D, t, La, Ka and Ta are larger than zero, while
wˆLa/b , wˆKa/b , Wˆa/b, wˆTa/b , Rˆa/b, and Pˆ na/b can have positive or negative values. We
do not exclude the possibility that absolute decrease in economic growth and social
welfare could happen in both countries a and b here at a certain time. Through
the simultaneous equations group (2), (3) and (4), we can have more illustrative
functions for factors employment in the corporation a from equations (8), (9) and
(10).
Then we will have more illustrative functions for factors employment in the
corporation a:
La = (
wˆ
x11−
x11x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
Ka/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
La/b
Tˆ
1+
x15
x3−x15
a Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
a/b
Pˆn
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16
a/b
DF Rˆ
x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a/b
Kˆ
1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
a
tB)
1
A (5)
Ka = (
wˆ
x17
Ta/b
wˆ
x211x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
x14
A
Ka/b
Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a Rˆ
(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a/b
Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
x14
A
a
Dx13−F
x14
A Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x14
A
a/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x14
A
La/b
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x14
A
+1
a Pˆn
x16+(
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16)
x14
A
a/b
tx18−
B
A
x14)
1
x15 (6)
Ta = (
wˆ
x11−(x11−
x11x4x15
x3−x15 )
x14
A
Ka/b
Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
a wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x8
A
La/b
Pˆn
x16+
x16x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a
Dx7−F
x8
A Rˆ
x10−(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a/b
Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a
tx12−
B
A
x8)
1
x9 (7)
where
A = x8 − x4 − x4x15x3−x15 − x8x9 x4x15x3−x15
B = x12 − x18 + (x6−x18)x15x3−x15 − x12x9 x4x15x3−x15
F = x7 − x13 + x15(x1−x13)x7−x13 − x7x9 x4x15x3−x15
70We can see from (2), (3) and (4), that Lˆ, Kˆ, and Tˆ are all assumed to be negatively correlated
with distance. There is empirical support for this specification, e.g., Blomstrom, Lipsey, and
Kulchycky (1988) conclude that there is insignificant relationship between distance and MNCs
activities.
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Since we are interested to find out the effect of factor inflow of the corporation
b on the current employment of the corporation a, we can differentiate factors em-
ployment of the corporation a with respect to the corresponding factor inflow, and
the expression formulas of the differentiation are given by (8) to (16):
dLa
dLˆa
= 1
A
L
A( 1
A
−1)
a (− x15x3−x15 )Lˆ
− x15
x3−x15−1
a Γ13 (8)
dKa
dLˆa
= 1
x15
K
x15(
1
x15
−1)
a
x15x14
(x3−x15)ALˆ
x15x14
(x3−x15)A−1
a Γ14 (9)
dTa
dLˆa
= 1
x9
T
x9(
1
x9
−1)
a
x15x8
(x3−x15)A Lˆ
x15x8
(x3−x15)A−1
a Γ15 (10)
dLa
dKˆa
= 1
A
L
A( 1
A
−1)
a (
x4x15
x9(x3−x15) − 1)Kˆ
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)−2
a Γ16 (11)
dKa
dKˆa
= 1
x15
K
x15(
1
x15
−1)
a (1− x4x15x9(x3−x15))x14A Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15) )
x14
A
−1
a Γ17 (12)
dTa
dKˆa
= 1
x9
T
x9(
1
x9
−1)
a ((1− x4x15x9(x3−x15))x8A − 1)Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15) )
x8
A
−2
a Γ18 (13)
dLa
dTˆa
= 1
A
L
A( 1
A
−1)
a (1 +
x15
x3−x15 )Tˆ
x15
x3−x15
a Γ19 (14)
dKa
dTˆa
= 1
x15
K
x15(
1
x15
−1)
a (−(1 + x15x3−x15 )x14A − 1)Tˆ
−(1+ x15
x3−x15 )
x14
A
−2
a Γ20 (15)
dTa
dTˆa
= 1
x9
T
x9(
1
x9
−1)
a (1 +
x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
−1
a Γ21 (16)
Due to the uncertainty of the signs of wˆLa/b , wˆKa/b , wˆTa/b , Wˆa/b, Rˆa/b and Pˆ na/b,
Γ13, ..., and Γ21, which are provided in the Appendix B, are also uncertain in the
sense of the sign. But, we simply assume they are all positive71, where returns to
factors, social welfare, and property protection are improving and market risk is
decreasing simultaneously all the time in both the countries a and b. Therefore, we
can have: the larger Wˆa/b, the faster progress of social security in the country a;
the larger Rˆa/b, the more improvement in reducing market risk in the country a (in
which x10 is less than zero); and the larger Pˆ na/b, the more likely a better property
institution in the country a (in which x16 is less than zero). So it is permitted that
there can be larger divergence (economic, social or institutional) between the two
countries if a country improves faster than the other one does. From the initial
specification of (2), (3) and (4), except x10 and x16 are negative, x1, x2,..., and x18
are all positive numbers. Observing (8) to (16), we would need to determine the sign
71The assumption factually excludes the possibility that factors moving in may flee out, which
happens in many developing countries. The results of the chapter may be different without the
assumption that the factors like social welfare and property rights protection in these two countries
are not improving all the time.
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of (x3 − x15). To guarantee that dKadLˆa ,
dTa
dLˆa
, dLa
dKˆa
, dTa
dKˆa
, dLa
dTˆa
and dKa
dTˆa
are negative from
(2), (3) and (4), there can be two possibilities. The first one is: (x3−x15) is smaller
than zero and A and (1 − x4x15
x9(x3−x15)) are larger than zero; the other alternative is:
(x3 − x15) is larger than zero and A and (1 − x4x15x9(x3−x15)) are less than zero at the
same time.
But only the second possibility is feasible. Since from the expressions of La,
Ka and Ta in (5), (6) and (7), it can be inferred that A and (1 − x4x15x9(x3−x15)) have
to be less than zero, while (1 + x15
x3−x15 ) and
x15
x3−x15 are larger than zero. If A and
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)) are larger than zero, while (1 +
x15
x3−x15 ) and therefore
x15
x3−x15 are less
than zero, there will be contradiction between (2)-(4) and (5)-(7).
So we can find out that the key result, i.e., dLa
dLˆa
 0, dKa
dKˆa
≺ 0 and dTa
dTˆa
≺ 0, which
shows that labor inflow from the corporation b is a complement to the current labor
employment of the corporation a, but capital and technology inflow is a substitute.
(x3 − x15) larger than zero can be interpreted as the substitution effect of capital
employment in the corporation a on capital inflow is larger than that on technology
inflow, which conforms to the common economic sense72.
Now we skip from the individual profit function of the corporation a, and directly
72Though domestic factor employment is not the main concern of the chapter compared to factor
movement, there are three points worthy of being noticed:
(a) La is negatively correlated with Wˆa/b, which implies the better the social security of a
country, the less domestic labor employment. Intuitively, domestic labor in a country with better
social environment is less willing to work;
(b) Ka is positively correlated with Rˆa/b, which can be shown by a positive
(x10 − x4x15
x9(x3 − x15) )︸ ︷︷ ︸
x14
A︸︷︷︸
≺ 0 ≺ 0
which means less market risk of a country would also encourages its domestic investment;
and (c) the relationship between Ta and Pˆ na/b is uncertain, since it would rely on the sign of
( x16︸︷︷︸+ x16x15x3 − x15 x8A︸ ︷︷ ︸)
≺ 0  0
The intuition is that a sounder property rights protection does not necessarily lead to higher
application of domestic technology.
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turn to the total profit function of the country a which is given by (17).
ΠTa = max
∑n
i=1(PaiXai − wLaiLai − wKaiKai − wTaiTai−
wLˆaiLˆai − wKˆaiKˆai − wTˆ aiTˆai) (17)
The objective function is subject to the resource constraints as
∑n
i=1 Lai = LTa,∑n
i=1Kai = KTa and
∑n
i=1 Tai = TTa. ΠTa is total corporate profit of the country
a; LTa, KTa and TTa are the total labor, capital and technology endowment of
the country a. wLai, wKai, wTai are the employment prices of labor (wage), capital
(interest rate) and technology (covering expenses used for such as innovation and
maintenance in producing the ith product) of the corporation i of the country a.
wLˆai, wKˆai, and wTˆ ai are the employment prices of labor, capital and technology
inflow from the corporation b. PaiXai is factually Yai. wLai = wLˆai, wKai = wKˆai, or
wTai = wTˆ ai may or may not hold.
Principally, the optimal employment level of domestic factors and international
factors can be determined by solving the FOCs, i.e., dΠTa
dLai
= 0, dΠTa
dKai
= 0, dΠTa
dTai
= 0,
dΠTa
dLˆai
= 0, dΠTa
dKˆai
= 0 and dΠTa
dTˆai
= 0. Because we concern more factor movement, the
concrete expressions of the FOCs of factor inflow are given from (18) to (20):
dΠTa
dLˆai
=
∑n
i=1
dYai
d´Lˆai
−∑ni=1(wLai dLaidLˆai + wKai dKaidLˆai+
wTai
dTai
dLˆai
+ wLˆai + wKˆai
dKˆai
dLˆai
+ wTˆ ai
dTˆai
dLˆai
) =∑n
i=1[Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai laiL
−ε
ai
1
Ai
(LAiai )
1
Ai
−1
(− x15i
x3i−x15i )Lˆ
− x15i
x3i−x15i−1
ai Γ4i+
Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai kaiK
−ε
ai
1
x15i
(Kx15iai )
1
x15i
−1 x15ix14i
(x3i−x15i)Ai Lˆ
x15ix14i
(x3i−x15i)Ai−1
ai Γ5i
+Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai taiT
−ε
ai
1
x9i
(T x9iai )
1
x9i
−1 x15ix8i
(x3i−x15i)Ai Lˆ
x15ix8i
(x3i−x15i)Ai−1
ai Γ6i+
Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai lˆaiLˆ
−ε
ai ]−
∑n
i=1[wLai
1
Ai
(LAiai )
1
Ai
−1
(− x15i
x3i−x15i )Lˆ
− x15i
x3i−x15i−1
ai Γ13i+
wKai
1
x15i
(Kx15iai )
1
x15i
−1 x15ix14i
(x3i−x15i)Ai Lˆ
x15ix14i
(x3i−x15i)Ai−1
ai Γ14i
+wTai
1
x9i
(T x9iai )
1
x9i
−1 x15ix8i
(x3i−x15i)Ai Lˆ
x15ix8i
(x3i−x15i)Ai−1
ai Γ15i
+wLˆai + wKˆai
dKˆai
dLˆai
+ wTˆ ai
dTˆai
dLˆai
] = 0 (18)
dΠTa
dKˆai
=
∑n
i=1
dYai
dKˆai
−∑ni=1(wLai dLaidKˆai + wKai dKaidKˆai + wTai dTaidKˆai + wKˆai+
wLˆai
dLˆai
dKˆai
+ wTˆ ai
dTˆai
dKˆai
) =
∑n
i=1[Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai laiL
−ε
ai
1
Ai
(LAiai )
1
Ai
−1
( 1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i − 1)Kˆ
1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i−2
ai Γ7i + Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai kaiK
−ε
ai
1
x15i
(Kx15iai )
1
x15i
−1
(1− 1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x14i
Ai
Kˆ
(1− 1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x14i
Ai
−1
ai Γ8i
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+Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai taiT
−ε
ai
1
x9i
(T x9iai )
1
x9i
−1
[(1− 1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x18i
Ai
−1]Kˆ(1−
1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x18i
Ai
−2
ai Γ9i + Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai kˆaiKˆ
−ε
ai ]
−∑ni=1[wLai 1Ai (LAiai ) 1Ai−1( 1x9i x4ix15ix3i−x15i − 1)Kˆ 1x9i x4ix15ix3i−x15i−2ai Γ16i+
wKai
1
x15i
(Kx15iai )
1
x15i
−1
(1− 1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x14i
Ai
Kˆ
(1− 1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x14i
Ai
−1
ai Γ17i
+wTai
1
x9i
(T x9iai )
1
x9i
−1
[(1− 1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x18i
Ai
−1]Kˆ(1−
1
x9i
x4ix15i
x3i−x15i )
x18i
Ai
−2
ai Γ18i + wKˆai + wLˆai
dLˆai
dKˆai
+ wTˆ ai
dTˆai
dKˆai
] = 0 (19)
dΠTa
dTˆai
=
∑n
i=1
dYai
dTˆai
−∑ni=1(wLai dLaidTˆai + wKai dKaidTˆai + wTai dTaidTˆai + wTˆai
+wLˆai
dLˆai
dTˆai
+ wKˆai
dKˆai
dTˆai
) =
∑n
i=1[Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai laiL
−ε
ai
1
Ai
(LAiai )
1
Ai
−1
(1+
x15i
x3i−x15i )Tˆ
x15i
x3i−x15i
ai Γ10i + Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai kaiK
−ε
ai
1
x15i
(Kx15iai )
1
x15i
−1
[−(1+
x15i
x3i−x15i )
x14i
Ai
− 1]Tˆai−(1+
x15i
(x3i−x15i) )
x14i
Ai
−2
Γ11i + Y
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai taiT
−ε
ai
1
x9i
(T x9iai )
1
x9i
−1
(1+
x15i
x3i−x15i )
x8i
Ai
Tˆai
(1+
x15i
(x3i−x15i) )
x8i
Ai
−1
Γ12i +
1
1−εY
(1−ε)( 1
1−ε−1)
ai tˆai(1− ε)Tˆ−εai ]
−∑ni=1[wLai 1Ai (LAiai ) 1Ai−1(1 + x15ix3i−x15i )Tˆ x15ix3i−x15i−1ai Γ19i+
wKai
1
x15i
(Kx15iai )
1
x15i
−1
[−(1 + x15i
(x3i−x15i))
x14i
Ai
− 1]Tˆ−(1+
x15i
(x3i−x15i) )
x14i
Ai
−2
ai Γ20i
+wTai
1
x9i
(T x9iai )
1
x9i
−1
(1 + x15i
x3i−x15i )
x8i
Ai
Tˆ
(1+
x15i
x3i−x15i )
x8i
Ai
−1
ai Γ21i
+wTˆ ai + wLˆai
dLˆai
dTˆai
+ wKˆai
dKˆai
dTˆai
] = 0 (20)
Within these derivative equations from (18), (19) and (20), we know they are
just pure addition of positive and negative terms (Γ4i, ..., and Γ21i are given by Γ4, ...,
and Γ21 with the subscript i added in the Appendix B). The optimal employment of
factor inflow for the country a can be solved from (18), (19) and (20) theoretically.
We do not provide the explicit solutions for the optimal factor inflows for the country
a since they are not crucial for the theme of the chapter. Intuitively, the country a
may potentially desire an optimal amount of employment of factor inflow for each
of its corporations from the country b if maximization of total profit is firmly its
objective.
Regarding to the corporation b and the country b, since they have similar pro-
duction, factor movement and profit functions, it is easy to get the similar results
inferred from the corporation a and the country a. That is, there is also comple-
mentary effect of labor inflow from the corporation a on the labor employment in
the corporation b, capital and technology inflow having substitution effect (the cor-
responding factor movement and related derivative functions are provided in the
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Appendix B). To the corporation b, maximization of total profit may not be its
highest goal. Pursuance of technological progress or production convergence may be
more salutary for its long run interest. The Proposition 6 of the chapter two which
implies production convergence can be an explanation.
Before we proceed to the next section discussing production/economic conver-
gence, we would talk a little bit about some side results from the model. The model
permits two types of general equilibria not subject to factor price equalization within
countries a and b. One is that factor movement becomes standstill. For example,
if the social welfare of the developed country a is much better than that of the de-
veloping country b, labor of the developing country would still have a tendency to
migrate out even though the remuneration is the same in both countries. The equi-
librium will end up with when the migration in certain or all industries across the
two countries comes to a steady state. The other one is production of both countries
and thus trade between them can reach their local maximum values for a certain
period of time. The second type will be expounded numerically in the following
text. So a general equilibrium of trade is not necessarily accompanied with factor
price equalization in our model – different from traditional trade models. In other
words, free mobility of factor movement may not lead to factor price equalization
when non-economic factors are considered.
Since the market structure in both countries is perfectly competitive, the result
of the general equilibrium is more like a multi-cone equilibrium termed by Deardorff
(2000)73. However, our model has shown a multi-cone equilibrium does not need
to exist in groups of countries. On the contrary, it can also exist in a two-country
case within each of which factor price equalization is allowed. And a multi-cone
equilibrium is not necessarily caused by contrasting factor endowment74. The multi-
cone equilibrium or failure of global factor price equalization can well survive in
73The definition of “multi-cone” equilibrium is, according to Deardorff (2000), “in which different
groups of countries have different factor prices and specialize with free trade in different collections
of goods.”
74Deardorff (1998) argues there are two kinds of global free trade equilibria. The equilibria are
characterized with scope of factor prices equalization. One is global when factor endowment of
countries are not too different, and the other one is regional when the endowment of countries are
rather different.
91
the long run if there is lasting, say, distinction in social environment between the
countries a and b.
4.4 Discussion of production/economic convergence
Production convergence and economic convergence is treated the same in the chap-
ter. Therefore, the assumption that products produced by the corporations a and b
are the same is not just for simplification, which makes it feasible to conduct com-
parison of production of the two corporations. Production/economic convergence
here is defined as that total production of the corporation b is growing faster than
that of the corporation a75.
With the fact that corporation a (or the country a) may desire an optimal quan-
tity of factor inflow in mind, pursuance of the corporation b (or the country b) for
production convergence (or economic convergence) in the perfectly competitive en-
vironment is within the bounds of possibility, where geography, culture, and social
institution can play a critical role.
We have provided a numerical study on economic convergence with the above
theoretical model. As a preliminary step of more rigorously enquiring into the effect
of non-economic factors, the following study does not fully employ the complete
theoretical forms of ε of the corporation a and θ of the corporation b76. It only
considers a simpler case that ε and θ are the function of geography, social institution
and time. The simplified forms of ε and θ are
ε =
∫ ζ
0
Gagro(.)
αageoIasoc(.)
βasoctdt, (21)
θ =
∫ ψ
0
Gbgro(.)
αbgeoIbsoc(.)
βbsoctdt (22)
respectively.
Because there are no well-performed indicators to denote geography G and social
institution I, we assume values of G and I are valued from one to ten. If G and
75The meaning is different from that in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) however, where economic
convergence is in the sense that economies tend to grow faster in per capita terms.
76The production function of the corporation b is given by Yb =
(lbL1−θb + kbK
1−θ
b + tbT
1−θ
b + lˆbLˆ
1−θ
b + kˆbKˆ
1−θ
b + tˆbTˆ
1−θ
b )
1
1−θ , where θ =∫ ψ
0
(Lb(ΩbLb ), Lˆb(ΩbLˆb ),Kb(ΩbKb ), Kˆb(ΩbKˆb ), Tb(ΩbTb ), Tˆb(ΩbTˆb ), C(Θb1), E(Θb2), I(Θb3))dt.
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I are all equal to ten, then they represent the best state of geography and social
institution, i.e., a corporation locates in the center of the world market and the
social institution benefits the most to its production growth and vice versa. Gageo
denotes geography of the corporation a; Iageo denotes the social institution faced by
the corporation a. Gbgeo and Ibgeo denote geography and the social institution for
the corporation b.
To study whether there is a possibility of convergence between these two corpo-
rations, we can calculate the values of Ya and Yb in the cases, for example, when
ζ = 10 (the tenth year) and 20 (the twentieth year) with 0 being the base year. The
values of G and I of the corporation a should be larger than those of the corpora-
tion b according to the assumption. Arbitrarily, we pick G = 6 and I = 7 for the
corporation a, while G = 4 and I = 5 for the corporation b.
Due to the specification of the model, it can be inferred that elasticities of sub-
stitution among the multiple inputs of the country a (the developed one) would
be lower than those of the country b, which is contrasting to the argument of the
literature such as Olarreaga (2000) or Klump and Grandville (2000). An intuition
can be, compared to developing ones, in developed countries, better social institu-
tion may lead to more rules-based employment which is however less substitutable
among different productive factors.
We can initially obtain some visual impression from presentment of Figures 6 to
13. Figures 6, 8, 10 and 11 are for the corporation a (whose G = 6 and I = 7),
whereas Figures 7, 9, 12 and 13 are for the corporation b (whose G = 4 and I = 5).
Values for αageo, βasoc, αbgeo, βbsoc and parameters like la, ka, ta and so on are simply
set to be 1. These figures plot out the relationships of three variables, i.e., Y , L and
K, similar inference applied when more productive factors are included.
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Figure 6 (when time is t, t ∈ [0, 10])
Figure 7 (when time is t, t ∈ [0, 10])
Figure 8 (when time is t2 , t ∈ [0, 10])
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Figure 9 (when time is t2, t ∈ [0, 10])
Figure 10 (when time is t, t ∈ [0, 20])
Figure 11 (when time is t2, t ∈ [0, 20])
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Figure 12 (when time is t, t ∈ [0, 20])
Figure 13 (when time is t2, t ∈ [0, 20])
From Figures 6 to 13, there are two noticeable facts. One is that better geography
and social institution affects positively output. Compared between Figures 6 and 7,
where, without losing generality, labor and capital employment is valued within the
sets [1, 100] and [100, 1000] respectively for the case of the corporation a, and the
other way around for the case of the corporation b, it is clear that the corporation
a achieves a higher output, 1.997 larger than 1.994. And the other one is that time
specification matters. Given other factors, output of corporations a and b is higher
when time is t2.
More complete numerical results considering all the factors employment and
factor inflows are given in the following tables, which exactly conclude that there
can be production/economic convergence or divergence between these two corpora-
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tions/countries besides what we have reached above.
4.4.1 Economic convergence
Assuming the parameters of domestic factors employment and factor inflows in both
the corporations a and b are all constant. Suppose growth rates of employment
of domestic labor, capital and technology, and employment of labor, capital and
technology inflow of the corporations a and b are 2%, 4%, 10%, 3.33%, 12.5%, 10%,
10%, 40%, 5%, 40%, 25% and 40% on average per year respectively. Additionally,
parameters la, ka, ta and so on remaining to be 1, let αageo = βasoc = 0.6 and
αbgeo = βbsoc = 0.4, which further reflects the difference of both the corporations in
their nature and the role of geography and social institution.
Table 1 (when time is t)
L = 100 L = 120
K = 200 K = 400
T = 400 T = 900
Lin = 10
The 10th year
Ya = 10
Lin = 20
The 20th year
Ya = 20.001
Kin = 20 Kin = 30
Tin = 40 Tin = 50
G = 6 G = 6
I = 7 I = 7
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L = 1000 L = 1400
K = 150 K = 200
T = 50 T = 100
Lin = 2
The 10th year
Yb = 2.0043
Lin = 10
The 20th year
Yb = 10
Kin = 4 Kin = 20
Tin = 6 Tin = 30
G = 4 G = 4
I = 5 I = 5
Table 1’ (when time is t2)
L = 100 L = 120
K = 200 K = 400
T = 400 T = 900
Lin = 10
The 10th year
Ya = 9.9995
Lin = 20
The 20th year
Ya = 20
Kin = 20 Kin = 30
Tin = 40 Tin = 50
G = 6 G = 6
I = 7 I = 7
L = 1000 L = 1400
K = 150 K = 200
T = 50 T = 100
Lin = 2
The 10th year
Yb = 2.0006
Lin = 10
The 20th year
Yb = 10
Kin = 4 Kin = 20
Tin = 6 Tin = 30
G = 4 G = 4
I = 5 I = 5
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4.4.2 Economic divergence
Assuming there is larger difference between the corporations a and b in the 10th year,
embodied by the difference in quantity of domestic factors employment and factor
inflow, and different growth rates of domestic factors employment and factor inflow
(for example, 25%, 15%, 90%, 55% and 25% on average for growth rate of capital,
technology, and labor employment, and capital and technology inflow respectively
for the corporation a. 50%, 130% and 490% on average for growth rate of capital
and technology employment, and capital inflow respectively for the corporation b.
Other assumptions are the same as in the case of economic convergence).
Table 2 (when time is t)
L = 100 L = 120
K = 2000 K = 7000
T = 4000 T = 10000
Lin = 100
The 10th year
Ya = 20.001
Lin = 1000
The 20th year
Ya = 100.001
Kin = 20 Kin = 110
Tin = 40 Tin = 100
G = 6 G = 6
I = 7 I = 7
L = 10000 L = 14000
K = 150 K = 900
T = 50 T = 700
Lin = 2
The 10th year
yb = 2.0043
Lin = 10
The 20th year
yb = 10.002
Kin = 4 Kin = 200
Tin = 6 Tin = 40
G = 4 G = 4
I = 5 I = 5
Table 2’ (when time is t2)
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L = 100 L = 120
K = 2000 K = 7000
T = 4000 T = 10000
Lin = 100
The 10th year
Ya = 19.999
Lin = 1000
The 20th year
Ya = 100.01
Kin = 20 Kin = 110
Tin = 40 Tin = 100
G = 6 G = 6
I = 7 I = 7
L = 10000 L = 14000
K = 150 K = 900
T = 50 T = 700
Lin = 2
The 10th year
Yb = 2.0006
Lin = 10
The 20th year
Yb = 10
Kin = 4 Kin = 200
Tin = 6 Tin = 40
G = 4 G = 4
I = 5 I = 5
From the tables above, we at least have the following five findings.
1) From table 1, we can see aggregate production of the corporation b in the 20th
year is five times of that in the 10th year and leaps from one fifth of the production
of the corporation a to only one second when time is specified as t. Aggregate
production of the corporation a is 50 times of that of the corporation b in the 10th
year, but only 23.51 times in the 20th year. The production of the corporation a
in the 20th year grows by 0.67 times of that in the 10th year, while the production
of the corporation b grows by 2.5 times. When time is non-linear as the form of
t2, table 1’ shows the corporation b grows even faster while the corporation a grows
slower. Both tables 1 and 1’ present the possibility of economic convergence.
2) When there exists larger difference from the initial stage in the 10th year in
average growth rates of factors employment and inflow in the corporations a and b,
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even t is linear, we would have economic divergence easily. In table 2, it can be seen
that the production of the corporation a in the 20th year rises by 3.165 times from the
10th year, and the production of the corporation b in the 20th year only rises by 2.57
times of that from the 10th year. What is more, the gap of the production between
the two corporations is slightly widened. The evidence of economic divergence from
table 2 can also be confirmed in table 2’ and we do not detail it here.
3) Improvement of social institution and geography is certainly beneficial to help
the corporation b reduce the gap of production growth between the corporation a
and itself. For example, in table 1, if we change the values for G and I of the
corporation b, making them equal to 6 and 7 respectively, given other variables, we
would find production of the corporation b becomes 10.002 in the 20th year. The
additional increase of Yb directly comes from improvement of G and I. But their
indirect effect on production growth through affecting domestic factors employment
and factor inflows should not be neglected. In fact, the first two findings tell the
preliminary state composed by domestic factors employment and factor inflow would
have momentous effect on the process of production/economic changes of a corpora-
tion or country. However, the initial state can in no way be exogenous, which is an
evolutionary result influenced by such factors as social institution and geography.
4) There exist local maximum values of production for both the corporations. For
example, look at the case of the corporation a in table 2, given other factors, when
capital inflow equals 101, production of the corporation a can reach 100.01. Further
increase of capital inflow from 101 on, the quantity of production 100.01 would
remain unchanged for the corporation a. The situation applies to the corporation b
too. The numerical finding accounts that the production of the corporations a and
b can remain at a steady state for a period of time. This production equilibrium and
therefore an induced trade one have nothing to do with factor price equalization.
5) Speed of tending to a local maximum value of production may be subject to the
size of effect of time on production growth given domestic factors employment and
factor inflow. When time is non-linear in the case where its exponent is larger than
one, for example time is captured by t2, the speed will be faster than time in the form
of t. When we continue to increase the size of the exponent of t, like t3, we can see
the speed will be much faster. For example, still look at the case for the corporation
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a in table 2. If we suppose time is formed as t3, when capital inflow is 99 given other
variables, production of the corporation a is 99.007 and its counterpart when time
is t2 is 98.998 accordingly. The implication is that convergence or divergence rate
can be faster depending on whether a country can win the initiative in international
competition.
4.5 Policy implications
From the chapter, we have known free migration may or may not contribute to pro-
duction/economic convergence between the two developed and developing countries.
Convergence or not may need to depend on the difference of preliminary situations
of employment and factor inflow in both countries, which is obviously related with
non-economic elements. Albeit free factor movement is not a sufficient condition for
convergence, it at least appears to be a potential way to get rid of disadvantages in
international economic activities for a developing corporation or country. Accord-
ing to the trade pattern drawn by traditional trade theory, it is never possible for
developing countries get dynamic gains from free trade such that their inferior trade
status can change to a favorable side through time. That is to say, participating in
free commodities trade is not competent for developing countries to catch up with
developed ones.
We are also aware from the above text, that making optimal use of international
factor movement is another prerequisite of realizing the maximum of total profit in
a country. But, making policies independently by every single corporation for hiring
optimal quantity of factor inflow is simply not possible in the regimes of concurrent
system of a country, which has to meet uncountable governmental and institutional
intervention and measures against free market behavior. Therefore, second-best
policies could be more attractive and feasible than optimal ones when coping with
international factor movement.
Grounded from the model, what policy implications can be drawn then? We
conclude four points applicable to both developed and developing countries:
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4.5.1 Adopting scientific policies in introducing international productive
factors
Freer factor movement is a trend of international economic integration. During the
process of global economic integration, degree of freedom of factor movement, can
be viewed as a barometer of degree of economic integration.
The model accounts that, to both developed and developing countries advancing
in returns to productive factors, social welfare, and property protection and market
risk is eliminated continuously, labor inflow will not do harm to employment of
domestic labor. That is because it would not decrease the employment level in the
host country. To capital and technology movement, on the contrary, it would be
negatively correlated with the local capital and technology employment.
So the chapter suggests that it may be not scientific that quite a few countries
adopt indiscernible policies of encouraging capital and technology inflow while set-
ting limits and controls on labor movement in their foreign trade, foreign capital or
immigration policies. The model implies that more reasonable policies of introduc-
tion of international productive factors should be based on a more solid comparative
study of economic and social situation in the countries involved. If both the country
exporting productive factors and the one importing productive factors are improving
in the elements we designate above, introduction of labor would be more beneficial
to these countries.
4.5.2 Creating good conditions to avail international productive factors
The above text shows it is a weighty alternative for developing countries to introduce
labor actively from developed countries rather than adopt capital or technology uni-
laterally. The disadvantage of doing so has already been shown in the chapter two77.
The realistic picture is not beautiful, however. Labor and capital from developed
countries seems not to be interested in moving to developing countries, and devel-
oped countries are not always ready to transfer even some obsolete technology to
77Of course, if it was easier to obtain from developed countries than innovate by developing
countries themselves, it would be another case (see Su, 1999). Similar views can be found in
Krugman (1990).
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the developing ones78. Developed countries have more or less strategically oriented
restrictions on exports to or imports from developing ones79 and much more severe
restrictions on factor outflows to the latter.
Introducing labor more does not mean less attention in moving in of capital
and technology. Our argument is that developing countries should grasp how to
raise their attractiveness to international productive factors. One spellbound policy
for these countries from the chapter is resorting to their potential and incentive to
improve their social institution or environment, more details given in the next point.
Because of geometric growth of technological innovation and information release
in the times of knowledge economy80, speed and content of economic development is
becoming essentially different from traditional economic period. Developing coun-
tries need to be cautious about the new situation and fasten their pace in follow-
ing up in economic development, social progress and betterment of other issues.
Though there would be stronger and stronger challenges, they have also been pro-
vided equally external access to employing international resources and international
assistance for their purpose.
4.5.3 Striving for a better social environment
Social environment is formed due to or apparent embodiment of statutorily stip-
ulated or implicitly recognized social institution. A better social environment is
substantive for social development besides economic one. Social development is a
78To reluctance of capital flowing to developing countries, Lucas (1990) views it as the result
of two economic reasons in substance, one is human capital differential, and the other is return
differential of capital between rich and poor countries. The non-economic reason, i.e., political
risk is argued to be inadequate. However, Lucas (1990) owes the inadequacy to no evidence of a
capital-labor ratio equalized by capital movement in the situation without political risk (or “in the
two centuries before 1945” in its text). From the chapter, Lucas’s argument is simply unconvincing.
Capital movement, as other factors do, is not necessarily accompanyed with equalization of factor
price or capital-labor ratios when both economic and non-economic elements are taken into account
at the same time.
79The reason may be a natural result of dynamics of growth, of trade, and of the political
economy of protection (see Deardorff, 2000).
80The non-linearity specification of time above-mentioned mimics the urgency endowed by swifter
development of information and technology.
104
more complex concept than economic development. It contains at least such el-
ements as development of habitation environment, humanistic environment, legal
environment and institutional environment.
Social development may not be uphold without economic growth and develop-
ment, but it will definitely have non-ignorable counter-effect on the latter. In the
model, though social institution does not affect production directly, it does have
effect on the performance of economic growth81 and factor inflow. It affects speed of
economic convergence and even lead to divergence. A country with a poorer social
environment may not absorb deserved amount of factor inflow even if the factor
payment is the same or higher than that of a country with a better one.
Fairness, equality, democracy, humanity, justice, transparency and so on should
be treated seriously in most developing countries. Action to ameliorate these ele-
ments constitutes the key of a better off social surroundings. A country, especially
a developing one, should work hard for a better social environment brought by
improvement of these institutional elements rather than economic objects only.
4.5.4 Improving fairer welfare distribution between developed and de-
veloping countries
Improving fairer welfare distribution between developed and developing countries
is still a long-lasting task only if developing countries are far behind developed
countries in economic development
The endogenous factor supply implies that the world production will increase
all the time without boundary in the long run, which is a direct reason from the
perspective of supply side that permits the possibility of continuous divergence.
As a matter of fact, economic divergence between developed and some developing
countries has been enlarging in an absolute term in the recent years.
Promoting international welfare distribution is a track of helping bridge the gap
of income and economic development between developed and developing countries.
It may involve objection from domestic interest groups of different countries and
international political struggle. Therefore, besides governments, relevant interna-
81Improvement of social institution leads to improvement of social development directly, while
providing a more favorable social environment for economic growth indirectly.
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tional organizations and non-governmental organizations should play an active role
in contributing to this undertaking which concerns the habitability of the whole
world in the future.
Prejudice, resentment, estrangement or hostility due to ideological, religion or
political difference should be abandoned. This may be a non-economic premise of
effectively conducting helping work to the poor countries. Meanwhile, sustainable
economic growth in developed and developing countries fixes the financial basis.
These two conditions are not converse to each other. Smooth international redistri-
bution is more possible when the world is in a better economic condition and there
is less antagonism among countries.
4.6 Conclusion
In response to theoretical paucity about factor movement, the chapter makes its
contribution with a study in the relationship between MNCs and factor movement
(i.e., labor migration, capital movement and technology flow). The theoretical model
given in the chapter is a novel effort of integrating both economic and non-economic
elements. Though we do not have a close-formed solution to the model, we have ac-
complished to find out new evidence around the topics in factor movement, domestic
employment, production/economic convergence, and social institution.
The chapter equips these long-standing problems in the academia with new in-
sights. When freely mobile factors are allowed, their impact on domestic factors
employment contrasts to normal conception. Analysis about production/economic
convergence reveals free factor movement is not a sufficient condition for developing
countries to catch up with their developed counterparts.
The core research results of the chapter are concluded as follows:
• Labor inflow may have a positive effect on the local labor employment, which
is valid for both the developed and developing corporations or countries cases,
if only returns to productive factors, social welfare, and property protection
are improving and market risk is falling all the time in both countries.
• Free international factor movement still can not guarantee production conver-
gence between MNCs and thus economic convergence between countries, since
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non-economic factors can create difference in factors employment and inflow
large enough to cause divergence.
• A country (especially an underdeveloped one) should strive for a better social
environment rather than economic objects only.
The side results of the chapter are in relation with the basic international trade
theory problems. The chapter argues: when non-economic factors are considered,
• a general equilibrium of international trade is not necessarily accompanied
with factor price equalization;
• free mobility of factor movement may not lead to factor price equalization;
• and a multi-cone equilibrium does not need to exist in groups of countries.
In the end, among others, a continuing research based on the chapter would
provide a numerical study making use of the complete theoretical specification of ε
and θ. Accordingly, there leaves a spacious room for empirical work too.
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Appendix A
(22) dΠdd =
(1) βd1(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ βd2(pQdf1Qdf1
−pIdf1ηId − pLdf1γLd)dz1 + (βd − βd1 − βd2)(pQdf2Qdf2
−pIdf2Id − pLdf2Ld)dz2 (FDI)
(2) βd3(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ βd4(pEdf1Edf1−
pIEdf1
Id − pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (βd − βd3 − βd4)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id
−pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) βd5(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ βd6(pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1ηId−
pLdf1γLd)dz1 + (βd − βd5 − φd6)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id
−pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) βd7(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ βd8(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id
−pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (βd − βd7 − βd8)(pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Id
−pLdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
(23) dΠdf1 =
(1) φd1(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd2(pQdf1Qdf1−
pIdf1ηId − pLdf1γLd)dz1 + (φd − φd1 − φd2)(pQdf2Qdf2−
pIdf2Id − pLdf2Ld)dz2 (FDI)
(2) φd3(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd4(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id
−pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (φd − φd3 − φd4)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id
−pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) φd5(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd6(pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1ηId
−pLdf1γLd)dz1 + (φd − φd5 − φd6)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id
−pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) φd7(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φd8(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id−
pLEdf1
Ld)dz1 + (φd − φd7 − φd8)(pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Id
−pLdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
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(24) dΠdf2 =
(1) θd1(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ θd2(pQdf1Qdf1−
pIdf1ηId − pLdf1γLd)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − θd1−
θd2)(pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Id − pLdf2Ld)dz2 (FDI)
(2) θd3(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ θd4(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id
−pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − θd3 − θd4)(pEdf2Edf2−
pIEdf2
Id − pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) θd5(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ θd6(pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1ηId−
pLdf1γLd)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − θd5 − θd6)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id
−pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) θd7(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ θd8(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id−
pLEdf1
Ld)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − θd7 − θd8)(pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Id
−pLdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
(25) dΠf1d =
(1) βf11(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ βf12(pQf1dQf1d
−pIf1dId − pLf1dLd)dz1 + (βf1 − βf11 − βf12)(pQf1f2Qf1f2
−pIf1f2Id − pLf1f2Ld)dz2 (FDI)
(2) βf13(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ βf14(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d ηId
−pLEf1d γLd)dz1 + (βf1 − βf13 − βf14)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 ηId
−pLEf1f2 γLd)dz2 (Export)
(3) βf15(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ βf16(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dId−
pLf1dLd)dz1 + (βf1 − βf15 − βf16)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 ηId
−pLEf1f2 γLd)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) βf17(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ βf18(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d ηId
−pLEf1d γLd)dz1 + (βf1 − βf17 − βf18)(pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2Id
−pLf1f2Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
(26) dΠf1f1 =
(1) φf11(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ φf12(pQf1dQf1d
−pIf1dId − pLf1dLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φf11 − φf12)(pQf1f2Qf1f2
−pIf1f2Id − pLf1f2Ld)dz2 (FDI)
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(2) φf13(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ φf14(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d ηId
−pLEf1d γLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φf13 − φf14)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 ηId
−pLEf1f2 γLd)dz2 (Export)
(3) φf15(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ φf16(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dId
−pLf1dLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φf15 − φf16)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 ηId
−pLEf1f2 γLd)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) φf17(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ φf18(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d ηId−
pLEf1d
γLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φf17 − φf18)(pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2Id
−pLf1f2Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
(27) dΠf1f2 =
(1) θf11(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ θf12(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dId
−pLf1dLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θf11 − θf12)(pQf1f2Qf1f2
−pIf1f2Id − pLf1f2Ld)dz2 (FDI)
(2) θf13(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ θf14(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d ηId−
pLEf1d
γLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θf13 − θf14)(pEf1f2Ef1f2−
pIEf1f2
ηId − pLEf1f2 γLd)dz2 (Export)
(3) θf15(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ θf16(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dId−
pLf1dLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θf15 − θf16)(pEf1f2Ef1f2−
pIEf1f2
ηId − pLEf1f2 γLd)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) θf17(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1ηId − pLf1γLd)dt+ θf18(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d ηId
−pLEf1d γLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θf17 − θf18)(pQf1f2Qf1f2−
pIf1f2Id − pLf1f2Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
(28) dΠf2d =
(1) βf21(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ βf22(pQf2dQf2d−
pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (βf2 − βf21 − βf22)(pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1ηId
−pLf2f1γLd)dz2 (FDI)
(2) βf23(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ βf24(pEf2dEf2d − pIEf2d Id
−pLEf2dLd)dz1 + (βf2 − βf23 − βf24)(pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1 Id
−pLEf2f1Ld)dz2 (Export)
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(3) βf25(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ βf26(pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dId
−pLf2dLd)dz1 + (βf2 − βf25 − βf26)(pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1 Id
−pLEf2f1Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) βf27(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ βf28(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
Id − pLEf2dLd)dz1 + (βf2 − βf27 − βf28)(pQf2f1Qf2f1
−pIf2f1ηId − pLf2f1γLd)dz2 (Mixed II)
(29) dΠf2f1 =
(1) φf21(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ φf22(pQf2dQf2d−
pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (φf2 − φf21 − φf22)(pQf2f1Qf2f1
−pIf2f1ηId − pLf2f1γLd)dz2 (FDI)
(2) φf23(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ φf24(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
Id − pLEf2dLd)dz1 + (φf2 − φf23 − φf24)(pEf2f1Ef2f1
−pIEf2f1 Id − pLEf2f1Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) φf25(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ φf26(pQf2dQf2d−
pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (φf2 − φf25 − φf26)(pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1 Id
−pLEf2f1Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) φf27(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ φf28(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
Id − pLEf2dLd)dz1 + (φf2 − φf27 − φf28)(pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1ηId
−pLf2f1γLd)dz2 (Mixed II)
(30) dΠf2f2 =
(1) θf21(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ θf22(pQf2dQf2d−
pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θf21 −
θf22)(pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1ηId − pLf2f1γLd)dz2 (FDI)
(2) θf23(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ θf24(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
Id − pLEf2dLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θf23 − θf24)(pEf2f1Ef2f1−
pIEf2f1
Id − pLEf2f1Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) θf25(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ θf26(pQf2dQf2d−
pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + ( − θf25 − θf26)(pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1 Id
−pLEf2f1Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
111
(4) θf27(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2Id − pLf2Ld)dt+ θf28(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
Id − pLEf2dLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θf27 − θf28)(pQf2f1Qf2f1
−pIf2f1ηId − pLf2f1γLd)dz2 (Mixed II)
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(44) dΠdd =
(1) β′d1(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ β′d2(pQdf1Qdf1−
pIdf1Id − pLdf1Ld)dz1 + (βd − β′d1 − β′d2)(pQdf2Qdf2
−pIdf2Id 1η′ − pLdf2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (FDI)
(2) β′d3(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ β′d4(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id
−pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (βd − β
′
d3 − β′d4)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id − pLEdf2Ld
−sEdf2 −mEdf2)dz2 (Export)
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(3) β′d5(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ β′d6(pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1Id
−pLdf1Ld)dz1 + (βd − β′d5 − β′d6)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id − pLEdf2Ld
−sEdf2 −mEdf2)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) β′d7(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ β′d8(pEdf1Edf1−
pIEdf1
Id − pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (βd − β
′
d7 − β′d8)(pQdf2Qdf2
−pIdf2Id 1η′ − pLdf2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (Mixed II)
(45) dΠdf1 =
(1) φ′d1(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φ′d2(pQdf1Qdf1−
pIdf1Id − pLdf1Ld)dz1 + (φd − φ′d1 − φ′d2)(pQdf2Qdf2
−pIdf2Id 1η′ − pLdf2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (FDI)
(2) φ′d3(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φ′d4(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id
−pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (φd − φ
′
d3 − φ′d4)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id−
pLEdf2
Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) φ′d5(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φ′d6(pQdf1Qdf1 − pIdf1Id
−pLdf1Ld)dz1 + (φd − φ′d5 − φ′d6)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id
−pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) φ′d7(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φ′d8(pEdf1Edf1−
pIEdf1
Id − pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (φd − φ
′
d7 − φ′d8)(pQdf2Qdf2
−pIdf2Id 1η′ − pLdf2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (Mixed II)
(46) dΠdf2 =
(1) θ′d1(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ φ′d2(pQdf1Qdf1−
pIdf1Id − pLdf1Ld)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − φ′d1−
φ′d2)(pQdf2Qdf2 − pIdf2Id 1η′ − pLdf2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (FDI)
(2) θ′d3(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ θ′d4(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id
−pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − θ
′
d3 − θ′d4)(pEdf2Edf2
−pIEdf2 Id − pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) θ′d5(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ θ′d6(pQdf1Qdf1−
pIdf1Id − pLdf1Ld)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − θ′d5−
θ′d6)(pEdf2Edf2 − pIEdf2 Id − pLEdf2Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
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(4) θ′d7(pQdQd − pIdId − pLdLd)dt+ θ′d8(pEdf1Edf1 − pIEdf1 Id
−pLEdf1Ld)dz1 + (1− βd − φd − θ
′
d7 − θ′d8)(pQdf2Qdf2−
pIdf2Id
1
η′ − pLdf2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (Mixed II)
(47) dΠf1d =
(1) β′f11(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ β′f12(pQf1dQf1d−
pIf1dId − pLf1dLd)dz1 + (βf1 − β′f11 − β′f12)(pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2Id 1η′
−pLf1f2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (FDI)
(2) β′f13(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ β′f14(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d Id
−pLEf1dLd)dz1 + (βf1 − β
′
f13 − β′f14)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 Id−
pLEf1f2
Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) β′f15(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ β′f16(pQf1dQf1d−
pIf1dId − pLf1dLd)dz1 + (βf1 − β′f15 − β′f16)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 Id−
pLEf1f2
Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) β′f17(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ β′f18(pEf1dEf1d−
pIEf1d
Id − pLEf1dLd)dz1 + (βf1 − β
′
f17 − β′f18)(pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2Id 1η′
−pLf1f2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (Mixed II)
(48) dΠf1f1 =
(1) φ′f11(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ φ′f12(pQf1dQf1d−
pIf1dId − pLf1dLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φ′f11 − φ′f12)(pQf1f2Qf1f2
−pIf1f2Id 1η′ − pLf1f2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (FDI)
(2) φ′f13(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ φ′f14(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d Id
−pLEf1dLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φ
′
f13 − φ′f14)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 Id−
pLEf1f2
Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) φ′f15(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ φ′f16(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dId
−pLf1dLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φ′f15 − φ′f16)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 Id
−pLEf1f2Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) φ′f17(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ φ′f18(pEf1dEf1d−
pIEf1d
Id − pLEf1dLd)dz1 + (φf1 − φ
′
f17 − φ′f18)(pQf1f2Qf1f2
−pIf1f2Id 1η′ − pLf1f2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (Mixed II)
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(49) dΠf1f2 =
(1) θ′f11(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ θ′f12(pQf1dQf1d−
pIf1dId − pLf1dLd)dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1 − θ′f11−
θ′f12)(pQf1f2Qf1f2 − pIf1f2Id 1η′ − pLf1f2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (FDI)
(2) θ′f13(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ θ′f14(pEf1dEf1d−
pIEf1d
Id − pLEf1dLd)dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1 − θ
′
f13 −
θ′f14)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 Id − pLEf1f2Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3) θ′f15(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ θ′f16(pQf1dQf1d − pIf1dId
−pLf1dLd)dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1 − θ′f15 − θ′f16)(pEf1f2Ef1f2 − pIEf1f2 Id−
pLEf1f2
Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) θ′f17(pQf1Qf1 − pIf1Id − pLf1Ld)dt+ θ′f18(pEf1dEf1d − pIEf1d Id
−pLEf1dLd)dz1 + (1− βf1 − φf1 − θ
′
f17 − θ′f18)(pQf1f2Qf1f2−
pIf1f2Id
1
η′ − pLf1f2Ld 1γ′ )dz2 (Mixed II)
(50) dΠf2d =
(1) β′f21(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+
β′f22(pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (βf2−
β′f21 − β′f22)(pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)dz2 (FDI)
(2) β′f23(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ β′f24(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
1
η′ Id − pLEf2d
1
γ′Ld)dz1 + (βf2 − β′f23 − β′f24)(pEf2f1Ef2f1
−pIEf2f1
1
η′ Id − pLEf2f1
1
γ′Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3)β′f25(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ β′f26(pQf2dQf2d−
pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (βf2 − β′f25 − β′f26)(pEf2f1Ef2f1−
pIEf2f1
1
η′ Id − pLEf2f1
1
γ′Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) β′f27(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ β′f28(pEf2dEf2d−
pIEf2d
1
η′ Id − pLEf2d
1
γ′Ld)dz1 + (βf2 − β′f27 − β′f28)(pQf2f1Qf2f1−
pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
(51) dΠf2f1 =
(1) φ′f21(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+
φ′f22(pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (φf2 − φ′f21
−φ′f22)(pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)dz2 (FDI)
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(2) φ′f23(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ φ′f24(pEf2dEf2d − pIEf2d
1
η′ Id
−pLEf2d
1
γ′Ld)dz1 + (φf2 − φ′f23 − φ′f24)(pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1
1
η′ Id
−pLEf2f1
1
γ′Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3)φ′f25(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ φ′f26(pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dId
−pLf2dLd)dz1 + (φf2 − φ′f25 − φ′f26)(pEf2f1Ef2f1 − pIEf2f1
1
η′ Id
−pLEf2f1
1
γ′Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) φ′f27(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ φ′f28(pEf2dEf2d − pIEf2d
1
η′ Id
−pLEf2d
1
γ′Ld)dz1 + (φf2 − φ′f27 − φ′f28)(pQf2f1Qf2f1
−pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
(52) dΠf2f2 =
(1) θ′f21(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+
θ′f22(pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dId − pLf2dLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2
−θ′f21 − θ′f22)(pQf2f1Qf2f1 − pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)dz2 (FDI)
(2) θ′f23(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ θ′f24(pEf2dEf2d − pIEf2d
1
η′ Id
−pLEf2d
1
γ′Ld)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θ′f23 − θ′f24)(pEf2f1Ef2f1
−pIEf2f1
1
η′ Id − pLEf2f1
1
γ′Ld)dz2 (Export)
(3)θ′f25(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ θ′f26(pQf2dQf2d − pIf2dId
−pLf2dLd)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θ′f25 − θ′f26)(pEf2f1Ef2f1
−pIEf2f1
1
η′ Id − pLEf2f1
1
γ′Ld)dz2 (Mixed I)
(4) θ′f27(pQf2Qf2 − pIf2 1η′ Id − pLf2 1γ′Ld)dt+ θ′f28(pEf2dEf2d − pIEf2d
1
η′ Id
−pLEf2d
1
γ′Ld)dz1 + (1− βf2 − φf2 − θ′f27 − θ′f28)(pQf2f1Qf2f1
−pIf2f1Id − pLf2f1Ld)dz2 (Mixed II)
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Γ4 =
wˆ
x11−
x11x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
Ka/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
La/b
Tˆ
1+
x15
x3−x15
a Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
a/b
Pˆn
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16
a/b
DF Rˆ
x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a/b
Kˆ
1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a
tB (23)
Γ5 =
wˆ
x17
Ta/b
wˆ
x211x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
x14
A
Ka/b
Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a Rˆ
(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a/b
Dx13−F
x14
A Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x14
A
a/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x14
A
La/b
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x14
A
+1
a Pˆn
x16+(
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16)
x14
A
a/b
tx18−
B
A
x14 (24)
Γ6 =
wˆ
x11−(x11−
x11x4x15
x3−x15 )
x14
A
Ka/b
Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
a wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x8
A
La/b
Pˆn
x16+
x16x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Dx7−F
x8
A Rˆ
x10−(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a/b
Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a
tx12−
B
A
x8 (25)
Γ7 =
wˆ
x11−(x11−
x11x4x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
Ka/b
Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
a wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x8
A
La/b
Pˆn
x16+
x16x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a
Dx7−F
x8
A Rˆ
x10−(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a/b
tx12−
B
A
x8 (26)
Γ8 =
wˆ
x17
Ta/b
wˆ
x211x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
x14
A
Ka/b
Rˆ
(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a/b
Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
x14
A
a
Dx13−F
x14
A Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x14
A
a/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x14
A
La/b
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x14
A
+1
a Pˆn
x16+(
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16)
x14
A
a/b
tx18−
B
A
x14 (27)
Γ9 =
wˆ
x11−(x11−
x11x4x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
Ka/b
Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Tˆ
(1+
x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
a wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x8
A
La/b
Pˆn
x16+
x16x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a
Dx7−F
x8
A Rˆ
x10−(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a/b
tx12−
B
A
x8 (28)
Γ10 =
wˆ
x11−
x11x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
Ka/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
La/b
Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
a/b
Pˆn
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16
a/b
DF Rˆ
x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a/b
Kˆ
1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
a
tB (29)
Γ11 =
wˆ
x17
Ta/b
wˆ
x211x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
x14
A
Ka/b
Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a Rˆ
(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a/b
Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
x14
A
a
Dx13−F
x14
A Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x14
A
a/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x14
A
La/b
Pˆn
x16+(
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16)
x14
A
a/b
tx18−
B
A
x14 (30)
Γ12 =
wˆ
x11−(x11−
x11x4x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
Ka/b
Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x8
A
La/b
Pˆn
x6+
x6x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a/b
Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
x8
A
a
Dx7−F
x8
A Rˆ
x10−(x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a/b
Kˆ
1−(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x8
A
a
tx12−
B
A
x8 (31)
Γ13 =
wˆ
x11−
x11x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
Ka/b
wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
La/b
Tˆ
1+
x15
x3−x15
a Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
a/b
Pˆn
x16x15
x3−x15 +x16
a/b
DF Rˆ
x10−
x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a/b
Kˆ
1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
a
tB (32)
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Γ14 =
wˆ
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Ta/b
wˆ
x211x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
x14
A
Ka/b
Kˆ
(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
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x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
a/b
Dx13−F
x14
A Wˆ
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x3−x15
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A
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wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
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A
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Tˆ
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A
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A
a/b
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B
A
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Γ15 =
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A
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A
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x2x15
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x8
A
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A
a/b
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)
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A
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A
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x5x15
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Pˆn
x16x15
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DF Rˆ
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x4x15
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Lˆ
x15
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a
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Γ17 =
wˆ
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Ta/b
wˆ
x211x4x15
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A
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Rˆ
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x4x15
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x14
A
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Lˆ
x15
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A
a
Dx13−F
x14
A Wˆ
x5x15
x3−x15
x14
A
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wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x14
A
La/b
Tˆ
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x15
x3−x15 )
x14
A
+1
a Pˆn
x16+(
x16x15
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x14
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tx18−
B
A
x14 (36)
Γ18 =
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x11x4x15
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x8
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x15
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A
a wˆ
x2x15
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A
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x16x15
x3−x15
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x15
x3−x15
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a
Dx7−F
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x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
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A
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tx12−
B
A
x8 (37)
Γ19 =
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x11x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
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x2x15
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x5x15
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x16x15
x3−x15 +x16
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DF Rˆ
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x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
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Kˆ
1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
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x3−x15
a
tB (38)
Γ20 =
wˆ
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x211x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
x14
A
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(1− x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
)
x14
A
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x4x15
x9(x3−x15)
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x14
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Lˆ
x15
x3−x15
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A
a
Dx13−F
x14
A Wˆ
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A
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wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x14
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Pˆn
x16+(
x16x15
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tx18−
B
A
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Γ21 =
wˆ
x11−(x11−
x11x4x15
x3−x15 )
x8
A
Ka/b
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x3−x15
x8
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wˆ
x2x15
x3−x15
x8
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La/b
Pˆn
x16+
x16x15
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x8
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Dx7−F
x8
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x9(x3−x15)
)
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Kˆ
1−(1− x4x15
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B
A
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Lb = (
wˆ
x′11−
x′11x′4x′15
x′9(x′3−x′15)
Kb/a
wˆ
x′2x′15
x′3−x′15
Lb/a
Tˆ
1+
x′15
x′3−x′15
b Wˆ
x′5x′15
x′3−x′15
b/a
Pˆn
x′16x′15
x′3−x′15
+x16
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x′4x′15
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Kˆ
1− x
′
4x
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x9(x
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1
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Kb = (
wˆ
x′17
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wˆ
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′
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4x
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x′9(x′3−x′15)
x′14
A′
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Concluding remarks
Up to now, the dissertation should come to an end. In above, we have hammered at
a number of significant theoretical topics as: (1) why would the intraindustry trade
and intraindustry investment more likely take place between developed countries?
(2) why shouldn’t technological transfer be unconditionally thought to be beneficial
to developing countries and why is research and development still a crucial means
for developing countries to survive a long run development? (3) why would being a
multinational corporation be more superior in terms of risk aversion? and (4) why
is free factor movement and sound social environment instrumental for a developing
country to catch up with its developed counterpart? These questions are not just
worthy of remark theoretically, but significant in toiling for a flourishing economic
and social development in developing countries and the world as a whole practically.
The study on why a corporation would like to keep technological leadership
discloses an almost ignored problem, i.e., developing corporations and countries
might benefit nothing from restricted technological transfer. The study stresses the
importance of strengthening research and development in developing countries and
free mobility of productive factors across the world. Though our worry at the very
first beginning that technological transfer may not help developing corporations
or countries raise their international competitiveness hits the point unfortunately,
anyhow, it has clued to these developing entities why their gap with developed
ones grew larger. We do hope it is never too late to improve economic buildup in
developing countries and technological assistance from developed ones for a bright
world henceforward.
A theoretical model of multi-factors production is devised for studying the re-
lationship between multinational corporations and factor movement. Free factor
movement is shown to be auxiliary to production growth of a corporation and eco-
nomic convergence of a country. We find out particularly that inflow of labor rather
than capital and technology has complementary effect on local employment of its
counterpart, given returns to productive factors, social welfare, and property pro-
tection are progressing and market risk is descending all the time in the countries
involved. The finding suggests that there is Pareto improvement area for a more
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blessed production/economic performance of a corporation/country. Especially to
a developing one, the information may appear to be more important. Optimizing
social environment, and carrying out policies oriented on introducing relatively skill-
ful professionals and experts from developed countries are imposing for its future
economic and social development.
Pursuit of a higher generalization is another characteristics of the dissertation.
It accommodates these forms of international economic exchange as intraindustry
trade, intraindustry investment, interindustry trade and interindustry investment
within a single model. It also provides intuition for other important trade phenom-
ena like intrafirm trade. It is no doubt that the dissertation points out that tradi-
tional trade theory still has its power to interpret new phenomena of international
trade, which is not necessarily the patent of the new trade theory. In addition, the
dissertation develops a model to look into the relationship between market risk and
business behavior of multinational corporations. In the corresponding chapter, one
can see easily how a corporation may be affected by variously sourced market risks
and why being a multinational can better plan for investment, labor employment
and production in front of these risks. The theoretical model is general enough to
study any kind of (economic or non-economic) risk, and is well ready to be extended.
As summed up in the Introduction, the major contribution of the dissertation
is distributed in the following four academic fields: international trade theory, the-
ory of multinational corporations, growth theory, and business and public policy
studies. We can hereby see from the dissertation, microeconomic foundation and
macroeconomic phenomena are closely tied. It is understandable, with abstraction
of complexity, that the way of operating a corporation may be effectively ascribed to
govern a country, since whether a country grows well leans upon whether corpora-
tions of the country performs well to a large extent. Perhaps, theory of public choice
argues a country would need to deal with social, cultural and other non-economic
problems besides economic ones such that their respective objectives may always
contradict among one another. On the contrary, the dissertation has offered such a
case that social environment and corporate behavior is compatible. That at least
can be viewed as a theoretical mirror of that there realistically exists that a devel-
oped country not only has developed corporate economy, but also has developed
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social environment.
The policy implications of the dissertation may be especially informative for
less developed market economy countries such as China, and other similar transi-
tion economies. China is the second largest recipient of FDI in the world, but an
indisputable fact is that most FDI happens among developed countries. Besides
the fact that China is facing large scale capital outflow, even worse, its scientific
and technological competitiveness is falling during recent years. The International
Institute for Management Development (IMD) has downgraded China’s ranking in
world competitiveness for consecutive three years from 29 in 1999, 30 in 2000 to 33
in 2001 (see World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999, 2000, 2001 ). Despite its high
growth rate in GDP, poor performance in its state-owned enterprises, relatively high
market risk and lack of economic efficiency has thrown doubts on China’s quality
of economic development. External positive impact like joining the WTO is help-
ful in raising survival probability (or sustainability) of economic growth (growth in
GDP per capita) and consumer welfare (see Schwalbach and Su, 2002), but internal
endeavour of promoting education and research and development, reducing market
risk, and improving social environment is the intrinsic way to achieve a healthier
and more competitive economy. And all of this is exactly what the dissertation aims
to account for.
Finally, all the four chapters are theoretical, suggesting that corresponding em-
pirical studies can be followed up based on the idea and framework of the dissertation
in our future work. However, a would-be difficulty is that relevant data such as those
recording international factor movement and reflecting social institution are still in-
sufficient. Certainly, theoretical extension is indispensable. For instance, a study
where non-economic or interdisciplinary reasonings can be introduced in the chapter
one and the chapter two, concrete anatomy of social institution in the chapter four,
and unsymmetrical risk across countries in the chapter three.
It is notwithstanding that the four chapters are only a trivial endeavour for
deeper and more precise understanding of the phenomena of multinational corpo-
rations, intraindustry trade, factor movement, market risk, economic growth, social
development and other related economic and non-economic issues. We know realistic
economic and business behavior is much more complicated than current theoretical
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modeling technique can glean. An exerted academic endeavor along the spirit of the
dissertation would be followed up by the author. Our wish would be best realized
if the dissertation can play a role of turning up more further studies from other
scholars and proper attention from countries concerned when stipulating economic
policies and so forth.
As Marcel Proust said, “the real voyage of discovery is not in seeking new lands
but in seeing with new eyes”, I do hope the dissertation can provide such “new eyes”
to the theory of multinational corporations.
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